Diplomacy

DIPLOMACY

By

HAROLD NICOLSON

OXFORD UNIVEJISITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

First published in 1939 and reprinted in 1939 {twice) and 1942

FEINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

CHAP.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Author’s Note . . • . . 7

I . Origins of Organized Diplomacy * • 9

II The DEVELOPivffiNT of Diplomatic Theory 34

III The Transition from the Old Diplomacy

to the New 56

IV Democratic Diplomacy . . . .80

V The Ideal Diplomatist . * .104

VI Types of European Diplomacy T . *127

VII Recent Changes in Diplomatic Practice 154

VIII Points of Diplomatic Procedure . . 178

IX The Foreign Service . • • , 202

• *

fC Diplomatic Language . . • • 226

Bibliography . • • • .251

Index

^53

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO

HORACE RUMBOLD

AN IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

AUTHOR^S NOTE

Since this book was first published Nazi diplomacy
has provoked the Second German War. It is no
satisfaction for me to observe that my original
analysis of the purposes and methods of German
and Italian diplomacy has been so amply confirmed.
It is, on the othef hand, a great satisfaction to
record that Mr. Anthony Eden has pledged himself
to the fusion of the Consular and Diplomatic
branches into one great Foreign Service. The
details of Mr. Eden's scheme have not yet been
elaborated, and the candidate for the Foreign
Service should therefore regard as out of date the
detailed prescriptions for application and entry set
out in Section III of#Chapter IX. He should
apply^to the Private Secretary at the Foreign Office
fos information as to the new regulations which
will before long enter into force.

Apart from this, the comments and information
contained in this book remain as valid as they were
when it was first publisfLed.

H.^N.

October 1941.

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

Since 1918 public opinion in democratic countries has
become increasingly iifterested in foreign affairs — ^Their
understanding of the problem has however been dimin-
ished owing to a confusion between “ foreign policy
and negotiation ’’ — ^This confusion - arises from the

indiscriminate use of the word “ diplomacy as a term
signifying many different things — ^The meaning of
“ diplomacy as employed in this study — Origins of
diplomatic practice — Prehistorical orgins and taboos —
The herald and his patron Hermes — The transition ffom
the herald-diplomatist to the advocate-diplomatist — ^The
Congress of Sparta in 432 B.c. as an illustration of diplo-
macy as organized by the Greek City States — ^The
Romans and the conception of ius naturale — Byzantine
diplomacy — ^The more scientific aspects of diplomacy
as impjied^by the word “ diploma ’’ and its associations
— The emergence in Italy of the art and profession of
diplomacy — The transition between temporary and per^
manent embassies brings with it a change from the
“ orator ” type of diplomatist to the “ trained-observer ’’
type — ^The confusion in diplomatic practice which
existed before the nineteenth century — ^The regulations
laid down by the Congresses . of Vienna and Aix-la-
Chapelle as the foundation of professional diplomacy —
The practice of diplomacy is thereby consolidated and
confirmed

•

It will be useful, from the outset, to define what
this bohk is about.

9

DIPLOMACY

• Before the war of 1914-18 the ordinary elector in
Great Britain, in the Dominions and in the. United
States took but a spasmodic interest in international
relations. There were periods, of course, when
foreign policy became the subject of party, and even
of platform, controversy. Yet for the most part
the public were uninterested either in the principles
of foreign policy or in the methods and agencies by
and through which that policy was executed.
There was the assumption that the foundations of
foreign policy were based upon changeless national
and_ imperial necessities and that, as such, they
stood outside the arena of party conflict. There
was a feeling that foreign affairs were a specialized
and esoteric study, the secrets of which lay beyond
the scope of the ordinary layman^s experience or
judgment. And there was thus a tendency to leave
the conduct of foreign policy to the Cabinet an<f
its attendant experts and to trust them to maintain
national ‘‘ rights and interests ” by such methods,
and by such combinations, as might appear to
them at the time to be feasible and expedient.

Implicit in this state of public indifference was
the confidence that successive Governments would
do 4 heir utmost to preserve the greatest of all
national interests, namely peace. And if a situ-
ation arose in which the vital liberties, rights',
possessions or interests of the country were menaced
by any threat of external force, the majority of
10

ORIGINS OF ORGANIZED DITpLOMACY

the country would support the Government in its
determination to resist that menace by the use of
military and naval power.

The war of I9I4-I8 did much to change this
negative or acquiescent attitude. On the one hand
it was realized that a country might be committed
(without its full knowledge, deliberation and
approval) to policies involving definite pledges to
foreign Powers. Ai^ that if a major crisis arose,
the people might be faced overnight by the alter-
native of having either to repudiate promises
which had been made in their name, or else to
plunge into hostilities. On the other hand it was
known that modern warfare is not confined in its
effects to those professional soldiers and^ sailors
who of their own free will have selected the pro-
fession of arms ; but that it entails upon every
individual citizen anxious ordeals, heavy anxieties
and appalling dangers.

It was the realization of these two facts which, '
after the War, encouraged the ordinary elector in
democtatic countries to adopt towards international
problems an attitude of less easy-going acquiescence,
of better informed criticism, and of more continuous
alertness. This was a valuable devel&pment. ^Yet
in approaching this new, this intricate and^ this
perplexing study, the mind of the general public
became ^cc|nfused. Their alertness took the form
of anxiety ; their criticism manifested itself all too

II

DIPLOMACY

♦often -in shapes of exaggerated suspicion ; and their
attention became straii\ed. *

One of the main causes of this anxious bewilder-
ment was the mistake made by the public in con-
fusing policy with negotiation and in calling the
two branches of their subject by the same ill-
favoured name of “ Diplomacy.’’ They failed to
distinguish between what might be called the
‘legislative” aspect of the ^problem and what
might be called its “ executive ” aspect. For
whereas “ foreign policy ” in democratic countries
should be a matter for the Cabinet to decide with
the approval of the elected representatives of the
people ; the execution of that policy, whether we
calt it “ diplomacy ” or “ negotiation,” should
generally be left to professionals of experience and
discretion.

This distinction is in# fact vital to any sound
democratic control of foreign policy. Iij domestic
affairs, in which the public have the accumulated
experience of many generations, the distinction
causes no difEculty. A budget or an education
bill is framed by the responsible Minister in
consultation with his departmental experts ; it is
the® discussed by the Cabinet as a whole and
subrnitted to Parliament for deliberation and
decision ; and th^eafter it is handed over to the
executive for execution. Public interest is rightly
focused upon the early deliberative stages during
12

ORIGINS 6F organized MPLOMACY

which the “ policy ’’ is being framed and decided ;
the subsequent “ executive stage/’ during which
it is being carried out, affects them less immediately.
In foreign affairs, however, the electorate have not
as yet acquired the habit of making this convenient
distinction ; and their failure to acquire this habit
is largely due to the continuous misuse of this
word- “ diplomacy ” as implying both the framing
of foreign policy and its execution.

It is thus essential, at the outset of this study,
to define what the word “ diplomacy ” really
means and in what sense, or senses, it will be used
in the pages that follow.

Il

In current language this word “ diplomacy ” is
carelessly taken to denote several quite different
things. At one moment jt is employed as a synonym
for ‘‘foreign policy,” as when we say “British
djj>lomacy in the Near East has been lacking in
yigour.” At another moment it signifies “ negqtS?-
ation,” as when we say “ the problem is one' which
might well be solved by diplomacy.” More
specifically, the word ''denotes the processes and
machinery by which such negotiation is carrie4 out.
A fourth meaning is that of a branch of the Foreign
Service, as when one says “ my nephew is working
for diplomacy.” And a fifth interpretation which
this unfortunate word^is made to carry is that o5.

13

DIPLOMACY

an abstract quality or gift, which, in its best sense,
implies skill in the conduct of international negoti-
ation ; and, in its worst sense, implies the more
guileful aspects of tact.

These five interpretations are, in English-
speaking countries, used indiscriminately, with the
result that there are few branches of politics which
have been exposed to such confusion of thought.
If, for instance, the word “ army ’’ were used to
mean the exercise of power, the art of strategy,
the science of”tactics, the profession of a soldier
and the combative instincts of man — ^we should
expect public discussion on military matters to
lead to much misunderstanding.

The purpose of this monograph is to describe,
in simple but precise forms, what diplomacy is and
what it is not. In the first two chapters a short
sketch will be given of the origins and evolution of
diplomatic practice and theory. The purpose of
this historical review will be to show that clipfomacy
Is neither the invention nor the pastime of some
particular political system, but is an essential
element in any reasonable relation between man
and man and between Cation and nation. An
exaqjination will follow of recent modifications in
diplomatic methods, with special reference to the
probFems of ‘‘ open ’’ and “ secret ’’ diplomacy
and to the difficulty of combining efficient diplo-
^macy with democratic contjpol. ' Other sections will

H

OKIGINS m O^IGANIZED DJPLOMACY

deal with the actual functioning of modem diplo-
macy, with the relation between diplomacy and
commerce, with the organisation and administration
of the Foreign Service, with diplomacy by Con-
ference and with the League of Nations as an
instrument of negotiation. At the end a reasoned
catalogue will be given of current diplomatic
phrases such as may assist the student in under-
standing the technical language (it is something
more than mere Jargon) which diplomacy has
evolved.

Yet before embarking upon so wide a field of
examination, it is, as has been said, necessary to
define in what sense, or senses, the word ‘‘ diplo-
macy ” will be used in this study. I propose to
employ the definition given by the Oxford English
Dictionary. It is as follows :

“ Diplomacy is the management of international
relations . by negotiation ; the method by which
th^se relations are adjusted and managed by ambas-
sadors and envoys ; the business or art of the
diplomatist.’’

By taking this precise, although wide, definition
as my terms of reference I hope to ^avoid straying,
on the one hand into the sands of foreign policy,
and on the other into the marshes of international
law. I shall discuss the several policies or systems
of the -different nations, only in so far as they affec|;^

15

DIPLOMACY

the methods by which, and the standards according
to which, such policies are carried out. I shall
mention international laV only in so far as it ad-
vances diplomatic theory or affects the privileges,
immunities, and actions of diplomatic envoys.
And I shall thus hope to be able to concentrate
upon the executive ’’ rather than upon the
“ legislative ” aspects of the problem.

in #

It is first necessary to consider how and why
diplomatic practice arose in human society.

I am conscious that the expression ‘‘ diplomatic
practice ” may in itself give rise to that ambiguity
which I have just deplored. By some it may be
interpreted as signifying those habits of conducting
international business which, after centuries of
experience, diplomatists have found to be the
most efficient : by others it may be taken as denoting
those principles of negotiation which are* common
all international intercourse and as such inde-
pendent of transitory changes in systems of govern-
ment or in foreign policy.

It will be well, therefore, to keep these two
shades of interpretation distinct from each other.
In t£e present chapter I shall examine by what
staged men came tq invent and develop the actual
imachinery of a professional diplomatic service.
Jn my next chapter I shall ejjcamine how the general

i6

0RK3INS 0!?' ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

conception and rules of the art of negotiation
emerged as something essentially different from
(although always supplementary and even sub-
servient to) state-craft on the one hand and politics
upon the other. I shall therefore begin with the
origins and evolution of the diplomatic service.

Diplomacy, in the sense of the ordered conduct
of relations between one group of human beings
and another group alien to themselves, is far older
than history. The tSeorists of the sixteenth century
contended that the first diplomatists were angels,
in that they served as “ angeloi or messengers
between heaven and earth. This is not a view
which would be held by modern historians.

Even in pre-history there must have come
moments when one group of savages wished to
negotiate with another group of savages, if only
^ for the purpose of indicating that they had had
enough of the day’s battle and would like a pause
in^wluch*to collect their wounded and to bury
their dead. From the very first, even to ouf
C romagnon or Neanderthal ancestors, it must have
become apparent that such negotiations would be
severely hampered if the emissary from one side
were killed and eaten by the oth^ side before
he had had time to deliver his message, ^he
practice must therefore have become established
even in the remotest times that it would be better
to grant to such negotiators certain privileges and<

17

DIPLOMAbY

immunities which were denied to warriors. The
persons of such envoys or messengers, if properly
accredited, must from the first have been regarded
as in some way ‘‘ sacrosanct ” ; and from this
practice derive those special immunities and
privileges enjoyed by diplomatists to-day.

It must be remembered that in primitive society
all foreigners were regarded as both dangerous
and impure. When Justin II sent ambassadors to
negotiate with the Seljuk Ttirks they were first
subjected to purification for the purpose of
exorcising all harmful influence. The tribal wizards
danced round them in a frenzy of ecstasy burning
incense, beating tambourines and endeavouring by
all.known magic to mitigate the dangers of infection.
Envoys to the Tartar Khans were also obliged to
pass through fire before they could be allowed into
the presence, and even the gifts which they had
brought with them were similarly sterilized. So
late as the fifteenth century the Republic^'of V'enice
^threatened with banishment, or even death, those
Venetians who held intercourse with any member
of a foreign legation. Even to-day some relics of
this taboo**" can be detected in Moscow and in
Teheran. In^ London, and other more advanced
capitals, the process of purification to which foreign
ambassadors are si^bjected is more gradual and less
overt.

In antiquity, this taboo^ against foreigners and

i8

OMGINS OF ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

especially against foreign envoys was widespread^
and potent. In order to mitigate its severity the
practice arose of assigning diplomatic privileges
to a special functionary, namely the tribal, or city,
herald. These heralds were invested with semi-
religious authority and placed under the special
tutelage of the God Hermes. The choice of this
deity ^ had an unfortunate effect upon the subse-
quent repute of the Diplomatic Service.

The God , Hern?es, it will be remembered,
symbolized for the ancients the qualities of charm,
trickery and cunning. On the very day of his
birth he stole fifty head of cattle from his brother
Apollo, and then (having hidden the cows in a cave)
returned to sleep peacefully in his cradle. This
resourcefulness on his part was warmly applauded
by Zeus who thereafter employed Hermes upon the
most delicate diplomatic missions, including the
murder of Argos. By the Greeks Hermes was
regarded "as the kindly but unscrupulous patron of
travellers, merchants and thieves. It was he whG
endowed Pandora, the first woman, with the gift
of flattery and deception. It was from him that
the heralds derived the^strength of their voice and
the retentiveness of their memory. » He caii^e to
be regarded as the intermediary between the upper
and the lower worlds ; yet although he was widely
popular, he was not deeply respected. Later
diplomatists have often^ regretted that someone less^
19

DIPLOMACY

brilliant but more reliable was not chosen as their
tutelar deity.

IV

When we pass from the mythological to the
historical, we find ourselves upon surer and more
reputable ground. The heralds of the Homeric
period were not only the accredited ‘agents of
negotiation, but were also charged with the func-
tions of managing the royaF household, keeping
order at assemblies and conducting certain religious
rites. As Greek civilization developed, and as
relations between the several city states became
at once closer and more competitive, it was found
that the art of negotiation entailed qualities of a
higher level than those possessed by the town-
crier. The profession of herald often ran in families,
and the main qualification for an efficient herald
was that he should possess a retentive memory and
a very loud voice. With the increasing comple:pty
«of the commercial and political relations between
the several city states' it became necessary to
raise the standard of this rudimentary diplomatic
service.

The Greek city states from the sixth century
onwards adopted the practice of choosing as their
Ambassadors the finest orators, the most plausible
forensic advocates, that the community could
produce. The task of these envoys was fo plead
20

ORIGINS 0> ORGANIZED Dll^LOMACY

the cause of their city before the popular assemblies ,
of foreign league? or cities. They were not ex-
pected to acquire information regarding the
countries which they visited or to write any reports
on their return ; all that was expected of them
was that they should make a magnificent speech.

Readers of Thucydides will recall how magni-
ficent,^ and how long, such speeches were. They

will also have observed that in the course ,pf the

>%

fifth century b.c. these special missions between
the Greek city states had become so frequent that
something approaching our own system of regular
diplomatic intercourse had been achieved.

Thucydides, in the opening chapters of his
history, gives us a full and instructive account^ of
the nature and procedure of a Greek diplomatic
conference. He describes how the Spartans sum-
moned a conference of tljieir allies for the purpose
of deciding whether Athens had in fact violated
hqj treaties and whether she should be punished
by war. This conference took place at Sparta in"^
432 B.c. Thucydides’ record provides us with
much valuable information regarding Greek diplo-
matic practice.

In the first place, there was th® question of
procedure. The delegations from Megara and
Corinth made long speeches to the Lacedaemonian
Assembly in which they outlined their case against
Athens.'* They were then asked to withdraw and-*
21

DIPLOMACY

the Assembly debated what action should be taken,
A motion in favour of war was put to the vote and
was carried, first by acclamation and then by a
numerical count.

The second point which emerges from Thucy-
dides’ record is that an Athenian delegation hap-
pened to be present in Sparta at the time. This
delegation had not been invited to the Conference,
which was composed solely of members of the
Peloponnesian League. They were there “ on
some other business,” probably in connection with
some trade treaty. Yet they were not only allowed
to attend the discussions of their impending enemies
but were also permitted to intervene in the debate.
And even when the League had voted for war
against Athens, this Athenian trade-delegation were
allowed to remain on in Sparta until their own
special business had been despatched. This shows
that the general diplomatic practice of^ thp city
states was unexpectedly advanced.

Thucydides’ record of the Sparta Conference
indicates that by the fifth century the Greeks had
elaborated some system of constant diplomatic
relations ; that members ""of diplomatic missions
wer^ accorded certain immunities and great con-
sideration ; and that it had come to be recognized
that the relations « between states could not be
managed or adjusted merely by ruse and vio-
lence, and^ that there was some implicit law ”
zz

ORIGINS Ol' ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

which was above immediate national interests or
momentaiy expediency.

V

These traditions and these precepts were handed
down from the Greeks to the Romans. The latter
were not gifted with any special aptitude for the
art of negotiation and during the many centuries
of their supremacy their methods were those of
the legionary and the road-m^er rather than
those of the diplomatist. At the worst, they were
ruthless in their objectives and brutal in their
methods. At the best, they evolved the principle
of crushing their more obstinate opponents and
sparing the submissive. The Roman contribution
to diplomacy is to be sought for, not in the area
of negotiation, but in the area of international law.

It would be far beyond the scope of this mono-
graph, to enter into a discussion of the difference
b^ween ius civile (the law as it applied as between
Roman citizens) and ius gentium (the law as it^
applied between citizens and foreigners) and ius
naturale (the law that is comrhon to all mankind).
The Roman doctrine oT the validity of contracts
naturally entailed a firm belief in the sanctity of
treaties, and the popularity of the Regulus legend
(the story of the man who sacrificed his life rather
than break his pledge to the Carthaginians) shows
that this conception was deeply rooted in . the^

DIPLOMACY

Roman conscience. The vague idea of a ius
naturale did, moreover, imply a- conception of
certain principles of what we should now call
international conduct. It suggested- a fundamental
idea of right applicable to all races and in all
circumstances. It laid stress upon the duty of
faithfulness to engagements. And it taught that
the interpretation of treaties must be based, not
upon the mere letter of the bond, but upon cpn-
siderations of equity and reason.

Valuable, and indeed vital, as these contributions
were, they “were contributions rather to the theory
of diplomacy than to its practice. The Roman
system did, as will be seen later, create the pro-
fession of trained archivists, who were specialists in:
diplomatic precedents and procedure. _Yet once
they achieved supremacy, their relations with other
countries were conducted from the colonial and^
administrative point of view, rather than from the
diplomatic point of view. They did little,^ in
fact, to create an expert body of trained negotiators.

It was during the later stages of the Roman
Empire that the necessity for the art of negotiation,
or of diplomacy proper,® made itself felt. The
Byzantine Emperors exercised this art with con-
summate ingenuity. They devised three main
methods. The first was to weaken the barbarians
by fomenting rivalry between them. The second
was to purchase the friendship of frontier tribes
24

ORIGINS 01?' ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

and peoples by subsidies and flattery. And the
third method was to convert the heathen to the
Christian faith. It ws by the concurrent employ-
ment of these three methods that Justinian was
able to extend his influence over the Sudan, Arabia
and Abyssinia and to keep at bay the tribes of the
Black Sea and the Caucasus. Similar methods
were adopted at a later stage of Byzantine history
when the menace came from the Bulgarians, the
Magyars and the Russians.

The constant efforts of the later Emperors to
supplement their waning physical strength by
diplomatic arrangements, and the particular methods
which they adopted, introduced a new element into
the practice of diplomacy. The method of playing
off neighbouring despots one against the other
rendered it essential that the Government at
Constantinople should be fully informed of the
ambitions, weaknesses and resources of those with
w^m they hoped to deal. It thus arose that the
envoys of the Byzantine Emperors were instructed,
not merely to represent the interests of the Empire
at the courts of these barbaric despots, but also
to furnish full reports ^ to the internal situation
in foreign countries and the relation of those
countries towards each other. For such purposes,
qualities other than those of the herald or the
orator were needed. What was required were
men of ^trained powers of observation, long experi-
^5

DIPLOMACY

ence and ^sound judgment. It was in this manner
that the type or character of the professional
diplomatist gradually evolved. Even as the orator
type replaced the primitive herald type, so also
did the orator give way to the trained observer.

VI

This evolution was a slow process. It was not
until the fifteenth century, when the Italian States
began to appoint permaneift Ambassadors, that
diplomacy as a profession can be said to have been
generally recognized. And even then it was not till
after 1815 that the status and rules of this profession
were established by international agreement.

.Meanwhile, however — and concurrently with this
evolution from the herald to the orator and the
orator to the professional diplomatist — a further
factor had gradually emerged. This factor was
connected in a curious way with the origin of the
word diplomacy itself. ^

That word is derived from the Greek verb
diploun ” meaning “ to fold.^’ In the days of
the Roman Empire all passports, passes along
imperial roads and way-bills were stamped on
double metal plates, folded and sewn together in a
particular manner. These metal passes were called
“ diplomas.’’ At a later date this
was extended to cover other and lessi^^^:
official documents, especially those conferring
26

ORIGINS OB organized Dlif^OMACY

privileges or embodying arrangements with foreign
communities or tribes. As these treaties accumu-
lated, the* imperial archives became encumbered
with innumerable little documents folded and en-
dorsed in a particular manner. It was found
necessary to employ trained clerks to index,
decipher and preserve these documents. Hence
the profession of archivist arose, and with it the
science of palaeography — ^the science, that is, of
verifying and deciphering ancient documents.
These two occupations were, until late in the
seventeenth century, called “ res diplomatica ’’ or
“ diplomatic business,’’ namely the business of
dealing with archives or diplomas.

We do not always realize the importance acquirejd
during the Middle Ages by the collection and the
orderly arrangement of archives. It is no exagger-
•ation to say that it was in the Papal and other
chanceries, under the direction and authority of
successive masters of the rolls,” that the usages
of diplomacy as a science based upon precedent
and experience first came to be established. The
Carolingian chancery was elaborately organized
with a full clerical staff and was placed under the
charge of an official known as the “^chancellor.”
This title (which in later Austrian and Gerrnan
such resoun^ding importance)
delpW^ff^Tthe name of “ cancellarim ” applied
in Komaa times to the man who was door-keeper
27

DIPLOMACY

at the Law Courts. Yet, in Carolingian times,
no royal edict was regarded as legal unless it bore
the counter-signature of the chancellor or keeper
of the royal archives. It was this system which
William the Conqueror established in England.

It should be remembered that the use of the
terms ‘‘ diplomacy ” or diplomatic as applying,
not to the study of archives, but to the conduct
or management of international relations is com-
paratively recent. In Englanti, it was not employed
in this sense until 1796, when it was so used by
Edmund Burke. And it was, as I have said above,
only after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that the
diplomatic service was recognized as a profession
distinct from that of the statesman or politician, or
that it acquired, in definite form, its own rules,
conventions and prescriptions.

The expression “ diplomacy was thus for many*^
years associated in men’s minds with the preserva-
tion of archives, the analysis of past treaties and
the study of the history of international negoti-
ations. This scientific, this scholarly, element is
still vital to the functioning of any efficient Foreign
Service. The British Foreign Office, for instance,
possesses ii\ its Treaty Department a body of
specialists upon diplomatic procedure, in its Library
a highly compete^it staff of experts in precedent,
and in its Legal Advisers a group of technicians
steeped in the niceties of treaty-drafting and inter-
28

ORIGINS OF^ ORGANIZED DIPLOMACY

national law. Without such a staff of historical
and legal. experts precedents would be overlooked
and inaccuracies might be committed. It is thus
important to emphasize what might be called the
scholarly or technical origins of diplomatic practice.

The herald conception of the diplomatist waned
with the realization that what was needed was some-
thing more than a stentorian voice ; the orator
conception waned when it was realized that it was
not sufficient to send a gifted advocate but that the
services of a trained observer of foreign conditions
were essential to the correct estimation of policy.
Yet, in spite of the Byzantine experiment, it was
only gradually that the diplomatist, the legate or
the “ orator ’’ (as he was for long called) camfe
to be permanent features in international relations.

In the dark ages, and especially in feudal Europe,
‘there was little opportui^ty for any orderly or
established^ system of international contacts.
Mojjern diplomacy as we understand it (meaning
by that not only the art of negotiation but the
technicians by whom that art is practised) arose
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in
Italy. It may have been regrettable that Italy
should have become the mother of (Organized .or
professional diplomacy ; but it was also inevitable.
The Italian city states stood .cfUtside the main
feudal system ; they were interconnected by count-
less common interests as well as sundered by
29

diplomacy"

ferocious rivalries ; they were constantly engaged
in a competition for power and preoccupied by
those combinations and alliances which might
render that power , predominant. It was thus in
Italy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
that the diplomatist-statesman arose.

Florence could boast of such Ambassadors as
Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio or, at a later stage,
of Machiavelli and Guicciardini. It is none the
less difficult to define with exactitude when and
where the vital step was taken between the tem-
porary mission and the permanent Embassy or
Legation. Scholars have identified the first experi-
ment in permanent representation with the legatine
system of the Holy See. No convincing proof can
be adduced for such an origin. The first recorded
permanent mission is that established at Genoa in
1455 by Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan. Five^
years later the Duke of Savoy sent Ei^seb^o Mar-
garia, archdeacon of Vercelli, to be his perm^ent
representative in Rome. In 1496 Venice appointed
two merchants then resident in London as “ mh-
ambasciatores on the ground that the way to
the British Isles is very fong and very dangerous.”
And a few 5^ears later permanent Embassies of the
Italian States were , established in London, Paris
and at the Cou'rt of Charles V. Other powers
imitated this example. In 1519 Sir Thomas Boleyn
and Dr. West were sent to Paris as permanent

30

ORIGINS OF* ORGANIZED DIPiOMACY'

British Ambassadors. And eventually Francis I
of France devised something like a permanent
diplomatic machinery.

Three centuries elapsed, however, before any
diplomatic hierarchy was definitely established or
recognized. In the Middle Ages diplomatic repre-
sentatives were called by all manner of different
names— legates, orators, nuncios, commisars, pro-
curators, agents or ambassadors. Gradually two
distinct classes came* to be recognized. There
was the ambassador who then, as now, was in
theory the personal representative of the head of
his own state. This representative quality led
to endless complications. He was supposed to
represent in his own person the status and dignity
of his sovereign. This entailed an acute pre-
occupation with precedence and many unseemly
wrangles, pushings and proddings in royal ante-
rooms. Even to-day the representatives of certain
minor powers are acutely sensitive to the place
which they are accorded at social functions and
are apt, in extreme cases of displacement (such
as frequently occur in London), to feel affronted.
Yet the wretched Ambassadors of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries were not merely supposed to
engage in physical combat for the maintenance of
their own precedence. They were expected to
indicate by the lavishness of their display the
magnitude •and power of their own sovereigns, and

31

DIPLOMACY •

since the Said sovereigns generally omitted to pay
them any salary, they fell frequently into debt.
Moreover, the conception of royal if vicarious
dignity precluded them from entering into contact
with any persons other than those of royal or semi-
royal blood. Their sources of information and
their opportunities for intercourse were thus cir-
cumscribed. It was found more effective, and far
cheaper, not to maintain full-fledged Ambassadors
in foreign capitals but to rely upon the services of
«emi-ofScial agents. These people were often un-
truthful and corrupt. The importance and influ-
ence which they acquired in the diplomatic services
of every country did not redound to the credit of
t 4 ie calling as a whole.

The statesmen who attended the Congress of
Vienna in 1815 realized that the opportunity should
be taken to put an end to this ill-balanced and un-*'
dignified system. The Riglement of March 19,
1815, and the subsequent regulations of t&e Congress
of Aix-la-Chapelle, finally established the diplo-
matic services and representation of the Powers
upon an agreed basis. Four categories or repre-
sentatives were defined^ namely (i) ambassadors,
papal legates and papal nuncios. (2) Envoys extra-
ordinary and Ministers plenipotentiary. (3) Min-
isters resident." (4) Charge d^Affaires. More
importantly, precedence in each category was to be
assessed, not upon the highly controvtirsial basis
32

ORIGINS Of organized diplomacy

of the relative status and importance of the Ambas-
sador's own sovereign, but upon the more demon-
strable fact of the priority of his own appointment.
Under this system the senior Ambassador, or in
other words the Ambassador who had been longest
at the post, became the doyen or dean of the diplo-
matic body. The other Ambassadors took their
precedence below him in their correct chronological
order. By this means all acute wrangles about
precedence were avcfided.

By 1815 therefore the Diplomatic Services of the
nations had been recognized as a distinct branch
of the public service in each country. A definite
profession had been established, possessing its own
hierarchy and rules, and destined, as will be seen
later, to evolve its own freemasonry and con-
ventions. In subsequent chapters the actual func-
tioning of this machinery will be described. The
present chapter is intended only to suggest-the slow
processes by which this machinery was evolved.
In*the next chapter an endeavour will be made to
indicate the development of diplomatic theory as
an adjunct to diplomatic practice.

CHAPTER 11

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY

Professor Mowat’s three stages — ^These throw too little
emphasis upon the continuity of diplomatic theory —
The influence of International Law — Definition of what
is meant by progress in diplomatic theory — ^The Greek
contribution to that progress — ^Arbitration and the
Amphictyonic Councj^ls — Reasons for their failure — ^The
Roman contribution mainly legal and colonial — ^The
Byzantine and resultant Italian theories as a reaction
against the development of sound diplomatic theory —
Effect of this — Sir Henry Wotton and Machiavelli — Is
" moral ” diplomacy inseparable from overwhelming
physical power ? — ^The influence of common sense —
This arose from commercial contacts — ^The danger of
estimating diplomatic theory solely from the ethical
point of view — ^The immense influence of trade and
commerce upon the art of negotiation — ^The^ feudal or
warrior conception as contrasted with the bourgeois or
■“shop-keeper conception — ^The dangers and illusions^ to
which each of these conceptions is subject — Nature of
the difference between them.

Professor Mowat, in his valuable book, Diplo^
macy and Peace^ distinguishes three periods in the
development “*of diplomatic theory in Europe. The
first of his periods runs from 476 to 1475 and covers
the dark ages when diplomacy was wholly dis-
organized, The second period runs from 1473 to
1914 and represents that phase in history when
34

THE DEVELOPSfENT OF OIPLOSJCATIC THEORY *

diplomatic theory followed the system of policy
known jas the “ European States system/’ The
third period is that which was inaugurated by
President Wilson, and from which what is some-
times known as “ democratic diplomacy ” has arisen.

Professor Mowat’s work was published in 1935
— that is before the League of Nations had fallen
into discredit and before the full eifficacy of anti-
democratic diplomacy had become apparent. It
may be doubted v^ether, in this year 1938, the
Professor would feel so optimistic regarding his
third category. It might now appear that the new
gospel preached by President Wilson was neither
so new nor so powerful as was at one time believed.
The Wilson doctrine may be regarded by subse-
quent generations, not as the opening words of a
new chapter in diplomatic theory, but as a footnote
to the nineteenth-century conflict between the
conception of a community of human interests and
the conception of exclusive national rights. ,

In examining the emergence and development
of diplomatic theory (by which I mean a generally
accepted idea of the principles and methods of
international conduct and negotiation) I shall avoid
dividing my subject into distinct phases or cate-
gories and shall concentrate upon the continuity
of this development rather thaii upon the sudden
spurts and long retardations by which it has been
marked.*

3 S

DIPLOMACY

It is necessary at the outset to warn the reader
that the main factor in the development of diplo-
matic theory lies, for the most part, outside the
general theme of my argument. I refer to the
steady progress throughout the centuries of the
conceptions and influence of what used to be
called the Law of Nations ” and of what we now
call (with some inexactitude) International Law.’’
The publication in 1625 of Grotius’ De iure belli ac
pads (“ On the law of war and peace ”) turned
the attention of all thinking men to the problem
whether there were not certain principles common
to all mankind, the aggregate of which formed an
actual code ” of international behaviour. Jurists
have argued for centuries whether in the absence
of any tribunal capable of enforcing this code, the
word “ Law ” is exactly applicable to what are
no more than suggestions of desirable principle.
Yet the truth remains that the interest inanifested
in the “ Law of Nations ” ; the fact that its rules
and precepts were continuously being discussed
and codified ; and the voluntary obedience paid
to its maxims by Great Powers over long stretches
of time, did exert an e?er-increasing influence
upon the general conception of international
morality, and thereby upon diplomatic theory.

The subject of International Law is, however, a
lifelong study in itself. In a monograph of this
nature I could only hope to touch the fringe of
.36

THE DEVELOPMENT OF D.IPLOMATIC THEORY^

the matter, and since that fringe would certainly
become entangled with my examination of the less
juridical aspects of diplomacy, I prefer to lay it on
one side. In so doing, however, I must again warn
the reader that I am discarding one of the main
constructive elements in the subject which I am
discussing.

If, therefore, one concentrates upon the con-
tinuity of diplomatic theory rather than upon its
discontinuity, one is impressed by the fact that,
in spite of the several different shapes which it
assumed, and in spite of dramatic periods when
violence momentarily became more authoritative
than reason, it is possible to recognize a distinct
upward curve of progress. What is the nature^ of
that progress ? I should define it as follows :
“ The progress of diplomatic theory has been from
the narrow conception of exclusive tribal rights
to the wider conception of inclusive common
intere*sts?’

It will be said that in postulating this definitiori
I am violating my own principle of not confusing
‘‘ policy with “ negotiation ’’ ; and that the
progress thus defined has been a progress in policy
and not a progress in the means by which policy
is executed. I deny such a contention. The
theory of policy and the theory of negotiation are
interactive ; it is not always true that the end
determmes the means ; and all students of diplo-
37

DIPLOMACY

macy will agree that diplomatists have often, pro-
gressed further than politicians in their conception
of international conduct, and that the servant has
more than once exercised a determinant and
beneficial influence upon his master.

n

In the previous chapter it was suggested, that
diplomatic practice gradually emerged from -the
herald or ‘‘ white-flag ’’ staged to the orator or
law-court ’’ stage. It was shown that by the
fifth century the Greeks had organized something
approaching a regular system of inter-state com-
munication. Their progress in diplomatic theory
was equally striking.

It is often supposed that the Greeks took as their
model of the successful diplomatist, not only the
titular God Hermes, but also the heroic figure of
Ulysses, fertile in expedients.’’ Much^ as^ they
admired astuteness, they admired intelligence even
more. At the very same Sparta Conference which
was cited in the previous chapter, a speech was
delivered by King Archidapans which is almost
topical in its realism :

^ “ I have not, Lacedaemonians, reached the age
that I have, without having gained experience of
many wars. There are some among you of the
"same age as myself, who will not make the unfor-

38

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY ,

tunate mistake of imagining in their ignorance that
war is a desirable thing or that it brings with it
either advantage or security. . . .

Not that I should urge you to display so little
right feeling as to allow Athens to inflict damage
upon your allies. Nor should I hesitate to unmask
her intrigues. But I do urge you not to rush
into hostilities at once, but first to send to Athens
some ambassador who would remonstrate with
them in a tone, neither too suggestive of war, nor
too suggestive of submission. In the meanwhile
we can employ the time gained in perfecting our
preparations. . . .

If the Athenians respond to our overtures, then
so much the better. If they reject them, then
after the lapse of two or three years our position
will be much stronger and we can attack them if
we think proper. It is possible even that when
they realize the extent of our rearmament, backed
as it ‘will be by equally forceful representations,
they will be disposed to give way. ...

Nor should we, in a single day’s debate of this'
kind, come to a decision which may involve the
lives and fortunes of our countrymen and in which
our national honour is deeply involved. We must
make our decision after calm deliberation. . . .
Nor should we forget that the Athenians have
offered, in this Potidea crisis, to give us legal
satisfaction. It is against the law to treat as a
39

DIPLOMACY

criminal a country which is prepared to offer
arbitration*’’

The realism of King Archidamus’ speech may
appeari:o us to-day as cynical, or at least as embar-
rassingly outspoken. Yet his final reference to
arbitration strikes a different note. How came it
that a Spartan statesman, addressing a popular
assembly 2,260 years before President Wilson,
can have referred (at a mom€ht of acute tension)
to the method of arbitration as one which was
known to, and ought to be accepted by, his
audience ? The fact was that the Greeks, for all
the passion of their rivalries, had emerged from
the theory of tribal rights to a conception of com-
mon interests. The collapse of Greek independence
was due to the fact that the latter conception was
not strong enough to quench the fires of the old
tribal theory. But the conception existed and
in the Amphictyonic Councils it expressed itself
in periodic reunions which were something betweSn
a Church Congress, an Eisteddfod and a meeting
of the League of Nations Assembly.

In the seventh century «^the most influential of
these Amphictyonic or “ regional ” conferences
was held in the Island of Delos. When that
sanctuary was despoiled by Athens the prestige
of the Delian Amphictyony was transferred to
Delphi. Although the main purpose of th%se con-
40

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOIvIaTIC THEORY

ferences, as of the permanent secretariat which
they maintained, was the safeguarding of shrines
and treasures and the regulation of the pilgrim
traffic, they also dealt with political matters of
common Hellenic interest and, as such, had an
important diplomatic function, and introduced an
important diplomatic innovation.

They claimed for themselves what would now
be called “ exterritorial ’’ or ‘‘ diplomatic privi-
leges. The several •States who were members of
the league, or council, undertook never to destroy
the city of any fellow-member and never to cut
off its water supply either in war or peace. Should
any member violate this article of their covenant
he would automatically become an enemy of all
other members who pledged themselves to go to
war against him. And in fact there are many
recorded instances of the Amphictyonic Councils
imposing sanctions upon breakers of their covenant.

These admirable institutions failed in the end
owing to two main reasons. In the first place they^
were never universal and many important States
remained outside. In the second place they did
not possess sufficient .corporate force to enable
them to impose their rulings upon the stronger
powers. Yet their very existence served as a
stabilizing influence in Greece, and did much to
further the conceptions of common inteimational
interests* and a common international law.

41

DIPLOMACY

III

Having reached this first high-water mark, diplo-
matic theory thereafter receded. The Greek City
States werer unable to live up to the standards of
that comity of nations which they had themselves
invented. Power triumphed. Alexander the Great
did not possess either the Amphictyonic or the
league spirit. Co-operation gave way to sub-
ordination. Liberties were lost.

The Romans, when they came, contributed the
conception of international order and discipline
rather than the conception of international equality
or co-operation. Their contribution to diplomatic
theory was of course immense ; for the advantages
of nimbleness and ruse, they substituted the advan-
tages of obedience, organization, “ the habit of
peace, and the hatred of lawlessness. Even
those who most dislike the physical gravity of the
Roman system must admit that it enhanced the
^corporate conscience of mankind. The small, belli-
cose and arrogant rivalries of the tribe or clan were
widened into what was in fact a world-conception.
The Romans rendered not only law, but also
diplomatic theory universal or oecumenical. Yet the
essential benefit which they conferred (apart from
the ‘‘ pax romana ” or world-authority) was a legal
benefit. And to* that extent it does not come within
the scope of a study of non-juridical diplomacy.

42

THE DEVELOPf^ENT OF DIPLOMtIC THEORY .

When, in the later empire, power-policy declined,
there came under the Byzantine system a re-
crudescence of diplomacy in its most unconstructive
form. Diplomacy became the stimulant rather
than the antidote to the greed and folly of mankind.
Instead of co-operation, you had disintegration ;
instead of unity, disruption; instead of reason,
you had astuteness ; in the place of moral principles
you had ingenuity. The Byzantine conception of
diplomacy was directly transmitted to Venice, and,
from those foetid lagoons, throughout the Italian
peninsula. Diplomacy in the Middle Ages had a
predominately Italian, and indeed Byzantine,
flavour. It is to this heredity that it owes, in
modem Europe, so much of its disrepute.

It is interesting to consider how it came that
diplomacy, which in its essence is common sense
and^ charity applied to international relations,
should have acquired such a dubious reputation.
It is perhaps not too invidious or far-fetched to
explain this unhappy prejudice by the fact that
it reached feudal Europe from Byzantium via the
Italian city states.

Admittedly, the standards of European diplomacy,
when it first asserted itself as a distinctive calling,
were not high standards. The diplomatists of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries often provided
ground for the suspicion from which their suc-
cessors •have unjustifiably suffered. They bribed
43

DIPLOMACY

courtiers ; they stimulated and financed rebellions ;
they encouraged opposition parties ; they inter-
vened in the most subversive ways in the internal
affairs of the countries to which they were
accredited ; they lied, they spied, they stole.

An ambassador in those days regarded himself
as ‘‘an honourable spy.’^ He was sincerely con-
vinced that private morality was a thing apart
from public morality. Many of them imagined
that “ the official lie ’’ bore bfft slight relation to
individual mendacity. Nor did they for one
moment realize that it was not merely unbecoming,
but actually ineffective, for a man of honour and
integrity to mislead foreign Governments by
deliberate distortions of fact.

It was a British Ambassador, Sir Henry Wotton,
who expressed the view that “ an ambassador is
an honest man who is sent to lie abroad for the
good of his country.*' That phrase is often quoted
against us. What is not stated is, that Sir Henry
Scribbled this remark as a joke in an album at
Augsburg, The remark was discovered by one
of his enemies, who reported it to James I. That
monarch was profoundly shocked by the cynicism
of his envoy ; < in vain did Wotton plead that he
had scribbled this apophthegm merely as a “ merri-
ment." King James refused to employ him again.

The ill repute enjoyed by diplomatists among the
general public was not due only to such^'chance
44

THE development OF DIPLOfvlATIC THEORY,

jests as that of Sir Henry Wotton. More im-
portantly, it can be ascribed to the progressive
identification of the theory and practice of diplo-
macy with the precepts of Machiavelli. It is a
curious fact that although The Prince of Niccolb
Machiavelli was written in 1513, an English trans-
lation was only issued in 1640, Meanwhile, a
garbled version of his ideas had percolated into
Great Britain and had created the word machi-
avellian/' As early as 1579 and 1592 we find
Stubbes and Nashe using the adjective mac-
ciavelian" and the substantive ‘‘ machiavilisme."

Machiavelli’s main intention was to warn his age
against the dangers of weak government :

‘‘You must know," he writes, “that there -are
two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other
by force ; the first method is that of men, the
second of beasts ; but as the first method is often
insuQicient, one must have recourse to the second."

This, considering the date at which it wa»
written, may appear realistic; but it is not cynical.
It was the distortion, rather than the text, of
Machiavelli’s theory which caused the damage
and created the epithet. And it must be admitted
that there are passages in The Prince which gave
grounds for the false impression induced.

“ How laudable," he writes, “ it is for a prince
to keep good faith and live with integrity, and not
45

DIPLOMACY

with astuteness, everyone knows. Still the experi-
ence of our time shows those princes to have done
great things who have had little regard for good
faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse
men’s brains and have ultimately overcome those
who have made’* loyalty their foundation. ...
Therefore a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith
when by so doing it would be against his interest,
and when the reasons which made him bind himself
no longer exist. If men were ail good, this precept
would not be a good one ; but as they are bad, and
would not observe faith with you, so you are not
bound to keep faith with them.”

Phrases such as these, which in fact occur but
rarely in Machiavelli’s memorable writings, were
widely quoted at the time ; and the public derived
therefrom an incorrect impression that such prin-
'ciples, rather than honesty and good sense, wefe in
fact at the root of all international negotiaCion and
were those which any aspiring diplomatist was
bound to observe.

I have sketched the development of diplomatic
theory from primitive times to the point where,
towards the middk of the sixteenth century, it
begins to assume a modern tinge. I have shown
how the Greeks endeavoured, but failed, to ^tablish
46

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLO^^ATIC THEORY ^

the conception of a community of nations, the
joint interests of which were more important and
more valuable than the sectional interests of indi-
vidual States. I have shown how the Romhns
introduced the conception of international law,
and how they were able by the very magnitude of
their Empire to impose the memory of a universal
State. In later centuries the Church of Rome
and the Holy Roman Empire endeavoured, although
with diminishing success, to perpetuate this memory.
I have indicated how, with the decline of imperial
preponderance, diplomatic theory became Byzan-
tine ; and how Constantinople bequeathed to the
Italian States the theory that diplomacy was the
ally rather than the enemy of force and lawlessness.

The observant cynic might contend that the
course of this development proves that diplomacy
only becomes moral when it is the servant of over-
whelming power, or that nations only subordinate
to the common weal their individual interests and
ambitions when they are faced by a menace which*
threatens all. There is some truth in this con-
tention. The Greeks succeeded in their experi-
ment when they were threatened by Persia and
relapsed into internecine conflict when the danger
had passed. The high ideals of their Amphictyons
failed because there was not one of their members
sufficiently powerful to impose unselfishness upon
the othgrs. The Romans again were only able to
47

DIPLOMACY

establish the rule of international law and the
“ habit of peace when they had become un-
questioned masters of the known world. Similarly,
once that mastery declined, diplomatic theory
degenerated from its world conception and became,
under the Byzantines and the Italians, predatory,
disruptive and mean.

Yet if we consider the continuity of diplomatic
theory and examine the graph of its development,
we shall find that this grapW (although at every
stage of the world’s history there have been mo-
ments, as now, when it becomes seismographic)
does show an ascending line. What were the influ-
ences that made for this improvement ?

The first was law ; the second was commerce.
It is the latter influence which I shall now consider.

Anglo-Saxon writers on diplomatic theory display
a tendency to attribute such improvements as they
can record in the standards of that theory to the
spread of moral enlightenment. They contend
1:hat the advance of diplomatic theory is to be
measured, not only by the increase in the con-
ception of a community of human interests, but
also by the gradual approximation of public to
private morality.

Such approximation is unquestionably an ideal
towards which all good diplomatists should strive.
Yet there has always existed, and there still exists,
a school of continental theorists who contend that

48

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY

the safety and interests of one’s own State con-
stitute the supreme moral law; and that it is
merely sentimental to contend that the ethical con-
ventions which govern the relations of individuals
between themselves have ever, or should ever, be
applied to the relations between sovereign States.
One is tempted, of course, to dismiss such a theory
as ignoble and reactionary and to contrast it with
the shining purity of its opposite. Yet in fact
the doctrine of ‘‘ My country right or wrong ”
makes a powerful appeal to many millions of quite
civilized people ; it can even stimulate such virtues
as self-sacrifice, discipline ' and energy ; and it
provides diplomacy with directives which are at
once more potent and more precise than the vague
aspirations of the enlightened.

My own practical experience, and the years of
study which I have devoted to this subject, have
left me with the profound conviction that “ moral ”
diplomacy is ultimately the most effective, and
that “ immoral ” diplomacy defeats its own pur-
poses. Yet I should hesitate, in commenting upon
the art of negotiation, to attribute its development
solely to ethical impukes. These impulses have
done much to foster a sounder diplcmiatic theory,
and they are operative even to-day. Yet to exag-
gerate their influence would he to distort the
actual proportions of development, might lead one
to regard one school of thought as “ good ” and
49

DIPLOMACY

the other school as “ bad,” and might thereby
expose one to the terrible dangers of selfrighteous-
ness, partisanship, or even moral indignation.

Diplomacy is not a system of moral philosophy ;
it is, as Sir Ernest Satow defined it, ‘‘ the application
of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official
relations between the governments of independent
States.” The worst kind of diplomatists are
missionaries, fanatics and lawyers ; the best kind
are the reasonable and humane sceptics. Thus it
is not religion which has been the main formative
influence in diplomatic theory ; it is common sense.
And it was through trade and commerce that people
first learnt to apply common sense in their dealings
with each other.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to
examine the stages by which international trade
emerged from the chaos of the dark ages and the
feudal system into the calmer waters of the Middle
Ages. I do not propose to discuss the "influence
"^upon commerce of the Crusades, of the Venetian
monopoly, or of the fall of the Eastern Empire. A
few dates will suffice. The Hanseatic League was
founded as early as 1241. jThe Canary Islands were
first sighted^ in 1330. Vasco da Gama reached
India by the Cape in 1497. The Portuguese
founded Macao m 1537. The Italian City States
established consuls in the Levant as early as 1196.

It was in this manner that the theory of diplo-

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY

macy developed upon several parallel lines. There
was Roman law and the memory of a world-state
capable of rendering it international. There was
the Byzantine tradition of ingenuity. There was
the imperial legacy of power-politics, leading to
the conception of diplomacy as an adjunct to the
military feudal caste. There was the papal idea
of a world discipline resting upon religious sanc-
tions. And in and out of these glittering stirands
of development, rat? the homely worsted of the
mercantile conception of a diplomacy governed by
the reasonable bargaining of man with man. Sound
diplomacy was the invention of middle-class citizens.

V

In the centuries that followed (and apart
from technical differences in aim and procedure
which will be noted in the following chapter) two
main currents of diplomatic theory can be differ-
entiated. The first was the theory of the military
and political caste which survived the feudal system.
The second was a more bourgeois conception which
arose from the contacts of commerce. The former
tended towards power-politics and was much con-
cerned with such associations as national prestige,
status, precedence, and glamour. The latter tended
towards profit-politics, and was mainly preoccupied
with appeasement, conciliation, compromise, and
credit. True it is that these tendencies frequently

51

DIPLOMACY

overlapped. There were periods during which
the feudal conception became extremely^ pacifist;
there were times when the bourgeois concep-
tion became violently provocative. Yet, on the
whole, it is the difference between these two ten-
dencies, the feudal tendency and the bourgeois
tendency, which throw a clearer light upon the
development and present condition of diplomacy
than any search for abstruse and inapplicable
moral conceptions.

Let us call the first the warrior or heroic
theory ; and the second the “ mercantile or shop-
keeper ’’ theory. The former regards diplomacy
as ‘‘ war by other means ” : the latter regards it
a§ an aid to peacefuL commerce.

It is not only the aims of the warrior school
which are predatory. The methods by which they
give effect to those policies are conceived and
managed from the military rather than^from the
civilian point of view. Negotiation under such a
system resembles a military campaign, or, at the
best, autunrn manoeuvres ; and the means which
such negotiators employ are more akin to military
tactics than to the give and take of civilian inter-
course. ' ^

Fundamental to such a conception of diplomacy
is the belief thai* the purpose of negotiation is
victory, and that the denial of complete victory
means defeat. Diplomacy is regarded ^ an un-

52

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY

remitting activity directed towards ultimate triumphi
The strategy of negotiation thus becomes an en^
deavour to out-flank your opponent, to occupy
strategical positions which are at once consolidated
before any further advance is made ; to weaken the
enemy by all manner of attacks behind the lines ;
to seek for every occasion to drive a wedge between
your main enemy and his allies ; and to hold your
opponents on one position while planning an
attack elsewhere. The actual tactics employed by
these negotiators are also military in character.
You have the surprise, and often the night, attack ;
you have the trench-raid or “ Kraftprohe ” designed
to test the strength of the enemy’s position at any
given point; you have the strategical retreat at
moments, and the stealthy occupation of key
positions ; yo^ have intimidation, ruthlessness and
force; and you have elaborate containing actions
while your main forces are being massed in some
other Sirection.

It is obvious that under such a system con-
ciliation, confidence and fair-dealing are not very
apparent. A concession made, a treaty concluded,
is apt to be regarded, not as the final settlement
of an isolated dispute, but as evidences of weak-
ness and retreat, as an advantage which must
immediately be exploited in preparation for further
triumphs.

As oppC)sed to this warrior conception pf diplo-
53

DIPLOMACY

macy, there stands the commercial, the mercantile
or the shop-keeper conception. This civilian theory
of negotiation is based upon the assumption that
a compromise between rivalries is generally more
profitable than the complete destruction of the
rival. That negotiation is not a mere phase in a
death-struggle, but an attempt by mutual concession
to ^ reach some durable understanding. That
“ national honour ” must be interpreted as
national honesty and thatf questions of prestige
should not be allowed to interfere unduly with a
sound business deal. That there is probably some
middle point between the two negotiators which,
if discovered, should reconcile their conflicting
interests. And that to find this middle point,
all that is required is a frank discussion, the placing
of cards upon the table, and the usual processes of
human reason, confidence and fair-dealing.

Each of these two theories has its peculiar dangers
as its peculiar illusions. Yet the greatest danger of
all is the inability of the military school to under-
stand the sincerity of the civilian school and the
failure of the shop-keepers to realize that the
warriors are inspired by a totally different idea of
the means and purposes of negotiation. The for-
mer believe far too much in the ability of force
to produce intimidation ; the latter believe far
too much in the ability of the credit idea to produce
confidence. The latter wish to inspire confidence,
54 .

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY

the former hope to create fear. This difference in
conception creates, on the one side resentment, and
on the other contemptuous suspicion.

From the emphasis which I have laid upon these
two divergent tendencies, it will have been observed
that I believe that the development .of ^diplomatic
theory has been (and still is) more dependent upon
the contrast between imagination and reason,
between the romantic and the sensible, between
the heroic and the# mercantile, than upon any
ascertainable standards of moral values. In each
of the two tendencies there exists both idealism
and realism. What really separates them is that
the former is essentially a dynamic theory whereas"
the latter is static. The one needs movement for
its expression, the other requires calm.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSITION FROM THE OLD DIPLOMACY TO THE
NEW

Is there any difference between old ’’ and ‘‘ new ”
diplomacy ? — ^Views of Jules Camibon — Illustration from
Soviet Diplomacy — ^A transition rather than a contrast
— Diplomacy as reflecting changes in systems of govern-
ment — Diplomacy under monarchic absolutism — Boudoir
diplomacy — Catherine II and Malmesbury as an instance
of this — ^The rise of constitutional monarchy — ^The
International of the Monarchs — ^William II and the
Tsar — ^The Bjorkoe Treaty — Edward VII — Queen Vic-
toria — ^The essential fact that a negotiator must represent
the sovereign authority in his own country — ^President
Wilson not sufficiently representative — From autocracy
to democracy — ^Three main factors of development —
(i) The conception of common European interests —
Canning and Metternich — ^the Concert of Europe ” —
(z) The belief in the force of public opinion — Canning
and Palmerston — (3) Improvement in communications
— ^The effect of the telephone upon diplomatic practice
— ^The essential importance in an Ambassador of personal
character — ^The old diplomatist — ^The freemasonry of
professional diplomacy — Value of such freemasonry

All reallje good people speak of the Old
Diplomacy/’ — as also of her disreputable friend
“ Secret Diplomgpy/’ — in a tone of moral cen-
sure. The implication is that, somewhere about
the year 1918, diplomacy saw a great white light,
S6

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

was converted, found salvation, and thereafter
and thenceforward became an entirely different
woman.

Marked differences do in fact exist between the
diplomacy of the seventeenth or eighteenth cen-
turies and the diplomacy of to-day. It would be
a mistake, however, to examine these differences as
if they were sharp contrasts between their darkness
and our light. No sudden conversion has taken
place ; no sharp coiJtrasts of principle or method
can be recognized ; all that has happened is that
the art of negotiation has gradually adjusted itself
to changes in political conditions.

Monsieur Jules Cambon (himself one of the
most intelligent and high-minded of professional
diplomatists) has gone so far as to contend that the
alleged difference between the old and the new
diplomacy is a popular illusion :

“ To talk,’’ he writes, about new and old
diplomacy is to make a distinction without a differ-
ence. It is the outward appearance, or, if you
like, the make-up of diplomacy which is gradually
changing. The substance will remain — ^firstly
because human nature never chang^fe; secondly
because there is only one way of settling inter-
national differences ; and lastly d^ecause the most
persuasive method at the disposal of a government
is the wold of an honest n\an,” ‘

57

DIPLOMACY

It is true that diplomacy is a continuous process
and that its basic principles represent the ^accumu-
lated experience of generations of wise and reason-
able men. It is also true that those who deride the
rules and formulas of diplomacy are apt to find in
practice that these prescriptions are not so vain or so
empty as was at first supposed. Had M. Cambon
so desired, he might have illustrated his point by
an examination of Soviet diplomatic methods since
1917. These methods wer^ at first proclaimed
with all the apparatus of a new revelation. The
speeches which the Soviet representatives delivered
at the Conference of Brest-Litovsk were pub-
lished as and when they were delivered. Immense
perplexity, tribulation and boredom were thereby
occasioned to the patient millions of the U.S.S.R. ;
nor, .when one considers the final terms of that
diktat, was this open covenant any the better for
having been so openly arrived at. The rank and
title of “ Ambassador ’’ was expunged from the
Soviet vocabulary and for a space of time the
accredited representatives of the U.S.S.R. were
called by the ungainly name of ‘‘ Polpreds.’’ And
the manner adopted by these missionaries of a new
system combined, at first, the sturdy ruggedness of
a triumphant proletariat Ivith that other-world
smile of conscioTis moral superiority which one^
associates with all recent converts to a new religion.

As the years passpd, however, the U.S.S.R.

' 58

TRANSITION FR(3m OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

relapsed not ungracefully into the manner of the
older convention. Their polpreds in Iran and
China were suddenly nominated ambassadors,
since it was by this means only that the Soviet
embassy could acquire precedence over the lega«
tions of the other powers. The negotiations which
led up to the Treaty of Rapallo were conducted
in the secrecy of a hotel bedroom, and the ensuing
treaty burst like a bombshell upon a startled world.
And with the waning of their first fine careless
rapture, the style, the behaviour, the external
appearance and the urbanity of the representatives
of Soviet Russia approximated ever close and closer
to that of pre-war Balkan diplomatists.

Yet in spite of M. Cambon^s contention, and in
spite of many other illustrations which might be
adduced to support it, the fact remains that the
development of diplomatic practice and theory is
marked by certain transitions. In the present
chapter I propose to examine by what stages the
Old Diplomacy merged into the New.

II

It would be agreeable, Jbut inaccurate, to contend
that the line of advance front the old to the new
diplomacy has been one from absolutism, via a
governing class, to democratic control. True it is
that in Great Britain the adjustments of diplomacy
to policy^ have in fact followed some such line.

DIPLOMACY

But this would not be true of other countries.
Herr Hitler, for instance, is far more ^absolutist
than were either William II or Bismarck ; Signor
Mussolini is far more autocratic than were Crispi
or Cavour. Diplpmacy during the last twenty
yprs has become more personal, more secret, more
occult even, than it was m the later nineteenth
century. So far from having died in 1918, the old
diplomacy is to-day more dynamic and more
assertive than the new. ^

It is possible, of course, to dismiss this incon-
venient fact as a temporary reversion to an out-
worn and discredited theory. That may be true.
Yet it is simpler and more precise to contend
that a certain political system inevitably reflects
itself in a certain type of diplomatic practice and
theory. Such changes as occur are due, less to
any alternation in ethical standards, than to a shift
in the centre of power. In examining transitions
from the old diplomacy I shall emphasize and
explain this contention.

In the days of absolute monarchy a country,
together with its inhabitants, was regarded as^the
absolute property of the j^eigning sovereign. Thus
Louis XIM and, to an even greater extent,
Catherine II and Frederick the Great, retained
the conduct of foreign policy, the issues of peace
or war, within their own hands. They were the
“ sovereign authority,^^’ not in name only, but also
60

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

in fact. Inevitably under such a system diplo-
macy and policy became inextricably mixed ;
negotiation became an intimate problem of per-
sonalities ; and it was highly important that an
Ambassador should secure the confidence, and if
possible the affections, of the sovereign to whom
he was accredited.

This . necessity led to many shabby expedients.
Not only did diplomatists in those days pay large
bribes to court functionaries, not only did they
wrangle interminably over precedence and status,
not only did they steal official documents, but they
strove by every means in their power to win the
support of the reigning favourite or, if that were
impossible, to secure his or her replacement by
some successor more amenable to their influence.

An admirable instance of this “ boudoir diplo-
macy ’’ is afforded by the mission of Sir James
Harris JLord Malmesbury) to St. Petersburg in
1779. That Harris was regarded as one of the
most skilled exponents of eighteenth-century diplo-
macy is made clear by the eulogy of Talleyrand.

I hold him,’’ he said, “ to have been the ablest
Minister of his time — it was impossible to surpass
him, all one could do was to follow him as closely
as possible.” Yet the fact remains that neither
in Russia nor in Holland did Harris achieve very
much.

His metliods in St. Petersburg were typical of
61

DIPLOMACY

the period. The aim of his mission was to induce
the Empress Catherine to ally herself wjth Great
Britain. The Empress flirted with the idea even as
she flirted with the Ambassador. Harris’s reports
give a vivid picture of the general atmosphere of
boudoir diplomacy :

On Monday,” he writes, “ at the masquerade
given at the Grand-Duchess’ birthday, some time
after her Imperial Majesty’s^ card-party^ at which
I had assisted, was finished, M. Korsakoff came up
to me, and desiring me to follow him, conducted
me a back way into the Empress’ private dressing-
room, and on introducing me, immediately retired.
The Empress, after making me sit down, began
by saying that after her own affairs, ours were those
which she had most at heart and she would be
happy if I could obviate the obstacles which ever
presented themselves to her mind in every plan
she had formed to be useful to us.”

Thus encouraged, the Ambassador suggested
that the Empress might make a naval demonstration
against France and Spain. The Empress remarked
that surely the British fleet was a match for those
of our enenlies, and that if we really wanted peace
we should give the American Colonies theirireedom.
Harris asked hef whether if she were Queen of
England she would make any such sacrifice. She
replied that she woi^ld rather have hef head cut
62

TRANSITION FROfk OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

off. She then pointed out, with justice, that this
was no Russian quarrel and that she saw no reason
why she should risk the Russian fleet in western
waters. Harris pointed out to her that she would
acquire much honour and glory by such an escapade.

She seemed,” he records, “ much pleased with
the idea.” Yet she evaded committing herself.

Our conversation,” Sir James adds, “ having
lasted upwards of an hour, she dismissed me, and
it being quite dark was with some difficulty I
found my way through the intricate passages back
to the ballroom.”

Harris did not relax his efforts. He became
intimate with Potemkin. He gave large sums of
money to the favourite’s friends. He did every-
thing within his power to destroy the influence of
Catherine’s chief minister, Panin. Nor did he fail
to press his suit upon the Empress. ‘‘ Were I a
younger woman,” she said to him, I might be
less prudent.” Harris was a fine-looking man and
the Empress was susceptible ; this was personal
diplomacy at its most intoxicating, yet in the
end Harris returned to London having achieved
but little and being the jpoorer in his own pocket
by over £ 20 ^ 000 .

Ill

The memoirs of James Harris, Earl of Malmes-
bury, do in fact show us moparchical diplomacy at
b3

DIPLOMACY

its very worst. His subsequent transactions in
Holland were, by our present standards, equally
deplorable. Yet it must be remembered that a
diplomatist is bound to take conditions in foreign
countries as he finds them. It is possible, and
even probable, that it was irksome for Harris to be
obliged to flirt with an Empress who was over fifty
years of age, even as it was unpleasant for him to
watch his wife being taken in to supper by I^otem-
kin ; yet the old diplomacy took a heavy toll upon
personal predilections and even to-day an ambas-
sador who allowed his dislike of foreign personalities
or conditions to become apparent would not in
fact be serving the purposes for which he had been
appointed.

With the rise of constitutional monarchy, boudoir
diplomacy began to wane. Yet throughout the
nineteenth century, and in fact until 1918, the
theory persisted that diplomacy was in some special
i sense identified with the person of the feigning
monarch. The Emperor William II, for instance,
was often apt to imagine that he was in some
degree his own foreign minister. He minuted
despatches, he made appointments, he issued
instructions.-! His correspondence with the
Emperor of Russia, 'which was published by the
Soviet Government, is in itself evidence of the
great responsibility which he assumed for the
conduct of diplomacy. He went fucrther. In
' 64

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

July 1905 he arranged a secret meeting with the
Tsar at Bjorkoe in Finland. There, in the cabin
of the Russian Imperial yacht, he obliged his
amiable cousin to sign a personal treaty of alliance
between Germany and Russia. The monarchs
were overjoyed, but when each of them returned
to his capital their Ministers refused to endorse the
treaty. . Much to the humiliation of the two
Emperors, the Bjorkoe arrangement was declared
null and void. For* in the earlier years of the
nineteenth century it was still considered unfitting
that the whims, emotions or affections of individuals
should determine the policy of their countries.

It was not only in autocratic, or semi-autocratic,
countries that monarchs, until 1918, regarded
themselves as standing in some special relation to
diplomacy. The part played by King Edward VII
in international affairs has been much exaggerated.
Yet it is true that he i*egarded ambassadors as his
personal representatives in something more than a
technical sense, and it is also true that until his
death he claimed to be closely consulted in regard
to foreign policy. Nor were the Governments of
his time at all averse •from according him this
special position. His experience wis immense ;
his knowledge great ; his tact unsurpassed. In
his own person he was a most potent Ambassador
and his state visits to foreign capitals, as well as
the conversations which he held with foreign
65 c

DIPLOMACY

statesmen in continental watering-places, had with-
out question an important, and on the whole a
useful, effect upon negotiation. It would be a
mistake, however, to suppose that King Edward VII
ever acted unconstitutionally or that his diplomatic
activities were undertaken without the knowledge
and warm approval of his responsible ministers.

Foreign policy, moreover (and with it diplomacy),
was, during the nineteenth century arid during the
first fourteen years of the twchtieth, not unaffected
by what has been called the international of the
monarchs.’* Inevitably these crowned heads estab-
lished some sort of freemasonry between them-
selves ; loyal though they mostly were to their
constitutional positions and to their own ministers
and subjects, yet they were drawn to each other,,
not only by a common monarchical principle, but
by that very loneliness which gapes around a throne j
Nor was this all. A matriarch such as Queen
Victoria, a patriarch such as Christian IX of Den-
mark, were in fact closely related to most of the
reigning houses of Europe. Queen Victoria was
temperamentally domestic and her family feelings
were acute and at moments forcible. She domin-
ated her cosmopolitan family by a network of
private correspondence which, although in appear-
ance naive and sentimental, was in fact instinct
with sound common sense. There can be little
doubt that her familv sermons to the German
/ 66

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

Empress and to Alexander II were effective in
preventing Bismarck from declaring war against
France in 1875. In all her vast correspondence
there are few instances of disloyalty to her own
ministers or of indiscretion. Even Mr. Gladstone,
who was a not too partial witness, bears testimony
to the value of her family connections :

Personal and domestic relations with tSe ruling
families abroad give^ openings, in delicate cases,
for saying more, and saying it at once more gently
and more efficaciously than could be ventured in
the more formal correspondence and under con-
tacts of Governments.'"’

IV

Yet although monarchical influence lingered long
in the practice and theory of diplomacy, the real
centre.of the machine shifted, from 1815 onwards,
from the Court to the Cabinet. \t was this change
in the focus of power which gradually altered
diplomatic methods.

It is obvious that if negotiation between one
country and another is* to achieve any practical
result, the negotiator must represent fhe actual, as
distinct from the theoiretical, sovereign authority
in his own country. This rule "applies to all and
every form of negotiation. Thus a representative
sent by the Midland Ban^ to negotiate a loan
67

DIPLOMACY

adopt the ideas and habits of the systems which
it represented. As those systems changed, diplo-
macy, although with a noticeable time-lag, changed
with them. It is a grave error to suppose that any
diplomacy could prove effective if it ceased to
retain the confidence and support of the sovereign
power in its own country, or to imagine that the
‘‘ old diplomacy ’’ possessed some organic existence
of its own, independent of the sovereign authority
from which it drew its very life-blood.

Thus when, during the course of the nineteenth
century, the old theories of diplomacy appeared
to be adopting new shapes, it was in fact not the
diplomatists who were undergoing a change of
heart but the political systems which they repre-
sented. A description of the transition between
old ’’ and ‘‘ new ” diplomacy would thus entail
a description of the whole democratic trends of the
last hundred years. This would obviously be
beyond the scope of this monograph. Yet it is
possible to distinguish, among the innumerable
influences which shaped modem democracies, three
special factors which exercised a specific effect
upon the methods and 'theory of international
negotiation. These three factors were : first a
growing sense of the community of nations ;
secondly an increasing appreciation of the
importance of public opinion ; and thirdly the
rapid increase in coi^nunications.

^ 70

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

V

I have already stated that the development of
diplomatic theory in democratic States has been
from the conception of exclusive national rights
towards a conception of common international
interests. This movement, if it is to triumph over
selfish .or regional prejudices, requires the impulse
of a common external danger. It was fear of Persia ^
which for a time ceihented the Greek States into
some form of solidarity ; it was the French Revolu-
tion and the Napoleonic danger which provided a
similar impulse in the nineteenth century. His-
torians ascribe the first conception of this common
European interest to the circular of Count Kaiftiitz
of July 17, 1791. In this circular he urged the
powers to unite to “ preserve public peace, the
tranquility of States, the inviolability of possessions,
and th^ faith of treaties.”

True it is that after 1815, when the danger was
removed, this fine conception degenerated into an
alliance of the victorious powers and that, under the
influence of Alexander I, it was twisted into an
anti-comintern pact. True it is also that the
England of Canning revolted against the Congress
System, the Holy Alliance and Metternich’s con-
ception of a federation of Europe." Yet, throughout
the nineteenth century, such phrases as The
General System of Europe,*^, or ‘‘ The Concert of

71

DIPLOMACY

adopt the ideas and habits of the systems which
it represented. As those systems changed, diplo-
macy, although with a noticeable time-lag, changed
with them. It is a grave error to suppose that any
diplomacy could prove effective if it ceased to
retain the confidence and support of the sovereign
power in its own country, or to imagine that the
old diplomacy ” possessed some organic existence
of its own, independent of the sovereigti authority
from which it drew its very life-blood.

Thus when, during the course of the nineteenth
century, the old theories of diplomacy appeared
to be adopting new shapes, it was in fact not the
diplomatists who were undergoing a change of
heart but the political systems which they repre-
sented. A description of the transition between
** old ’’ and “ new ’’ diplomacy would thus entail
a description of the whole democratic trends of the
last hundred years. This would obviously be
beyond the scope of this monograph. Yet it is
possible to distinguish, among the innumerable
influences which shaped modern democracies, three
special factors which exercised a specific effect
upon the methods and ^theory of international
negotiation. These three factors were : first a
growing sense of the community of nations ;
secondly an increasing appreciation of the
importance of public opinion ; and thirdly the
rapid increase in com/nunications.

70

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

V

I have already stated that the development of
diplomatic theory in democratic States has been
from the conception of exclusive national rights
towards a conception of common international
interests. This movement, if it is to triumph over
selfish .or regional prejudices, requires the impulse
of a common external danger. It was fear of Persia
which for a time ceihented the Greek States into
some form of solidarity ; it was the French Revolu-
tion and the Napoleonic danger which provided a
similar impulse in the nineteenth century. His-
torians ascribe the first conception of this common
European interest to the circular of Count Kailtiitz
of July 17, 1791. In this circular he urged the
powers to unite to “ preserve public peace, the
tranquility of States, the inviolability of possessions,
and the faith of treaties.’^

True it is that after 1815, when the danger was
removed, this fine conception degenerated into an
alliance of the victorious powers and that, under the
influence of Alexander I, it was twisted into an
anti-comintern pact. True it is also that the
Ei^land of Canning revolted against the Congress
System, the Holy Alliance and Metternich’s con-
ception of a federation of Europe." Yet, throughout
the nineteenth century, such phrases as “ The
General System of Europe, \ or “ The Concert of

71

DIPLOMACY

Europe/’ or, more familiarly, “ The Concert,”
perpetuated the theory of a community of European
nations. Even Mr. Gladstone, in 1879, obliged
to place the Concert of Europe among those prin-
ciples of foreign policy which he preached during
the Midlothian campaign :

^ In my opinion,” he said, “ the third sound
principle is this : to strive to cultivate and maintain,
ay, to the very uttermost, whait is called the Concert
of Europe, to keep the Powers of Europe in union
together. And why ? Because keeping all in
union together you neutralize and fetter and bind
up the selfish aims of each.”

It is incorrect to dismiss the conception of the
Concert of Europe as a purely inoperative diplo-
matic catchword or as a phrase designed to justify
the domination of the Great Powers. It was more
than that. It represented a tacit understanding
between the five Great Powers that there were
certain common standards of dignity, humanity
and good faith whjch should govern the conduct
of these Powers in their relations with each other
and in their dealings with less potent or less civilized
communities, Wheh, in 1914, this whole con-
ception was shattered, something of great stabilizing
value, something of durable common repute, passed
from the policies of Europe.

The second great fector in the development of
7 ^

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

diplomatic theory during the nineteenth century
was the growing realization of the importance of
public opinion. To a diplomatist of the old school
such as Metternich the very idea that the public
should have any Imowledge of, or opinion upon,
foreign policy appeared both dangerous and fan-
tastic. Canning, on the other hand, regarded
public .opinion as something which, so far from
being avoided, should actually be invoked. It was
mainly for this reasofi that Metternich described
him as “ a malevolent meteor hurled by divine
providence upon Europe.’’

For to Canning public opinion was “ a power
more tremendous than was perhaps ever yet brought
into action in the history of mankind.” Palmer-
ston was of the same view. Opinions,” he
said, “ are stronger than armies. Opinions, if
they are founded in truth and justice, will in the
end prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the
fire of artillery and the charges of cavalry.” The
force of this conviction sometimes led Lord Palmer-
ston astray. The opinion of the Danes upon the
question of Schleswig-Holstein was unquestionably
“ founded in truth and jjistice,” but it failed, much
to Palmerston’s dismay, to triumph .over Bismarck’s
grenadiers. Moreover, Palmerston, as most British
statesmen, was subject to the Macy that foreign
public opinion is akin to our own ; he imagined
that if public opinion on the Continent were allowed
73 " ‘ C2

DIPLOMACY

to express itself, peace would inevitably result;
nor did he realize that on occasions popular emotion
may, when once unleashed, be more dangerous
than any diplomatic machinations.

The problem of diplomacy and public opinion is
one of some complexity and will be discussed at
length in the following chapter. It is sufficient to
record that during the nineteenth century the
regard for (and sometimes, as with Bismarck, the
deliberate exploitation of) piSblic opinion became
an ever increasing factor in the transition between
the old diplomacy and the new.

A third factor in this transition was the improve-
ment in communications. The steam engine, the
telegraph, the aeroplane and the telephone have
done much to modify the practices of the old
diplomacy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries an ambassador was despatched with
written instructions indicating to him the general
line which he should follow and the main purposes
which he should strive to achieve. Once he reached
his post he became almost cut off from his own
government . and had to steer his course by his
own* compass and under ^alien stars. To-day an
ambassador, "" if he is uncertain regarding the
slightest detail of his action, can telephone within
a few minutes to Downing Street, whereas his
Foreign Secretary or even his Prime Minister is
apt, at any moment, tor descend upon him from the
74

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

sky. It is obvious, therefore, that the qualities of
personal initiative, enterprise and responsibility
are less severely strained in the new diplomacy
than they were in the old.

It would be an exaggeration, none the less, to
contend that the modern ambassador is, in com-
parison to his predecessors in the eighteenth
century, no more than a clerk at the end of the
telephone. In the first place most of the eighteenth
century envoys were terrified of committing their
governments or of having their notes and actions
repudiated, that they preferred to take no action
at all. We remember the sensational ambassadors
of the pre-telegraph days such as Malmesbury and
Elliot, Stratford Canning and Bulwer. The enter-
prise, the resource, and the ingenuity of these
legates were in fact terrifying. But we forget the
other long succession of drab envoys, too timid
to take the initiative, too exiled to be very happy,
too lazy even to write a report. The telegraph
has at least prevented the former type from landing
us in war and the latter type from hiding amicably
behind their own laziness and inefficiency.

Conversely, in an ag§ when personality is again
becoming one of the decisive factofs in politics,
the character and intelligence of an ambassador are
of vital significance. Exactly the same qualities
may not be required to-day as were required in
the eighteenth century. Yet to-day, as .then, the
75

DIPLOMACY

policy of a Cabinet can only be rightly executed
if they possess as their representative on the spot
a man of experience, integrity, and intelligence ;
a man of resource, good-temper and courage ; a
man, above all, who is not swayed by emotion or
prejudice, who is profoundly modest in all his
dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public
duty, and, who understands the perils of cleverness
and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion,
patience and tact. Mere telephone clerks are not,
in so far as I am aware, expected to display all
these difficult qualities at once.

VI

By such slow stages, through such various
channels, has the great river of diplomacy changed
its bed. The water is the same as formerly, the
river is fed by the same tributaries and performs
much the same functions. It is merely that it l^as
shifted itself a mile or so in the sand.

It will always be desirable that the foreign policy
of any great country should be carried out by
professionals trained in their business. Amateur
diplomatists (as the UnitedcStates and the U.S.S.R.
are coming to recognize) are prone to prove un-
reliable. It is not merely that their lack of know-
ledge and experience may be of disadvantage to
their governments, it is that the amateur diplo-
matist is apt out of vanity and owing to the'^shortness

76

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

of his tenure to seek for rapid successes ; that
he tends, owing to diffidence, to be over-suspicious ;
that he is inclined to be far too zealous and to
have bright ideas ; that he has not acquired the
humane and tolerant disbelief which is the product
of a long diplomatic career and is often assailed
by ^convictions, sympathies, even impulses ; that
he may arrive with a righteous contempt for the
formalities of diplomacy and with some impatience
of its conventions ; * that he may cause offence
when he wishes only to inspire geniality ; and that
in his reports and despatches he may seek rather to
display his own acumen and literary brilliance
than to provide his government with a careful and
sensible balance-sheet of facts.

The old diplomatist, from the days of La Bruy^re
to those of Marcel Proust, has been frequently
ridiculed and at times abused. He is represented
sometknes as a man of infinite cunning and some-
times as a dotard of incredible ineptitude. The
professional diplomatist does, it must be admitted,
acquire a habit of conventional suavity which is
sometimes irritating. Yet he also acquires, during
the course of his experience, many estimable
qualities which will be considered hereafter.

More important, perhaps, is the corporate feeling
which the diplomatic service creates., Even as
scientists,^ philatelists and other experts find, when
they meet together, that \he interests* of their
77

DIPLOMACY

calling transcend all differences of nationality or
language, so also do the diplomatic services of the
several countries evolve a form of solidarity and
establish certain tacit standards which they all
respect. A man who has spent his life in the
foreign service of his country has either met or
known by reputation most of the professional
diplomatists of his age. In later years an •ambas-
sador and the head of some foreign Ministry may
find that they were young attaches together before
the war. They thus possess an estimate of each
other’s reliability and intelligence which is based
upon long experience rather than upon instinctive
supposition. At the best, this produces absolute
mutual confidence ; at the worst, it provides the
negotiators on each side with an accurate assessment
of each other’s turpitude.

Nor is this all. As in other walks of life, and
as in other professions, a man is ultimately judged, '
not by his brilliance, but by his rectitude. The
professional diplomatist, as other men, desires
deeply to be regarded as a man of honour by
those whom he respects. One of the advantages
of professional diplomacy tinder the former system
was that it produced and maintained a corporate
estimate of character. It was the Stock Market of
diplomatic reputation. It was generally known
that men such as Biilow, Aerenthal an4 Iswolsky
were not* to be wholly trusted ; it was generally
78

TRANSITION FROM OLD DIPLOMACY TO NEW

known that upon such men as Bethmann-Hollweg,
the two Cambons, and Stolypin one could rely.
With the passing of professional diplomacy this
expert estimation of character will also pass. Nor
will the business of international negotiation profit
thereby.

79

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

Certain axioms show that diplomacy is the servant of
the public — ^Had these axioms been clearly understood
the confusion regarding “ secret diplomacy need not
have arisen — President Wilson and his open covenants ”
— ^The difference between his theory and his practice —
Yet in fact in 1919 democratic control of foreign policy
was secured — Firstly by Article 18 of the League Covenant
— ^And secondly by the new practice of ratification —
Examination of that new practice — Its merits and defects
— ^The main dangers of democratic diplomacy —
Irresponsibility of the sovereign people — ^Their ignorance
and lethargy in regard to foreign ajffairs — The slowness
of democratic diplomacy — Its imprecision — Effect of
democratic control upon the practice of diplomacy — ^The
publicity problem — Diplomacy and the Press — ^The
politician as negotiator — ^Disadvantages of this "practice
— ^How is democratic diplomacy to discover its own
formula ?

The function of diplomacy is the management
of the relations between independent States by
processes of negotiation. •The professional diplo-
matist is the servant of the sovereign authority in
his own country. In democratic countries, that
sovereign authority is represented, in the ‘ first
place by a majority of the House of Commons,
^nd in the second pface by the Government or
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DEMOCIUTIC DIPLOMACY

Cabinet to whom that majority accords executive
powers.

It may be true, as Rousseau contended, that
the sovereign people in democratic countries
only exercise their sovereignty during a general
election, and that thereafter, and for a period of
some four years, it is only a proportion of the
sovereign people (namely the majority at the
previous general election) who actually govern.
It may be true also* that even their governance
and control is so indirect as to be merely vicarious,
and that during the lifetime of any given Parliament
or Administration, the majority may have shifted
from one side to the other. To that extent repre-
sentative government is based upon a fiction ; yet
it must be adniitted that on the whole it is the fairest
and most convenient fiction that the brain of man
has yet been able to devise.

Thejcivil service, of which the diplomatic service
is a branch, is supposed to possess no politics.
Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal
of the Government in power, to tender advice,
and if need be to raise objections. Yet, if that
advice be disregarded by the Minister, as representa-
tive of the sovereign people, it is tile duty and
function of the civil service to execute his instruc-
tions without further question.

There is an implicit contract, under this system,
between tLe Government ^d the civil* service,

8i

DIPLOMACY

The latter are expected loyally to serve all consti-
tutional governments irrespective of party the
former, in return, are expected to accord their
confidence to all civil servants, irrespective of their
supposed party sympathies.

This also, to some extent, is a fiction. In Great
Britain, where the civil service code is immensely
potent, it is much more than a fiction, it is an
almost universal fact. Other countries are less
fortunate in the relations between their governments
and the civil services.

The basic theory of democratic diplomacy is
therefore as follows : “ The diplomatist, being a
civil servant, is subject to the Foreign Secretary ; the
Foreign Secretary, being a member of the Cabinet,
is subject to the majority in Parliament ; and
Parliament, being but a representative Assembly,
is subject to the will of the sovereign people.’’

Had these axioms been accepted and realized in
1918, much confusion of thought and action might
have been prevented. The diplomatists, for their
part, were not to blame, they did what they were
told. But the public misconceived the true nature
of the problem, and in ©their rightful desire to
establish democratic control over what they care-
lessly called '' diplomacy ” they failed, as I have
said, to make the essential distinction between
policy, which was a legitimate subject for their
control, and negotiatifin, which was not
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DEMOCRA.TIC DIPLOMACY

The anomalies which were created by this con-
fusion can well be illustrated by the gulf which
opened between the theories of President Wilson
and his actions. Woodrow Wilson was the prophet
of “ open diplomacy,” and in the first of the Four-
teen Points which he promulgated on January 8,
1918, he laid it down that in future there should
be “ open covenants of peace openly arrived at,
after which there shall be no private international
understandings of any kind.”

Less than a year after making this pronounce-
ment, President Wilson was himself called upon to
negotiate one of the most important covenants
that have ever been concluded, namely the Treaty
of Versailles. That treaty was certainly an open
covenant since its terms were published before
they were submitted to the approval of the sovereign
authority in the several signatory States. Yet with
equal certainty it was not “ openly arrived at.” In
fact few negotiations in history have been so secret,
or indeed so occult.

Not only were Germany and her allies excluded
from any part. in the discussion ; not only were all
the minor Powers kept in the dark regarding the
several stages of the negotiations ; not only were
the press accorded no information beyond the most
meagre of official bulletins ; but in the end President
Wilson shyt himself up in ^ his own study with
Lloyd George and Clemenceau, while an American

83

DIPLOMACY

marine with fixed bayonet marched up and down
in order to prevent the intrusion of all experts,
diplomatists or plenipotentiaries, including even
the President’s own colleagues on the American
Delegation.

I am not contending for the moment that such
secrecy was not inevitable, I am merely pointing
out that it was unparalleled. It proves that the
highest apostle of ‘‘ open diplomacy ” found, when
it came to practice, that open negotiation was
totally unworkable. And it shows how false was
the position into which ^President Wilson (a gifted
and in many ways a noble man) had placed himself,
by having failed, in January 1918, to foresee that
there was all the difference in the world between
“ open covenants ” and “ openly arrived at ”
— between policy and negotiation.

II

The ordinary citizen in democratic countries
shared this illusion. He did not observe, for
instance, that as a result of the Paris Conference,
of the treaties which were then concluded, and of
the practice^ which was ■fliereafter established, he
had in fact attained the very thing which he desired,
namely democratic control of foreign policy. How
,was this admirable aim achieved ?

Until 1914 it was not generally reali 2 e 4 that, even
in countries which possessed ancient representative
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DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

institutions, the control of foreign policy was not
really vested in the elected representatives of the
people. The terms of the Franco- Russian alliance,
for instance, were not kijown either to the Russian
or the French peoples, although in ' certain
eventualities it committed those peoples to war or
to a breach of national good faith. The exact
nature of the Triple Alliance was hidden from the
German, Austrian and the Italian public, although
it was those very tenhs which dragged Germany
into the war. And even so convinced a Liberal
as Lord Grey of Fallodon saw nothing wrong in
entering into engagements and making promises
of which, not only the country, not only the two
Houses of Parliament, but even the majority of
the Cabinet, were unaware.

On realizing that they had in this manner been
committed without their consent, the democracies
of the eWorld determined that this should not
happen again. Two essential steps were taken to
prevent a recurrence of such a situation. But as
the public by then were prancing off after the red
herrings of ‘‘ secret diplomacy ’’ and ‘‘ openly
arrived at they failed to idealize what a revolution,
by these two measures, had been effected in the
direction of democratic control.

The first measure was a provision inserted as
Article i8 in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
It reads as'^follows :

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DIPLOMACY

“ Every treaty or international engagement en-
tered into hereafter by any Member of the League
shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat
and shall as soon as possible be published by it.
No such treaty or international engagement shall
be binding until so registered.

This provision would, if all the Powers of the
world had become or had remained members of
the League of Nations, havef effectively put an end
to all secret treaties, and with them to all secret
foreign policy, of a nature to commit peoples to
war without their knowledge. Unfortunately
abstentions and defections from membership have
left outside many countries, who are now at liberty
to conclude secret treaties as between themselves.
Yet the peoples of countries who are still members
of the League have the assurance that no secret
treaty signed by their governments has ap.y legal
validity unless it be published ; and in this way
they for their part are safeguarded against such
situations as arose in 1914.

The second step which has been taken to ensure
democratic control of policy is a definite alteration
(again in democratic countries only) of the former
theory and practice of “ ratification. ’’ By ratifica-
tion is meant the final approval given by the sover-
eign authority in a country to the treaties con-
cluded by its representatives.

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DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

Before 1918 ratification was little more than a
conventional formula. The government of the
day, possessing a majority in Parliament, furnished
certain envoys or negotiators with “ full powers ’’
to sign a given treaty and with instructions regard-
ing the aims which it was desired to achieve and
the concessions that the government might, if
necessary, be prepared to make. Provided that
the negotiator faithfully executed his instructions
the treaty which he signed was ratified as a matter
of course. There might (as in the case of the
Anglo-Russian convention of 1907) be some debate,
and some acrid criticism, regarding; the actual
terms of the treaty. Yet in all European countries
at least, the government of the day regarded them-
selves as morally pledged by the signature of their
plenipotentiaries ; a repudiation of that signature,
or in other words a denial of ratification, would
have been regarded as implying a vote of non-
confidence and would thereby have entailed the
resignation of the government in power. More-
over, until 1919, such action on the part of a
European Power would have seemed an act of
international bad faith anti a violation gf the prin-
ciples of the Concert of Europe.

It should be noted, incidentally, that the practice
of the United States had always been different.
Under Section 2 of Article H of the Constitution,
th^ power of ratification is vested in the President

87

DIPLOMACY

“ by and with the advice of a two-thirds majority of
the Senate. It has thus not infrequently happened
that the Senators have either refused to ratify a
treaty or have insisted on adding bright ideas of
their own. When, in 1807, the Senate sent back
the Treaty of London unratified and asked for
further alteration Canning described their action
as a practice altogether unusual in the political
transactions of States.’’ Yet in this unusual prac-
tice the Senate have persis^ted ever since. And
the most resounding example of their theory and
powers was provided by the refusal to ratify a
treaty which had been signed and negotiated by
the President in person. I refer to the Treaty of
Versailles.

A profound effect was created in Europe by this
refusal. Although it flung the whole peace settle-
ment into chaos, it assuredly led other countries
to realize that in this formality of ratification lay
the solution of democratic control. To-day the
ratification of any treaty concluded by a democratic
government is actually, and not merely technically,
subject to the approval of a majority of the Houses
of Parliampnt. And in** order to reinforce this
safeguard, the first Labour Government in Great
Britain established the rule that any treaty requiring
ratification must lie upon the table of the House
for at least twenty-one days before being ratified.

Although these provisions do in fact constitute
88

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

a tremendous safeguard against secret treaties or
secret policy, and although they represent the
veritable buttress of democratic control, the present
system cannot in any sense be regarded as a final
solution. It is in fact highly inconvenient and
inefficient. It is obvious that the whole process of
negotiation will be much encumbered if the negoti-
ator on .each side is totally unable to guarantee that
what he gives or takes will be accepted by the
sovereign authority iii his own country. In the
old days, European diplomacy did not, except in
rare and exceptional circumstances, have to face
tfiis problem. Thus while the new practice repre-
sents an immense gain in the direction of open
covenants ’’ it is a terrible liability in respect of
negotiation.

The art of negotiation is severely hampered when
one powerful negotiator demands concessions from
his fellQw negotiators without being in a position
to guarantee that his own promises will similarly
be fulfilled. If democratic diplomacy is to prove
as efficient as its predecessors, this is one of the
problems which it will have to solve.

a

III

It is not the only problem. Every system of
government has its peculiar virtues and its peculiar
faults, which in their turn affect foreign policy and
the machinery by which it** is executed. If we
89

DIPLOMACY

admit that one of the great achievements of demo-
cratic diplomacy is to have abolished the pernicious
system of secret treaties, we must also admit that
it has introduced other complications which hamper,
not merely the art of negotiation, but also the
amity and stability of international relations.

What, therefore, are the particular dangers or
difficulties to which democratic diplomacy is exposed
both in its theory and in its practice ? I shall
begin with theory.

It will be generally agreed that the most potent
source of danger in democratic diplomacy is the
irresponsibility of the sovereign people. By this
I mean that, although the people are now the
sovereign authority which ultimately controls foreign
policy, yet they are almost wholly unaware of the
responsibilities which this entails.

In the days of absolute monarchy the personal
honour of the King was involved in the maintenance *
of the contracts or treaties which had been signed
and ratified in his name. Monarchs were not
invariably very sensitive to this obligation, but
they were at least aware (and Louis XIV was
constantly aware) that ^heir own reputation for
integrity was directly and personally at stake.
Similarly, when the control of policy shifted from
the individual monarch to a governing class, the
feeling persisted that the engagements entered
into by the government pledged the honour of the

90

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

class as a whole. Yet now that the innumerable
anonymous and unconscious electorate control
foreign policy, this sense of personal, or corporate
responsibility no longer exists. The sovereign
people are not conscious of their sovereignty and
are therefore unaware that it is they themselves
who have caused these treaties to be signed.

This irresponsibility is encouraged by certain
popular newspapers, which are apt to advocate the
repudiation of pledges without even mentioning
that such pledges' have been incurred by a duly
elected government, and ratified, after full discus-
sion, by both Houses of Parliament. The same
newspaper proprietor who would be profoundly
shocked were an advertising firm or a news-print
manufacturer to repudiate their contracts, is per-
fectly prepared to preach similar repudiation to
the country as a whole.

Werent to become the practice of democracies
to disavow the decisions which have been come
to in their name and endorsed by their representa-
tives, then clearly the whole basis of international
contract would be destroyed ; anarchy would follow.

This problem is closHy connected with the
second great danger of democratic diplomacy,
namely igiiorance. By ignorance I do not
mean ignorance of ascertainable facts ; it is the
duty of thoir rulers and experts to provide the
electorate with the essential facts in digestible
9 ^

DIPLOMACY

form. It matters little whether the electorate
know where Teschen is or what is the output of the
Skoda works. But it does matter greatly that in
their approach to foreign affairs the democracies
of the world do not all of them manifest that
balance and good sense which they apply to domestic
problems.

Thus, even educated electors are almost totally
unaware what are to-day the^ treaties by which their
countries are bound. These treaties have been
published, debated in Parliament and discussed
in the press. Yet the vast majority of the people
have no conception of their existence, have for-
gotten all about them, and would certainly clamour
about “ secret diplomacy ’’ once they were invoked.
It is only when the honouring of our national
engagements becomes a matter of topical concern
that the public remember, or even learn of, their
existence. It is at that stage, when it is too late,
that the sovereign people clamour for the abroga-
tion of contracts of which they had themselves
approved.

Nor is this all. The ordinary elector is not
merely ignorant, lazy arid forgetful regarding the
international commitments for which he has him-
self assumed responsibility, but he does not apply
to the general theory of foreign affairs that thought
and intelligence wh|ch he devotes 0 domestic
matters. lie is unwilling to make any effort of
92

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

comprehension or to try to understand the simplest
elements of the problem.

In Great Britain, for instance, the ordinary man
or woman has not yet realized that foreign affairs
are foreign affairs, namely that they concern, not
our own national interests only, but also the interests
of other countries. They imagine that a foreign
policy is framed in much the same manner as a
budget or an education bill. That it is prepared
by the responsible Minister, submitted to the
Cabinet, approved by Parliament, and that there-
after all that remains to be done is to hand it over
to the Foreign Office for execution. This con-
fusion of thought tempts them to believe that an
ideal foreign policy for Great Britain has only to
be devised in order to be carried out. They
ignore the fact that other countries, with equally
powerful armaments, interests and prejudices, must
similarly<'be consulted if any policy is to be effective.

The extent of this ignorance, the narcotic force of
ill-considered slogans, can be well illustrated by
two enquiries which I myself received. The first
was, Why does not the Government enter into
an offensive alliance with the United^ States ? ”
The second was, “ Why does the Government
not understand that what the country wants is
collective security and the League of Nations;
and that thqy will never star^l for any European
entanglements ? ” The foolishness of such en-
93

DIPLOMACY

quiries leads one at moments to despair of demo-
cratic diplomacy.

More dangerous even than popular ignorance, are
certain forms of popular knowledge. The pro-
fessional diplomatist, having spent his life in
studying the psychology and conditions of foreign
countries, is very chary of basing generalizations
upon hastily observed phenomena. The elector
shows no such hesitation. A summer cruise to
Dalmatia, a bicycling tou/ in the Black Forest,
three happy weeks at Porto Fino, and he returns
equipped with certain profound convictions regard-
ing the Near East, the relations between Herr
Hitler and his General Staff, and the effect of the
Abyssinian venture upon Italian public opinion.
Since his judgment is based upon feelings rather
than upon thoughts, he is at the mercy of any
chance encounter or any accidental conversation.
The fact that some impatient policeman may
have pushed or prodded Effie that day at Hildes-
heim may well render Ef5e*s parents anti-
German ” for life. The fact that the hotel porter
at Ragusa presented Arthur with three interesting
pre-war pqstage stamps, may wfll convince Arthur’s
father that the Jugo-Slavs are the kindliest and most
gentle race on earth. A slight controversy with
the ouvreuse of a Paris theatre may, within the
space of five minut^, turn a British citizen into a
passionate Francophobe. Even such accidents as
94

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

bad weather or a missed railway connection may
permanently influence an elector’s attitude towards
foreign affairs. Such effects are not the least
disturbing symptoms of democratic irresponsibility*

IV

A third danger is the danger of delay. An
absolute ■ monarch or a dictator can frame and
execute a policy within the space of a few hours. A
democratic government has to wait until public
opinion has digested its own conclusions. True
it is that these conclusions, when reached, are
generally more sensible and more stable than the
somnambulist certainties of a dictator. Yet the
months which must elapse before any definite
public opinion can be ascertained is often fatal to
evident policy or negotiation.

This time-lag between the convictions of the
experts a!id the assent of the ordinary elector is a
disadvantage which would seem inseparable from
all forms of democratic diplomacy. Let me give
an instance. By January 1919 Mr.' Lloyd George
had been convinced by his financial experts that
it would be prejudicial to our own irrterests to
extract from Germany an indemnity so large as to
render bankrupt our best customer or to cause dis-
turbances in international exchange such as would
damage our oconomy. Yet the British public and
the House of Commons took eighteen months to
95

DIPLOMACY

reacii a similar conclusion. French public opinion
took five years. As a result, the whole German
middle classes were reduced to ruin and hope-
lessness, with the consequences which we are all
sadly witnessing to-day.

A fourth danger which lies in wait for democratic
diplomacy is the danger of imprecision. The
vagueness and fluidity of democratic policy is one
of its most salient vices. Not only is there the
uncertainty which arises from the irresponsible
attitude adopted by sovereign democracy towards
its own obligations, but there is the tendency of
all democracies (and especially of Anglo-Saxon
democracies) to prefer a vague and comforting
formula to a precise and binding definition. The
effectiveness of any diplomacy is dependent upon
the amount of conviction or certainty that it in-
spires ; yet if policy be non-committal, then its
servant diplomacy must also be vague. » Thus it
often occurs that democratic governments, by
couching their statements of policy in vague or
ambiguous language, invite the very dangers which
they wish to prevent.

Nor is imprecision thb only temptation to which
a democratic statesman or diplomatist is exposed.
In order that his policy may make an appeal to
the ordinary man or woman he is apt to emphasize
the emotional, dramatic or moral aspects of the
situation and to suppress the practical aspects.

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DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

In extreme cases this leads him into actual hypocrisy,
as when, in defending vital national interests, he
pretends that he is defending some abstract idea.
This temptation is one to which Bidtish statesmen
all too readily succumb.

V

The above considerations have mainly centred
upon those changes in diplomatic theory which
have been occasioned •by democratic control of
foreign policy. New problems have also arisen
in regard to diplomatic practice.

The first problem is that of publicity, since
obviously the sovereign democracy needs to be
informed. The use of the printing press as an
ally to diplomacy is as old as Swift and the Treaty
of Utrecht. Canning and Palmerston, as we have
seen, believed fervently in an instructed public
opinion, ^and enormous influence was exercised
during the later nineteenth century by such news-
papers as The Times, Cavour in Italy and Bismarck
in Germany employed the Press for the purposes
of secret rather than of open diplomacy, and Bis-
marck himself was not above fabricating articles
and letters which served the uses of his policy.

The present problem is of a different nature.
In the dictator States the controlled Press is used as a
vehicle of propaganda. In democratic countries
the aim is to employ it for purposes of information
97 n

DIPLOMACY

and education. Yet a satisfactory adjustment be-
tween the needs and rights of a popular Press and
the requirements of discretion has yet to be found.
In Great Britain, where the Press has a fine sense
of responsibility, and an even finer sense of inde-
pendence, the problem has not as yet become acute.
In other countries, where the Press may be venal
and is often^ sensational, publicity has proved the
enemy rather than the friend of sensible diplomacy.

Before the war the problem of publicity was
dealt with by European diplomatists in different
ways. It was, and still is, customary upon the
continent for the Foreign Minister or Foreign
'Office to favour certain special newspaper or
agency ; these are called, politely, the inspired
press ’’ ; or, less politely, the “ reptile press.” In
Great Britain the custom was to differentiate rather
vaguely between the ‘‘ responsible ” and the “ irre-
sponsible ” newspapers, the latter category repre-
senting those journals which were not too friendly
to the government. With the advent of democratic
diplomacy this system of newspaper favouritism
obviously became impossible, and even in Downing
Street a Press Department was installed.

The present British system, although by no
means fool-proof, works well enough. In so far
as news ” is concerned a loyal attempt is made
not to discriminate between any of the newspapers.
In so far as “ guidance ” is concerned, it is obvious
9a

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

that certain correspondents (whether serving govern-
ment or opposition papers) are more experienced,
intelligent and reliable than other correspondents.
It is inevitable that the former should be treated
with greater confidence than the latter. Nor has
the system in practice aroused serious discontent.

Far more complicated than the actual relations
between the Press and the Foreign Office, is the
effect of a free Press upon continental opinion.
Foreign governments do not really believe that the
British Press is as independent of the Foreign Office
as is actually the case. If The Times writes a lead-
ing article which appears to differ from official
policy, foreign observers do not believe that Print-
ing House Square has had a sharp brain-wave all
on its own, they believe that the Foreign Office is
“ flying a kite.’^ Similarly, if one or other of the
great national dailies launch an attack upon the
Government, foreign observers tend to imagine
that the latter is ‘‘ testing public opinion.” This
misconception leads to many disadvantages. On
the one hand it tempts other governments to
conclude that British opinion is more divided, or
the Government more undecided than they actually
are. And on the other hand it leads them to blame
the Foreign Office for attacks upon foreign countries
or personalities which that unfortunate department
is honestly quite unable to control.

The advantages of a free Press are so immeasur-
99

DIPLOMACY

ably greater than its disadvantages that this par-
ticular problem of democratic diplomacy need not
cause anxiety. It is little more than a minor
inconvenience.

A more dangerous innovation in diplomatic
practice is the tendency of democratic countries
to allow their politicians to take a personal part in
negotiation. Clearly there are moments when it
is essential that the Prime Minister or the Foreign
Minister should attend important conferences.
Yet repeated personal visits on the part of the
Foreign Secretary of one country to the Foreign
Secretary of the other should not be encouraged.
Such visits arouse public expectation, lead to mis-
understandings, and create confusion. The time
at the disposal of these visitors is not always suffi-
cient to allow for patience and calm deliberation.
The honours which are paid to a minister in a
foreign capital may tire his physique, excite his
vanity, or bewilder his judgment. His desire not
to offend his host may lead him, with lamentable
results, to avoid raising unpalatable questions or
to be imprecise regarding acute points of con-
troversy. Nor is he always able on his return to
obtain the approval of his Cabinet colleagues to his
statements and actions.

Such visits, naturally enough, are very dear to
the heart of all politi|cians. They are called the
value of personal contact.’’ . Yet in truth, as I

ICO

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

have said elsewhere, diplomacy is not the art of
conversation, it is the art of negotiating agree-
ments in precise and ratifiable form. As such, it is,
on all ordinary occasions, far better left to the
professional diplomatist. His visits to the Foreign
Office of the government to which he is accredited
arouse no public expectation, inspire no Press
indiscretions, and if sterile lead to no public dis-
appointment. He has ample time to renew his
visits at regular intervals and to occupy the inter-
vening weeks or days in informing his government,
obtaining instructions, and pondering tranquilly
upon the negotiation itself. He is not hampered
by ceremonial, or embarrassed by excessive cour-
tesy. And above all the stages and results of his
negotiation are carefully recorded in written
documents.

VI

m

Such are some of the main problems in theory
and practice which diplomacy under a democratic
system has yet to solve. I do not wish to leave
in the mind of the reader the impression that I
regard democratic diploinacy as more inefEcient
or dangerous than its predecessors. Far from it.
I consider it, even in its present confused state,
infinitely preferable to any other system. Yet I
confess that to my mind democratic diplomacy has
not as yet discovered its own formula.

DIPLOMACY

How is that formula to be found ? It will only
be by long processes of trial and error that we can
hope^to adjust this infinitely delicate piano to the
sturdy fingers of a popular electorate. Yet there
are certain principles of adjustment which it may
be well to bear in mind.

It is in the first place important that the electorate
should come to realize the distinction, on which I
have dwelt so heavily, between policy and negoti-
ation. Once they fully understand that they are
safeguarded against secret policy, they may not
worry themselves so acutely over the imaginary
terrors of secret negotiation.

In the second place, once confidence has been
re-established between diplomacy and its sovereign,
it is important that the professional side of diplo-
macy should _be fortified and its basis enlarged.
It is possible in future years that we may have as
foreign secretaries or prime ministers men who,
owing to lack of experience, take an emotional
or sentimental view of foreign policy. It is essential
that such men should be able to call upon the
services of a thoroughly experienced staff. Yet
that staff must also be,, democratized and must
cease to be generally, although to some extent
inaccurately, regarded as the preserve of the upper
bourgeoisie.

And in the thirds place nothing should be left
undone to educate the public, not so much in
102

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY

regard to the details of foreign affairs, as in regard
to those general principles of good sense and
experience which have been evolved by generations
of gifted and reasonable persons, and which, so
long as men live in separate independent States^,
must always govern their relations between
themselves.

103

CHAPTER V

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

The principles which experience has shown to be neces-
sary to sound diplomacy can well be illustrated by
examining the qualities needecf by the ideal diplomatist
— ^What are these specific qualities ? — Some are now out
of date — Others are still essential — ^The basis of good
negotiation is moral influence and that influence is
founded on seven specific diplomatic virtues, namely : —
(i) Truthfulness — (2) Precision — (3) Calm — (4) Good
temper — (5) Patience — (6) Modesty — (7) Loyalty

What are those “ general principles of good
sense and experience ’’ to which, at the conclusion
of the last chapter, I referred ? They can, I think,
most conveniently be expounded if in thi§ chapter
I try to define the moral and intellectual qualities
which the ideal diplomatist should possess. Yet if
I catalogue these qualities in the shape of personal
characteristics, I should not wish it to be supposed
that I am indulging in ^ mere character sketch in
the manner of Theophrastus or La Bruyfere. My
purpose is more practical than that. It is to
illustrate by these qualities what rules and pre-
scriptions sound diplomacy, in the passage of
centuries, has evolved for itself, I ""wish at the
104

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

same time to lay down certain standards of criticism
by which the student of diplomacy may be able to
judge what is “ good diplomacy ’’ and what is ‘‘ bad
diplomacy.” And I hope thereby to* indicate to
the reader that the art of negotiation requires a
combination of certain special qualities which are
not always to be found in the ordinary politician,
nor even in the ordinary man.

Most writers on diplomatic theory have devoted
much space to a discujssion of the qualities neces-
sary for a successful negotiator. They are gener-
ally agreed that an ambassador, if he is to be
successful, should be able to gain the confidence
and liking of those exercising authority in the
country to which he is accredited. This necessarily
entails consideration both of time and of place.
A man who might have made an admirable ambas-
sador in the seventeenth century is unlikely to
prove anything but a laughing-stock to-day. A
man who had been eminently successful at Teheran
might prove a ghastly failure if transferred to
Washington. These differences are obvious and
need not detain us. Yet before I pass to what I
should call the permanent qualities of the negotiator
it may be interesting to glance for a moment at
those other qualities which were once thought
necessary and which to-day no longer apply.

In the admirable article upon Diplomacy contri-
buted to the Encyclopcedia Britannica by Professor
xos ' D 2

DIPLOMACY

Alison. Phillips, some interesting extracts are given
from former manuals defining the qualifications
necessary for the ideal diplomatist. Ottaviano
Maggi, for instance (whose De Legato was published
in 1596), contended that an ambassador should
be a trained theologian, should be well versed in
Aristotle and Plato, and should be able at a moment’s
notice to solve the most abstruse problems in cor-
rect dialectical form : he should also be expert in
mathematics, architecture, music, physics and civil
and canon law. He should speak and write Latin
.fluently and must also be proficient in Greek,
Spanish, French, German and Turkish. While
being a trained classical scholar, a historian, a
geographer and an expert in military science, he
must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And
above all he must be of excellent family, rich,
and endowed with a fine physical presence.

More specific qualities were sometimes de-
manded. Thus we find the Princess of Zerbst,
mother of the Empress Catherine of Russia, writing
to Frederick the Great advising him to choose as
his Ambassador to St. Petersburg a handsome
young man with a good complexion; whereas a
capacity for absorbing without derangement vast
quantities of intoxicating liquor was considered
essential in any envoy to Holland or the German
Courts.

These qualifications are no longer"^ regarded as
106

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

absolutely essential by those who nominate candi-
dates for the Diplomatic Examination. It might
be said even that the old theory of selecting a
certain type of personality for a certain type of post
is falling into disrepute and being succeeded by the
idea that a man who has proved himself efficient
in one country is likely on the whole to be equally
efficient in another. Experience has shown that
there is much truth in this contention and that
intelligence and character are equally effective in
Warsaw' as they are in Buenos Aires. It is some-
times said, however, that the British Foreign Office
press this idea too far and are apt to make their
appointments without regard to the psychology of
the individual or the conditions of the post to
which he is being sent. Such a criticism is, on
the whole, unfounded.

It is interesting also to observe that throughout
the ages opinions have differed on the question
whether intelligence or character, cunning or
probity, are the more effective instruments of
diplomacy. Even some quite modern diplomatists
have sought to justify the diplomatic lie. Thus
Prince Billow contended, that Bethmann-Hollweg
should have flatly denied that he ever used that
unfortunate phrase about “ a scrap of paper.’’
Count Szilassy, in his treatise on diplomacy,
definitely argues that in certain circumstances it is
patriotic ” to tell a deliberate falsehood. Such

107

DIPLOMACY

writers are not representative of classic diplomatic
theory. Count Szilassy was a very minor diplo-
matist, whereas Prince Biilow was the most
disastrous statesman that even Germany has ever
possessed. The general trend of opinion upon the
art of negotiation has been markedly in favour of
“ credit and ‘‘ confidence in preference to
deception. Nor is this more enlightened con-
ception merely a product of comparatively recent
times, ^

Monsieur de Callieres, for instance, published
in 1716 a treatise entitled : On the manner ,of
negotiation with Princes ; on the uses of diplomacy ;
the choice of ministers and enmys ; and the personal
qualities necessary for success in missions ahroadJ*^
This manual, which was regarded as a text-book
by eighteenth- century diplomatists, contains many
wise and righteous precepts, some of which I shall
quote in the pages that follow. For the moment I
shall only reproduce the following passage as
indicating that, even at a time when Frederick the
Great was four years old, the Biilow theory of
diplomacy made no appeal to men of common
sense.

The good negotiator,’’ writes de Callieres,
“ will never base the success of his negotiations
upon false, promises qr breaches of faith ; it is an
error to suppose, as public opinion supposes, that'
108

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

it is necessary for an efficient Ambassador to be a
past master in the art of deception ; dishonesty
is in fact little more than a proof of the smallness
of mind of he who resorts to it^ and shows that he
is too meagrely equipped to gain his purposes by
just and reasonable methods. Doubtless the art
of lying has on occasions been successfully practised
by diplomatists ; but unlike that honesty which
here, as elsewhere, is the best policy, a lie always
leaves in its wake a drop of poison. . . . Even the
most dazzling diplomatic triumphs which have been
gained by deception are based upon insecure
foundations. They leave the defeated party with
a sense of indignation, a desire to be revenged and
a resentment which will always be a danger.

' Even were deceit not in itself repugnant to every
right-minded person, the negotiator should recol-
lect that he is likely for the rest of his life to be
constantly engaged in diplomatic business, and that
it is essential for him to establish a reputation for
straight and honest dealing so that thereafter men
may be ready to trust his word.^’

II

It will be evident from the above that "even in th^
eighteenth century diplomatists who put down on
paper the results of their own experience placed
moral integrity in the forefront of the qualities
which a successful diplomatist must possess. M.

109

DIPLOMACY

Jules Cambon, writing more than two-hundred
years after Callieres, was of the same opinion.

It will be seen/’ he writes, “ that moi-al influ-
ence is the most essential qualification of a diplo-
matist. He must be a man of the strictest honour
if the government to which he is accredited and
his own government are to place explicit confidence
in his statements.”

If therefore we admit th^t the ingenious diplo-
matist is likely to prove the unreliable diplomatist
and that the unreliable diplomatist is certain to be
a dangerous failure — ^then we must examine what
special virtues, under the general heading of ‘‘ moral
influence,” our ideal diplomatist must either possess
or acquire.

First among these virtues is truthfulness. By
this is meant, not merely abstention from conscious
misstatements, but a scrupulous care to avoid the
suggestion of the false or the suppression of the
true. A good diplomatist should be at pains not
to leave any incorrect impressions whatsoever
upon the minds of those with whom he negotiates.
If, in perfect good faith, he misleads a foreign
minister, or if subsequent information contradicts
information which he had previously communicated,
he should at once correct the misapprehension,
however temporarily^ convenient it may seem to
allow it to remain. Even if we judg^ negotiation

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

by its lowest standards, it is evident that the cor-
rection of inaccurate information increases present
credit and fortifies future confidence.

Nor should the negotiator for one moment allow
himself to agree with Machiavelli that the dis-
honesty of others justifies any dishonesty in oneself.
Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister in 1918,
caused to be carved upon the mantelpiece of his
study the motto “ Aliis licet : tibi non licet —
‘‘ others may : you mayn’t.” That motto should
be borne in mind by all diplomatists.

A similar rule is applicable to those who have
to deal with the subtleties of the Oriental mind.
A notable British diplomatist, who had long experi-
ence in the Far and Middle East, was in the habit
of providing younger negotiators appointed to
Oriental capitals with the following piece of advice :
‘‘ Do not waste your time in trying to discover
what is at the back of an OrientaFs mind ; there
may, for all you know, be nothing at the back ;
concentrate all your attention upon making quite
certain that he is left in no doubt whatsoever
in regard to what is at the back oi your mind.”

The principle that truthfulness is essential to any
efficient diplomacy is, as I have said above, no very
recent discovery. I have already referred to Lord
Malmesbury as an example of the old diplomacy
and have described his methods. Yet even Lord
Malmesbuif learnt by experience that duplicity
in

DIPLOMACY

simply did not pay. Writing to Lord Camden in
1813, in response to a request for his opinion
Regarding diplomatic conduct, he expressed himself
as follows :

“ It is scarcely necessary to say that no occasion,
no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an unjust
accusation, no idea — ^however tempting — of promot-
ing the object you have in view — can need, much
less justify, a fakehood. Success obtained by one
is a precarious and baseless success. Detection
would ruin, not only your own reputation for ever,
but deeply wound the honour of your Court. If,
as frequently happens, an indiscreet question,
which seems to require a distinct answer, is put to
you abruptly by an artful minister, parry it either
by treating it as an indiscreet question, or get rid
of it by a grave and serious look ; but on no account
contradict the assertion flatly if it be true, or
admit it as true, if false and of a dangerous
tendency/*

III

If truthfulness be the first essential for the ideal
diplomatist^ the second essential is precision. By
this is meant not merely intellectual accuracy, but
moral accuracy. The negotiator should be accurate
both in mind and soul.

The professional djiplomatist is inured, from his
earliest days as an attache, to rules of precision.

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

It is the amateur diplomatist who is apt to be
slovenly. Even politicians, even cabinet ministers,
have been known. to overlook the fact that diplo-
macy, as its name implies, is a written rather than
a verbal art and the great high-roads of history are
strewn with little shrines of peace which have either
been left unfinished, or have collapsed when
completed, for the sole reason that their founda-
tions were built on the sands of some verbal mis-
conception. Bjorkoer Buchlau, Thoiry, Stresa,
Munich — ^these ruined temples should serve as
warnings to all young negotiators.

Professional diplomacy is not, as a rule, so
liable to imprecision. An ^ ambassador almost
invariably receives his instructions in writing ; the
representations which he thereafter makes to the
foreign government are either embodied in a care-
fully drafted Note or conveyed in a personal inter-
view ; Jin the latter event he is careful, immediately
on his return, to record the course of that interview
in a despatch to his own government.

It is customary, moreover, when an ambassador
has to make to a foreign government a communica-
tion of special importance that he should bring
with him a short synopsis or aide-memoire of
what he is instructed to say. He may read this
memorandum out to the foreign minister and he
may also leave a copy behii^d. Conversely, when
an ambassador receives from a foreign minister

DIPLOMACY

some vitally important oral communication, it is a
wise precaution on his part to submit to the latter
his version of the conversation before reporting it
oiEBcially to his own government. Failure to take
this precaution has led to regrettable incidents in
the past. A classic instance of such a misunder-
standing is the repudiation by M. Guizot in 1848
of promises made verbally to Lord Normanby
(then British Ambassador in Paris) and which the
latter had reported in a despatch to London. M.
Guizot stated that Lord Normanby had completely
misinterpreted his remarks and that he had never
made any promises of the nature asserted. He
added the wise dictum that the report of a con-
versation furnished by an ambassador to his home
government could only be regarded as authentic
and binding if previously submitted for observations
to the person whose statements it is supposed to
represent.

Yet, although the professional diplomatist is
seldom guilty of what I have called ‘‘ intellectual
inaccuracy,’’ his temptation to what I have called
“ moral inaccuracy ” is persistent and extreme.

This moral inaccuracy takes several forms.
The experienced diplomatist is well aware that
human actions are at the mercy of chance occur-
rences and that prophecy is always dangerous. He
is thus tempted, if not to avoid all predictions, then
at least to phrase his forecasts in a Dflphic style.

114

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

The spirit, as well as the ingenious diction, of the
Sibyl all too often furnish an example for the
anxious diplomatist. He prefers to hedge. Justi-
fied, though he assuredly is, in avoiding all rash
prophecies, as all intemperate statements, yet a
diplomatist should not hesitate to inform his
government of the direction in which he himself
believes local events are likely to develop. The
‘‘ heads I win, tails you lose ’’ type of despatch
may, it is true, enable an ambassador, after the
event, to claim prescience by recalling his previous
reference either to tails or to heads ; yet it is not
of deep benefit either to his government or to his
own reputation. All too often diplomatists are so
afraid of being accused of lack of judgment, that
they avoid expressing any judgment at all. In
evading these responsibilities they are omitting to
perform one of their most desirable duties.

This is perhaps only a negative failing, but if this
tendency towards moral imprecision affects an
envoy's communications with the government to
which he is accredited, then nrnst serious damage
may be done. An ambassador is rightly pre-
occupied with the task of maintaining friendly
relations with the authorities with whom he has
to deal. At times this preoccupation becomes
excessive. It not infrequently occurs that a diplo-
matist, when instructed by Ms government to make
a communication which he knows will cause irrita-

DIPLOMACY

tion and pain, so waters down his instructions that
an inaccurate and flaccid impression of their pur-
port is conveyed.

Even if he be sufiiciently loyal and conscientious
to carry out the strict letter of his instructions, he is
sometimes tempted, in order to avoid giving
offence, to accompany the delivery of .these instruc-
tions with such intonation of voice, such con-
ciliation of gesture, as to imply that he himself
does not really agree with ^^the intimation which
he has been instructed to make. These tempta-
tions, and their attendant symptoms, will be
referred to again under the heading of loyalty.*’

IV

A third quality which is essential to the ideal
diplomatist is the quality of calm. Not only must
the negotiator avoid displaying irritation when
confronted by the stupidity,' dishonesty, brutality
or conceit of those with whom it is his unpleasant
duty to negotiate ; but he must eschew all personal
animosities, all personal predilections, all enthu-
siasms, prejudices, vanities, exaggerations, dramati-
zations^ and moral indignations. The well-known
epigram of*Talieyrand, wlien asked to give advice
to a young diplomatist, would be echoed by all
experienced negotiators : “ surtout pas trap de
“ And above everything, do not allow your-
self to become excited about your work.”

‘ ii6

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

The impassivity which characterizes the ideal
diplomatist may render him much disliked by his
friends. In fact .the manner of suspended judg-
ment, of sceptical tolerance, of passionless detach-
ment which denotes the trained .diplomatist, is
often taken by outside observers to suggest that
he is conceited, lazy, stupid, or very very ill.

The quality of calm, as applied to the ideal
diplomatist, should express itself in two major
directions. In the first place he should be good-
tempered, or at least he should be able to keep
his ill-temper under perfect control. In the second
place he should be quite exceptionally patient.

The occasions on which diplomatists have lost
their tempers are remembered with horror by
generations of their successors. Napoleon lost his
temper with Metternich in the Marcolini Palace
j at Dresden on June 26, 1813, and flung his hat
upon the carpet with the most unfortunate results.
Sir Charles Euan Smith lost his temper with the
Sultan of Morocco and tore up a treaty in the
imperial presence. Count Tattenbach lost his
temper at the Algeciras Conference and exposed
his country to a graven diplomatic humiliation.
Herr Stinnes lost his temper at Spa.

Patience and perseverance are also essential to
any successful negotiator. M. Paul Cambon — ^one
of the mo^t successful dipfomatists in modern
history and French Ambassador in London for
117

DIPLOMACY

over twenty years — ^was a miracle of patience.
He arrived in England at a time when Franco-
British relations were strained almost to breaking
point. When he left it, we were firm allies.
Throughout those twenty years M. Paul Cambon
waited. He was always conciliatory ; he was
invariably discreet ; he was the soul of loyalty ;
and he was always there. His extraordinary
capacity for seizing the right moment, his delicate
“ sense of occasion,” the extreme dignity of his
manner, rendered him by 1914 a man who was
universally trusted and universally esteemed. Simi-
lar patience has not always been displayed by the
envoys of other nations who have wished to secure
some rapid triumph and to return home quickly
bearing some brilliant result. All too often these
impatient ambassadors have frightened the British
bull-dog away from its bone.

The brother of Paul Cambon — M. Jules Gambon,
French Ambassador in Berlin — in his attractive
study of The Diplomatist puts patience among
the first of diplomatic virtues. “ Patience,” he
writes, “ is an indispensable quality for the suc-
cessful negotiator. The ^ wind is bound to be
contrary at times, and then one has to tack to get
into port.” And he then proceeds to cite as an
instance of patience and perseverance his own
negotiations with Eiderlen-Waechter ^before the

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

V

A diplomatist may be truthful, accurate, calm,
patient and good-tempered, but he is not an ideal
diplomatist unless he be also modest. The dangers
of vanity in a negotiator can scarcely be exaggerated.
It tempts him to disregard the advice or opinions
of those who may have had longer experience of a
country, or of a problem, than he possesses himself.
It renders him vulnerable to the flattery or the
attacks of those with whom he is negotiating. It
encourages him to take too personal a view of the
nature and purposes of his functions and in extreme
cases to prefer a brilliant but undesirable triumph
to some unostentatious but more prudent com-
promise. It leads him to boast of his victories
and thereby to incur the hatred of those whom he
has vanquished. It may prevent him, at some
crucial moment, from confessing to his government
that his predictions or his information were in-
correct. It prompts him to incur or to provoke
unnecessary friction over matters which are of
.purely social importance. It may cause him to
offend by ostentation, snobbishness qr ordinary
vulgarity. It is at the root of all indiscretion and
of most tactlessness. It lures its addicts into dis-
playing their own verbal brilliance, and into such
fatal diplomatic indulgences* as irony, epigrams,
insinuations, and the barbed reply. It may pre-i
119

DIPLOMACY

vent an ambassador from admitting even to him-
self that he does not know Turkish, Persian,
Chinese and Russian sufficiently to enable him, in
any important matter, to dispense with the services
of an interpreter. It may induce that terrible and
frequent illusion of the professional diplomatist
that his own post is the centre of the diplomatic
universe and that the Foreign Office is both blind
and obstinate in ignoring his advice. It may
betray him, when entertaining visiting politicians
or journalists, to speak with disloyalty and clever-
ness about his own foreign secretary. And it
may bring in its train those other vices of inipre-
cision, excitability, impatience, emotionalism and
even untruthfulness. Of all diplomatic faults (and
they are many) personal vanity is assuredly the
most common and the most disadvantageous.

Among the misfortunes into which personal
vanity drives the frail spirit of man there^ is one
which has a more specific bearing upon the practice
of negotiation. It is self-satisfaction. It leads
first to a loss of adaptability, and second to a
decline in imagination.

Diplomatists, especially those who are appointed
to, and liable to remain in, smaller posts, are
apt to. pass by slow gradations from ordinary
human vanity to an inordinate sense of their own
importance. The w^iole apparatus of diplomatic
life — ^the ceremonial, the court functions, the large
120

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

houses, tlie lacqueys and the food — induces an
increasing sclerosis of personality. Such people,
as they become older, incline to a slowness of
speech, movement and perception which is almost
ah tn to pompousness. The type of M. de Norpois
is not, it is true, a common type in modern diplo-
macy. But, if it is unfair to take him as a sample,
it is wise to regard him as a warning.

It is this rigidity of spirit which, as it settles
upon the less gifted diplomatist, deprives him of
his adaptability. He fails to respond with his
former elasticity to conditions of which he dis-
approves or to ideas with which he is not familiar.
This fault is of course common to all those who
surrender themselves without a struggle to later
middle age. Yet in a diplomatist it entails a real
diminution of efficiency, since adaptability — or the
power of putting oneself in another’s place — ^is an
essential element in successful negotiation.

Let me once again quote Calliferes :

‘‘ It is essential that a negotiator should be able
to divest himself of his own opinion in order to
place himself in the position of the Prince with
whom he is negotiating. He should be able, that
is, to adopt the other’s personality, and to enter
into his views and inclinations. And he should
thus say to himself — ‘ If I were in the place of
that Prince, endowed with equal power, governed

I2I

DIPLOMACY

by identical prejudices and passions, what eiFect
would my own representations make uponmyself ? ’ ’’

With loss of adaptability comes loss of imagin-
ation. In a young diplomatist, imagination is
often a snare. Pas de fantaisie ’’ was the advice
given (fruitlessly we may suppose) by the elder
Billow to his more famous son. Yet, if an older
diplomatist loses his gift of imagination, he becomes
all keel and ballast without sail. He fails to respond
to the new winds which may blow from his own
country, or to the squalls which may arise suddenly
in the country where he is stationed. He becomes
so satisfied with himself that he loses his former
interest in the psychology of others. And since
psychological alertness is one of the most vital
factors in negotiation, a diplomatist who becomes
lethargic in such matters has passed the period of
usefulness. ,

Let me conclude this chapter with the seventh
great virtue of the ideal diplomatist. It is the virtue
of loyalty.

The professional diplomatist is governed by
several different, and at times conflicting, loyalties.
He owes loyalty to his own sovereign, government,
minister and foreign office ; he owes loyalty to
his own staff ; he owes a form of loyalty to the
diplomatic body in the capital where he resides ;
he owes loyalty to the local British colony and its
122

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

commercial interests ; and he owes another form of
loyalty to the government to which he is accredited
and to the minister with whom he negotiates.

There is always a tendency among diplomatists
who have resided for long in foreign countries, and
who have perhaps fallen out of contact with their
own people and with their own foreign oflSce, to
find that their loyalties become a trifle blurred.
They are apt either to love the country in which
they reside with a sentimental passion which blinds
them to all its vices, or else to loathe it with an
intensity which is impervious to all its virtues.
Alternatively they may have become so impressed
by the doctrine that the function of an ambassador
is to create good relations ’’ with a foreign govern-
ment, that they confuse the end with the means,
and see “ good relations not as part of their
functions but as the sole purpose of their activity.
Their mtense concentration upon the work of their
own mission may blind them to the fact that their
own country does in fact possess missions in other
capitals as well, and that the only central authority
which is in possession of all sources of information
and which is able to balance correctly the diplo-
matic position in one country against that in another,
is the Foreign Oflice at home. Personal antipathy
to some foreign colleague may diminish their readi-
ness to co-operate with that# colleague even when
co-operation is the policy of the two countries
iZ3

DIPLOMACY

which they represent. Old traditions, old rivalries
even, may make it obnoxious to them to execute
full-heartedly some new policy which a Foreign
Secretary may advocate. And occasionally, even,
personal friction with his staff may divert the
attention of an envoy from the more serious business
of his mission.

To all such poisons which may attack the negoti-
ator there is one sovereign antidote. That antidote
is loyalty above all to the ^government whom he
serves.

I have previously indicated how easy it is for a
diplomatist who finds himself in disagreement with
the policy of his government to indicate that
disagreement without violating the strict letter of
his instructions. Yet even if he ‘‘ assents with civil
leer ” he should know full well that his attitude
is in fact an act of silent disloyalty.

A more subtle and unconscious disloyalty may
intrude into the reports which he himself sends
home. Even Calli^res warned the diplomatist
against the temptation of telling his own government
what they would like to hear, rather than what they
ought tp Imow. The most honourable envoy is
liable to slide into this temptation without realizing
that by so doing he is in fact committing an act
of disloyalty towards his own government, who
should be told the bitter truth.

Yet how tempting it is, for a diplomatist abroad,
124

THE IDEAL DIPLOMATIST

while not departing from veracity, to make the
most of all favourable fact ! He knows that his
despatches will reach Downing Street or the Quai
d’Orsay at the sapie time as other despatches from
other capitals. He also knows that the Foreign
OfEce ofHcials who have to read and minute these
despatches are overwhelmed with work and bur-
dened with amdety. He knows that (human
nature being as it is) a comforting despatch arouses
feelings of pleasure, whereas a disturbing despatch
causes pangs of pain. Inevitably the harassed
official who finds upon his table six despatches
coming from six different countries is distressed
by sharp criticisms of inertia at home or gloomy
forebodings of trouble in the future. He turns
with relief from the despatch of Sir Charles X . . .
(who writes, “ Unless you take urgent and immediate
action complete catastrophe will result ”) to the
despatch.of Sir Henry Y . . . (who writes, “ Owing
to the vigour and foresight manifested by His
Majesty’s Government the situation is now com-
pletely in hand ; you may leave everything to me,

I need no further instructions ”).

Inevitably the harassed official comgs to the
conclusion that Sir Charles X . . . is “ cantankerous
and wrong-headed,” whereas Sir Henry Y ... is
definitely a reliable man.” And here again
Fran9ois Callfees, so long ago* as 1716, uttered his
warning.

las

DIPLOMACY

These, then, are , the qualities of my ideal diplo-
matist. Truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good
temper, modesty and loyalty. They are also the
qualities of an ideal diplomacy.

“ But,’^ the reader may object, “ you have for-
gotten intelligence, knowledge, discernment, pru-
dence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and
even tact.’’ I have not forgotten them. I have
taken them for granted.

xa6

CHAPTER VI

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

Amateurishness of British and American politicians —
American Diplomacy — ^British Diplomacy — ^A reflection
of policy — Foundations .of British policy — ^The Eyre
Crowe memorandum — ^The Balance of Power — Certain
precepts of British policy — ^How do these affect British
diplomacy ? — ^Virtues and vices of British diplomatic
method — Criticisms made by foreign observers — ^The
relation between caution and timidity — German political
theory — From Fichte to Hitler — ^The cult of the State
and the mystic belief in forcfe as a unifying formula —
Effect of this theory upon diplomatic practice — Sudden
diplomacy — Fear versus conciliation — French policy
and diplomacy — Faults of the French system — ^Rigidity
and intolerance — ^The Italian conception of mobility —
Italian methods — Great Power versus Small Power
diplomacy

In preceding chapters I have emphasized the
continuity of diplomatic practice and theory and
have tried to show that there exist certain standards
of negotiation which might be regarded as per-
manent and universal. Apart from thesQ standards,
which should be common to all diplomacy, there
are marked differences in the theory and practice
of the several Great Powers. These differences
are caused by variations in national character, tradi-
tions and requirements. One can thus distinguish
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DIPLOMACY

types, or species, of diplomacy and it is important
that these distinctions should be recognized. All
diplomatists (the professionals scarcely less than,
the amateurs) are inclined to assume , that their own
conception of the art of negotiation is shared more
or less by those foreigners with whom they are
negotiating. This fallacy leads to misunderstanding.

It might be admitted, incidentally, that British
statesmen are peculiarly prone to this illusion.
They are so accustomed, in domestic controversies,
to invoke the principle of fair dealing and to rely
upon settlement by compromise, that they do not
understand that such conceptions are not always
present in the minds of foreign negotiators. It
was difficult, for instance, for those who worked
under Sir Edward Grey to convince him that
the envoy of some Balkan country did not possess
the same sort of traditions, intuitions and principles,
as he had inherited himself: he was inqjined to
regard them, if not perhaps as Old Wykehamists,
then at least as Old Marlburians. If subsequent
developments led him to revise this opinion, he
would feel that a gross deception had been practised
upon him,^and would regard the foreign statesman
who had failed to live up to Old Marlburian
standards as a man of irredeemable iniquity. .

The Americans, conversely, are convinced that
all diplomatists are - determined to ensnare, en-
tangle and humiliate all those with whom they
iz8

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

negotiate. They enter a conference as Daniel
entered the den of lions, conscious that it is only
their own bright faith and innocence which will
preserve them from the claws of the wild beasts
by whom they are surrounded. It is in fact strange
that, whereas an American business man will
negotiate with foreign business men in a spirit of
almost reckless self-confidence, an American diplo-
matist will, in the presence of continental diplo-
matists, become overwhelmed with diffidence and
suspicion. These errors, of British optimism and
American pessimism, might be corrected were the
differences in the diplomatic methods and standards
of the several countries realized and accepted with
greatei; clarity.

I propose therefore in the present chapter to
examine the differences in diplomatic theory and
practice which exist between Great Britain, Ger-
many, france and Italy. I should extend my
examination to a discussion of Small Power
Diplomacy ” and Oriental Diplomacy,’^ were it
not that the four main typ^ which I have chosen
will amply suffice to illustrate the distinctions which
I wish to suggest.

I shall not discuss United States diplomacy,
since it is only recently that a professional American
foreign service has come into existence and since
it has had no time to develop its particular tech-
nique. In past years the reputation of America’s
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DIPLOMACY

foreign service suffered much from the political
appointments made under the “ spoils system/’
A political supporter who was accorded the per-
quisite of an Embassy or a Legation was all too
often more concerned with maintaining his
publicity- value in^his home-town than with serving
the rights and interests of his own country abroad.
The capitals of Europe and Latin America echoed
with the indiscretions of these amateur diplomatists
and much damage was done to all concerned. Now
that the American people have, in their wisdom,
seen that some form of professional diplomacy is
desirable, we may be confident that it will rapidly
become among the best in the world. My own
experience of American negotiators has been
uniformly happy. I have found them reasonable,
resourceful, well-informed, accurate and immensely
reliable. They are hampered by the same dis-
abilities as are the British diplomatists in that
they are obliged to consider the feelings of their
people at home. Nor do I envy any American
diplomatist the jealous and almost totally ignorant
scrutiny, of Senatorial Committees. But their
ideals are the same as British ideals, only simpler
and more unhampered. And their methods will
assuredly be the same as those which, in the course
of centuries, have always commended themselves
to men of humanity ^nd common sense.

I now pass to the differences which can be
130

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

observed in the theory and practice of the Great
European Powers. These diflferences arise, as I
have said, from variations in national tradition,
character and needs. It is these which determine
policy; and policy in its turn determines diplo-
matic methods. It might indeed be contended
that there can be no such thing as distinct “ Types
of Diplomacy ’’ or “ Types of Policy.” Yet in
fact it is possible to identify certain constant
characteristics in the art of negotiation as practised
by the Great Powers ; and it is these characteristics
which I propose to examine in this chapter.

11

British diplomacy is generally regarded by foreign
observers with bewildered, and sometimes with
indignant, admiration. On the one hand they
notice that professional British diplomatists display
little initiative, take no pains to impress others with
their intellectual brilliance, and are to all appear-
ance unimaginative, uninformative, lethargic and
slow. On the other hand it is impossible to ignore
the fact that the British diplomatist is exceptionally
well informed, manages to acquire and to retain
the confidence of foreign governments, is imper-
turbable in times of crisis, and almost always
succeeds.

Foreign critics are apt to* explain this anomaly
^ many fantastic theories. Sometimes they will
131

DIPLOMACY

contend that the British diplomatist is a man of
diabolical cunning who, under the disguise of stolid
respectability, conceals a mind which is nimble aAd
treacherous in the extreme. At other times they
will swing round to the opposite pole and contend
that the success of British diplomacy is due to the
eternal moral principles upon which it is founded.
At other times, and with greater justification, they
will explain the contradiction between apparent
British ineptitude and their evident success, by
contending that a diplomacy which is backed by
such enormous potential power must always be
almost fool-proof. And there are moments of
enlightenment when they recognize that the art
of negotiation is essentially a mercantile art, and
that the success of British diplomacy is to be
explained by the fact that it is founded on the
sound business principles of moderation, fair-
dealing, reasonableness, credit, compromise, and
a distrust of all surprises or seiisational extremes.

Essentially, British diplomacy Is but the expres-
sion, in terms of international contacts, of those
principles of policy which, owing to history,
geographical position, imperial responsibilities,
liberal institutions and national character, have, in
the course of centuries, been found best suited to
British requirements. What are those principles ?

On January i, 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe, at that
time head of the Western Department of the

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

Foreign Office, wrote for the Cabinet a confidential
memorandum upon Anglo- German relations. That
memorandum, which contains incidentally an acute
analysis of German aims, embodies a careful defini-
tion of the historical principles of British policy.

Sir Eyre Crowe took as his axiom the incon-
testable premise that British policy was determined
by geography. On the one hand you had a small
island situated on the exposed flank of Europe.
On the other hand you had a vast Empire stretching
across the world. The law of self-preservation
necessitated the maintenance of the food-supplies
of the island and the safety of its communications
with its Empire overseas. This dual necessity
implied preponderance of sea-power against any
possible enemy. The United States are not a
possible enemy.

It is the corollary of this proposition which
applies 'to my present argument. Sir Eyre Crowe
argued that this maritime supremacy would, if
pressed, arouse feelings of resentment and jealousy
throughout the world. It must therefore be exer-
cised with the utmost benevolence and with the
minimum of provocation. It must be “ closely
identified with the primary and vital interests of a
majority of other nations.’’

What were these primary interests ? The first
was indepe^gdence ; the secohd was trade. ’ British
policy must therefore maintain the open door and

133

DIPLOMACY

must at the same time display a direct and positive
interest in the independence of small nations.”
Great Britain must therefore recognize herself as

the natural enemy of any nation which threatened
the independence of smaller countries.” The. doc-
trine of the “ Balance of Power ” thus assumed for
Great Britain a peculiar form. It meant that she
must be “ opposed to the political dictatorship of
the strongest single State or group of States at any
given time.” This opposition, Sir Eyre Crowe
stated, was for Great Britain “ a law of nature.”

Historians may question the validity of the latter
assumption and may contend that the British
instinct for self-preservation is not aroused by the
threat of some continental dictatorship as such,
but only when such dictatorships threaten the
Channel ports or the Empire’s maritime com-
munications. Yet they would accept his former
premise, namely that it is a principle oE policy,
rather than any special human virtue, that makes
Great Britain see herself as the champion of the
rights of small nations. And they would agree that
this necessity, coupled with a democratic system,
has tended^during the last hundred years to render
British policy, and therefore British diplomacy,
more “ liberal ” than those of certain other powers.

If, therefore, we accept this general formula, it is
useful to examine how in the last century it has
expressed itself in international affairs and what are

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

the particular precepts of policy which can be
recognized as most specifically British.

HI

The constant motive or principle which runs
through all British foreign policy is the principle
of the Balance of Power. That principle has in
recent years acquired a bad reputation and has
been much misunderstood. It does not, as its
critics suppose, imply that British policy is con-
stantly directed towards organizing coalitions against
whatever country may at any time be the strongest
Power in Europe ; it means that the general trend
of policy is opposed to any single Power or group
of Powers who may seek to use their strength in
order to deprive other European countries of their
liberty and independence. The Balance of
Power,” wrote Lord John Russell in 1859, “ in
Europe ’ means in effect the independence of its
several States.”

It is evident that the doctrine of the Balance of
Power has imposed upon British policy a peculiar
quality of empiricism, or even of opportunism.
The British system is not governed, as is the policy
of Germany and Italy, by any planned ambitions,
even as it is not determined (as French policy is
determined) by preoccupation with any hereditary
enemy : it depends upon cofnbinations of events.

“ And how,” inquired a visitor to Sans Souci

135

DIPLOMACY

«

in 1768, ** would Your Majesty define the English
system ?

The English/’ snapped Frederick the Great,
“ have no system.”

This opportunism is fortified by the tempera-
mental insularity of the British character and
necessitated by the democratic nature of British
institutions. It is for this reason that for the last
hundred years British statesmen have done their
best to avoid any planned or long-term foreign
policy and to eschew as far as possible all precise
continental commitments.

Canning and Palmerston were equally opposed
to laying down fixed resolutions for eventual
probabilities.”

It is not usual,” wrote the latter to our Ambas-
sador in Russia, for England to enter into engage-
ments with reference to cases which have not
actually arisen, or which are not immediately in
prospect ; and this for a plain reason. All formal
engagements of the Crown, which involve the
questions of peace and war, must be submitted to
Parliament; and Parliament might probably not
approve of an engagement which should bind
England prospectively to take up arms in a con-
tingency which could not as yet be foreseen,”

The general precept underlying tMs principle
ha^ never been more lucidly expressed than in
136

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

the letter which Gladstone wrote to Queen Victoria
on April 17, 1869 :

“ England should keep entire in her own hands
the means of estimating her own obligations upon
the various states of facts as they arise ; she should
not foreclose and narrow her own liberty of choice
by declarations made to other Powers, in their real
or supposed interests, of which they would claim
to be at least joint interpreters ; it is dangerous
for her to assume alone an advanced and therefore
isolated position, in regard to European controver-
sies ; come what may it is better for her to promise
too little than too much ; she should not encourage
the weak by giving expectation of aid to resist the
strong, but should rather seek to deter the strong
by firm but moderate language from aggression of
the weak ; she should seek to develop and mature
the action of a common, or public, or European
opinion, as the best standing bulwark against
wrong, but should beware of seeming to lay down
the law of that opinion by her own authority, and
thus running the risk of setting against her, and
against right and justice, the general sentiment
which ought to be, and generally would be, arrayed
in their favour/^

Such, for more than one hundred years, have
been the directives of British foreign policy. It
is possible^ now that Great Britain may appear to
137 E2

DIPLOMACY

have lost her invulnerability, that these principles
may be modified. It is probable that the former
policy of alternating isolation with intervention
may have to be supplanted by some more planned
system of collective security and that to this extent
the old doctrine of the Balance of Power will be
abandoned. Yet it may be questioned whether
the final decision in warfare has yet passed from
the sea to the air, and it may be suggested that fo)c
many years Great Britain should adhere, with only
slight modifications, to her old traditions. Whether
her position in international affairs should best be
described as that of “ the honest broker,” “ the
final arbiter,” “ the world’s peace-maker,” “ the
tertim gaudens ” or ‘‘ The God in the machine,”
is a matter of individual opinion.

How do these general precepts of policy affect
the methods of British diplomacy ? It is that
problem which must now be considered. ^

IV

In his interesting work. The Spirit of British
Policy^ Dr. Kantorowicz has analysed, from a
foreigner’s point of view, the guiding principles of
the British system and their effect upon diplomacy.
His analysis is flattering to British self-esteem.
He catalogues as the main virtues of British diplo-
macy the three qualities of Chivalry, Objectivity
and Humanitarianism. Its main defect appears
138

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

to him to be that of Irrationality. He does not
dwell with any insistence upon the opportunism
of the British system or upon its fundamental
selfishness. Yet he does recognize (since he is a
scholarly and charitable observer) that British
policy is all too apt to fluctuate between idealism
and realism, between humanitarianism and self-
interest ; and he rightly admits that Great Britain’s
international reputation for hypocrisy, as well as
the phrase ‘‘ perfidious Albion,” is due, not to any
national insincerity, but to a national distaste for
logic, and a national preference for dealing with
situations after they have arisen rather than before
they arise. In other words, the typical British
approach to any international problem is one from
the idealistic to the realistic. The first impulse is
one of humanitarianism and it is only af a later
stage that the motives of self-interest or of self-
preseryation come into play ; this is apt to create
some discrepancy between the purposes which are
proclaimed at the outset of an international crisis
and those which determine British policy at the end.

Not all foreign observers are as kindly as Dr.
Kantorowicz. Heinrich Heine, for iijstance, des-
cribed the English as the most odious race that
God in his wrath had ev^r created,” and warned
his contemporaries , against “ the treacherous and
murderous intrigues of those Carthaginians of the
North Sea.” Yet Heine was at the time writing
^39

DIPLOMACY

as a journalist and his diatribes, which had some
influence in France and Germany, can be largely
discounted as being of the nature of propaganda.
It is more interesting to consider how the English
system struck trained observers, such as Prince
Billow, Count BernstorflF and Count Mensdorif,
These diplomatists defined the main difference
between the British and the continental attitude to
foreign affairs under two headings. The first was
simplicity, amounting to childishness ; the second
was sentimentality.

In 1899 Prince Billow paid a visit to Windsor
and recorded his impressions in his diary :

The English politicians do not know the
Continent well. They do not know much more
about conditions on the Continent than we know
about conditions in Peru or Siam. Their general
ideas, according to our standard, are somewhat
naive. There is something naive in their un-
conscious egotism, but they have also a certain
credulity. They are not prone to suspect really
evil intentions. They are very quiet, rather indo-
lent and very optimistic.’’

Count Mensdorff, for long Austrian Ambassador
in London and a good friend to Britain, shared
Prince Billow’s judgment.

‘‘ Most of the British^'Ministers,” he wrote, “ and
politicians are far more ignorant, inexact and
140

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

amateurish than we believe. A good deal that we
interpret as deceit is in fact merely the result
of ignorance and superficiality, and is due to
carelessness and confusion. Almost without ex-
ception, they have no clear idea about foreign
conditions.’’

To this charge of ignorance and muddle-headed-
ness is added a complaint of British sentimentality.
This complaint assumed a somewhat startling form
in a letter written to Prince Biilow in 1904 by Count
Bernstorff, subsequently German Ambassador at
Washington, and at the time Counsellor of the
German Embassy in London :

In my humble opinion an improvement in the
relation between the two countries might well be
initiated by the conclusion of a treaty of arbitration
with England. In the form which is customary
nowadays, such treaties are quite harmless and de
facto of no importance. At the same time it is
surprising to note the extent to which, in political
matters, our ‘ practical Englishmen ’ are dominated
by phrases. If we were to agree to a treaty of
arbitration, a very large number of people in
England would believe that the Germans had put
off their desire for conquest and had become
peaceable individuals. In exchange we could afford
to build q^few more battleships, especially if they
were not given too much publicity.”

DIPLOMACY

I have quoted these opinions of experienced
observers since they illustrate what are, in fact, the
main faults of British statesmen in their handling
of international problems. There is considerable
ignorance, not so much of foreign conditions, as of
foreign psychology ; there is unbounded optimism ;
there is a dislike of facing unpleasant possibilities
in advance ; and there is a tendency to welcome
transactions and agreements which, while they have
no real validity, are calculated .to appeal to the
sentiment of the British public and their love of
comforting phrases.

The British diplomatist inevitably reflects the
merits and the defects of his political masters. I
have already indicated that the Foreign Office and
the Cabinet are apt to prefer their optimistic to
their pessimistic ambassadors, and to regard those
who warn them of coming dangers or disasters as
“ slightly unbalanced,’’ “ neurotic ” or “ unsound.”
An ambassador who has spent his life in the foreign
service, and who has come to realize that the
standards and mentality of foreigners, are not always
those of the English gentleman, is frequently
appalled by^the almost boyish serenity of Cabinet
Ministers. If he be a man of great integrity and
will-power he will gladly undergo the unpopularity
which assails the prophet of woe, and assume the
role of a Cassandra. But if he be a man of lesser
character, he is tempted to reflect, and even to
14a

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

minister to, the serenity of his rulers ; great damage
may. be done thereby to British foreign policy.

The British diplomatist, again, is rightly im-
pressed by the supreme importance of avoiding any
indiscretion, any intemperate word or action, which
may place his government in an embarrassing
position. Yet, as he becomes older, and the pos-
sibility of an ambassador’s pension begins to
glimmer before his eyes, he tends to reflect that a
false step is a more terrible thing than no step
at all and that, whereas an ill-judged action pro-
duces immediate chastisement, inactivity (if I may
misquote Wordsworth) is :

permanent, obscure and dark
And has the nature of Infinity.’^

In such circumstances the fine tradition of
caution which animates the British foreign service
declines into timidity.

Yet if British diplomacy reflects the failings of
British policy — and is therefore, apt to become all
too optimistic, confused, non-committal, irrational
and elastic — it also reflects its merits. The good
British diplomatist is tolerant and fair ; he acquires
a fine balance between imagination ^nd reason,
between ideaEsm and realism ; he is reliable and
scrupulously precise ; he possesses dignity with-
out self-importance, demeanour without man-
nerisms, poise without stolidity ; he can display
resolution as well as flexibility, and can combine
H3

DIPLOMACY

gentleness with courage ; he never boasts ; he
knows that impatience is as dangerous as ill-
temper and, that intellectual brilliance is not a
diplomatic quality ; he knows above all that it is
his duty to interpret the policy of his government
with loyalty and common sense and that the founda-
tion of good diplomacy is the same as the foundation
of good business — ^namely credit, confidence, con-
sideration and compromise.

V

I have devoted this space to the discussion of the
British type of diplomacy, not merely because it is
the type of which I have had intimate and con-
tinuous knowledge all my life, but because I believe,
in all sincerity, that it is on the whole the type which
is most conducive to the maintenance of peaceful
relations. I shall now pass to other types, and shall
begin with the German type.

The German theory of policy, and therefore of
diplomacy, is, as I have said before, a “ heroic ”
or warrior conception and as such widely
different from the mercantile or shop-keeper con-
ception of tl;^e British. It also displays remarkable
continuity.

It would be beyond the range of this monograph
to examine the causes which have produced the
type of mind which one can recognize as the dis-
tinctively German type of mind. Underneath all

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TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

the solid and magnificent virtues of the German
race there lies a layer of nervous uncertainty. This
uncertainty (which has been defined by Friedrich
Sieburg as ‘‘ spiritual homelessness ’’) is due to a
lack of any sharp geographical, racial or historical
definition or outline. It all began when Augustus
withdrew the Roman limes from the Elbe to the
Danube, thus dividing the' Germanics into the
civilized and the barbarian. This disruption was
later emphasized by the Reformation and the feel-
ing that northern Germany was no more than a
colony of the Holy Roman Empire. ‘‘ We are,’’
writes Sieburg, shifting sand, yet in every grain
there inheres the longing to combine with the rest
into solid, durable stone.” It is this desire to find
some real focus, some centre of gravity, which has
impelled the Germans to regard the conception of
‘‘unity,” as expressed by the State, as something
mystical ^d almost religious. It has also led them
to find in physical unity, and therefore in physical
power, that sense of solidarity which they lack as
individuals.

The whole of modern German political theory
from Fichte, via Hegel and Stewart Chamberlain,
to Hitler is coloured by this emphasis upon some
mystic union. The old thirteenth-century ideals
of the Teutonic Order of the German Knights were
inherited by Prussia who came to represent the
ideal of German force; her pride of race, her yearn-

145

DIPLOMACY

ing for political dominion. Fichte’s original con-
ception of the Germans as some “ primordial
people ” (Urvolk) became linked with the later
conceptions of ‘‘ blood and iron,” “ blood and soil,”
and blood and race.” Fichte declared that
“ between States there is neither law nor right
unless it be the right of the strongest.” Hegel
defined war as “ eternal and moral.” Thus Ger-
man Kultur (which we most inaccurately translate
as “ culture ”) came to represent a general theory
of mastery, of effort constantly renewed, of some
mystical union between the German people and the
elemental forces of nature.

German policy has been deeply affected by this
philosophy. It is inspired by the ideal that Ger-
man Kultur is some virile but inspired force which
in the interests of humanity should impose itself
upon the world. This ideal is essentially mystic.

Germany,” writes Sieburg, “ is a destiny, not a
way of life.” To that destiny the German indi-
vidual citizen is prepared to sacrifice his mind,
his independence, if necessary his life. What
distinguishes us,” writes Sieburg again, “ from other
nations is^the bounds we set to the instinct of self-
preservation.” In every German there is an
element of suicidal mania.

The practical interpretation of this ideal assumes
several forms. In "so far as foreign policy and
diplomacy are concerned it expresses itself in two
146

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

ways. On the one hand there is the belief that
force, or the threat of force, are the main instru-
ments of negotiation. And on the other hand there
is the theory that the “ rakon d^etaty^ or needs of
the State, take precedence over all individual
religions or philosophies.

GeiTOan policy, therefore, is essentially ‘‘ Macht-
politik ” or Power policy.’’ Her diplomacy, as I
have indicated before, reflects this warrior or
military conception. It seems to them more
important to inspire fear than to beget confidence ;
and when, as invariably happens, the frightened
nations combine to protect themselves, the Ger-
mans complain of “ Einkreisung ” or ‘‘ encircle-
ment,” wholly ignoring the fact that it is their
own methods and menaces which have produced
this reaction.

A characteristic symptom of the warrior con-
ception of policy is what Professor Mowat has called
sudden diplomacy,” Of all forms of diplomacy
that assuredly is the most dangerous. Its theoretical
basis is that it demonstrates strength, causes per-
turbation, and thereby increases opportunity for
pressure. Its practical justification is tfiat it pro-
vides the negotiator with something in hand.”
The classic instance of sudden diplomacy is Count
AerenthaPs seizure of Bosnia Herzegovina in 1908.
It was eminently successful at* the moment, but it
left behind it the legacy of fear and of resentment
147

DIPLOMACY

which led eventually to the destruction of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Other instances of
this sudden or surprise diplomacy have occurred in
more recent years. It is a conception of negotiation
which is often resorted to by German diplomatists.
It is essentially a military conception.

It might be argued that the art of negotiation,
which is a civilian art, can find but small place
in a state-theory so largely dominated by military
ideas. True it is that German foreign policy has
always tended to be subsidiary to “ Machtpolitik ’’
and that the General Staff often exercise greater
influence upon policy than do the Foreign Office.
True it is also that the German belief in the leader-
ship principle, and their tendency to concentrate
power in the hands of a single individual, has
prevented the German foreign service from acquir-
ing the same corporate consciousness, technique or
independence as its British counterpart. Yet the
fact remains that, in spite of these disadvantages,
the German diplomatic and consular service are
fine professions, staffed by most efficient and
honourable men. The German Ambassadors be-
fore the war were usually drawn from the profession
itself and had thus acquired a clearer sense of the
common interests of Europe, and a more sensitive
understanding of foreign psychology, than was
possessed by the bufeaucrats in Berliiy It is almost
tragic to read the despatches and memoirs of these
148

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

diplomatists and to observe how frequently their
councils were ignored or misinterpreted or, dis-
missed by the Emperor or his Chancellors.

Nor can it be said that the discipline and loyalty
of the German foreign service can be compared
with the standards expected from the diplomatist
of other countries. It was Bismarck who first
introduced the system of appointing as secretaries
to German Embassies abroad agents of his own
choosing,, whose function was to spy upon their
Ambassador. This system was brought to a fine
art by Fritz von Holstein who, during his long
period of influence in the Wilhelmstrasse, en-
tangled the whole German foreign service in a
spider^s web of suspicion, jealousy and intrigue.
It was largely owing to the influence of that almost
demented bureaucrat. that the high principles and
wise judgment of the elder German diplomatists
were so offen rendered ineffective. And even after
Holstein’s disappearance, Prince Lichnowsky com-
plained that his efforts to warn his government of
the probable effects of their policy in 1914 were
counteracted by other secret reports sent to Berlin
by members of his own staff.

It might thus be said that German diplomatists
have never been given a fair chance. Their moder-
ation has been interpreted in Berlin as a sign of
weakness or timidity ; their counsels of prudence
have been dismissed as un- German; their recti-
149

DIPLOMACY

tude has been regarded with suspicion. It is not
surprising that so many of their finer diplomatists
should have retired in embittered disdain.

VI

French policy has, for the last sixty years, been
governed almost exclusively by fear of her eastern
neighbour and is thus more consistent than that
of any other Great Power. The eyes of all French
diplomatists remain eternally fixed on the “ blue
line of the Vosges,’’ and their whole policy is
directed towards defending themselves against the
German menace. This constant preoccupation is
apt to render French policy tense, rigid and inelastic.

The French diplomatic service ought to be the
best in the world. It possesses a long tradition
and the recent example of such ideal diplomatists
as the two Gambons, Jusserand, Barrere, and
Berthelot. It is staffed by men of remarkable
intelligence, wide experience and great social charm.
The French combine with acuteness of observation
a special gift of lucid persuasiveness. They are
honourable and precise. Yet they lack tolerance.
So convipiced is the average Frenchman of his own
intellectual pre-eminence, • so conscious is he of
the superiority of his own culture, that he finds
it difficult at times to conceal his impatience with
the barbarians who" inhabit other countries. This
causes offence,

150

types of europeak diplomacy

The concentration, again, of the French mind
upon a particular line of policy prevents them on
occasions from observing events which lie outside
their immediate and intense focus. All diplo-
matists are bound to place the interests of their
own countries in the forefront of their conscious-
ness : yet for the French, the interests of France
loom so exclusively that the forefront is apt to
become blocked. Moreover, their passion for logic,
the legal temper of their minds, their extreme
realism, their distrust of all political emotion,
often blind them to the motives, the feelings
and often the thoughts of other nations. Their
superb intellectual integrity tempts them to re-
gard as insincere the, confused fumblings of less
lucid minds and to feel irritated, dry contempt,
when what is necessary is a little lucubrating indul-
gence. It thus occurs that French diplomacy,
with all 4ts magnificent equipment and its fine
principles, is often ineffective. Nor do the
professional politicians always allow to the pro-
fessional diplomatisjts that scope which is their
due*

The rigidity of French diplomacy stands in
striking contrast to the mobile diplomacy of the
Italians. The Italian system is derived from the
traditions of the Italian States of the Renaissance
and is based iif ither on the soufid business concept,
nor on power-policy, nor on the logical attainment

DIPLOMACY

of certain ends. It is more than opportunist, it
is based upon incessant manoeuvre.

The aim of Italy’s foreign policy is to acquire
by negotiation an importance greater than can be
supplied by her own physical strength. It is thus
the antithesis of the German system, since instead
of basing diplomacy on power she . bases power on
diplomacy. It is the antithesis of the French
system, since instead of striving to secure permanent
allies against a permanent enemy, she regards her
allies and her enemies as interchangeable. It is
the antithesis of the British system, since it is not'
durable credit that she seeks for, but immediate
advantage. Her conception, moreover, of the Bal-
ance of Power is not identical with the British
conception; for whereas in Great Britain that
doctrine is interpreted as opposition to any country
who may seek to dominate Europe, in Italy it is
desired as a balance of such equipoiscr that her
own weight can tilt the scale.

Italian diplomatists make a speciality of the art
of negotiation. Their usual method is first to
create bad relations with the country with whom
they wish to negotiate and then to offer good
relations.” Before entering upon such negotiations
th% are careful to provide themselves with three
bargaining counters. The first of these is a sense
of grievance and hostility which are artificially
provoked among the Italian people. The second
IS2

TYPES OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

is some form of nuisance-value against the country
with which Italy is about to negotiate. And the
third is a claim for some concession which Italy
does not expect to obtain, or really desires, but
the abandonment of which will oblige the other
country to pay some compensation. As the negoti-
ations proceed, these counters are added to by
others. And, if the negotiations show signs of
becoming difEcult, a hint is given that similar
negotiations will be opened elsewhere. Occasion-
ally concurrent negotiations are undertaken with
two opposing sides. Thus in 1914-16 Italy simul-
taneously negotiated with her allies and with their
enemies regarding the concessions which the former
would pay for her neutrality, and the latter for her
assistance. The latter were in the position to oiffer
a higher price,

Italy^s diplomacy, ingenious though it be, is not
perhaps ^ fair sample of the art of negotiation.
She combines, on the one hand, the ambitions and
the pretensions of a Great Power with, on the other,
the methods of a Small Power. Her policy is thus
not volatile only but essentially transitional.
Modern Italy has already produced diplomatists,
such as Sforza and Grandi, who have rightly won
general esteem. It is confidently to be expected
that now that Italy is becoming a Great Power, in
fact as well as in name, her diplomacy will become
more stable ind more dignified.

153

CHAPTER VII

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

Diplomacy by Conference — Its popularity now on the
decline — ^Its advantages and defects — ^The demand for
increased democratic control — Diplomacy and cdm-
mercial interests — ^The creation of the Commercial
Diplomatic Service — ^The “ Press Attach^ '' and his
functions — ^The dangers of propaganda — ^The League
of Nations — Its secretariat — ^The British Common-
wealth of Nations as a new experiment in international
co-operation

I HAVE now examined the origin and develop-
ment of diplomatic theory and practice ; I have con-
sidered the faults and virtues both of the old and the
new diplomacy ; and I have contrasted the qualities
of the ideal diplomatist with certain defects imposed
upon this admirable profession by different types
of policy. I propose in the present chapter to
discuss the main innovations introduced into
fiiplomatic practice by such post-war developments
ks the mpyeipent towards greater democratic con-
trol, the^increasin^ of economics and.,,

finance, the inventions of modern science, and a
more enhghtened (although still restricted) con-
ception of the community of international interests.
^ 5 ^

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

It was felt after the War of 1914-18 that diplo-
matic intercourse would henceforward be conducted
almost entirely by round-table conferences. In a
valuable address which he delivered to the Royal
Institute of International Affairs on November 2,
1920, Sir Maurice Hahkey, who had himself attended
488 International Meetings since 1914, expressed
the considered opinion that “ Jt can hardly be
doubted that diplomacy by conference has come to
stay.’’

It had been found during the war that agreement
between the several Allied Governments on matters
of immediate importance could not rapidly be
secured by the ordinary methods of diplomatic
communication. It became essential that at regular
intervals the Prime Ministers or experts of the
several Powers should meet round a table and
discuss the urgent problems of strategy and policy
which the^ joint conduct of the war imposed.
There were in addition innumerable technical
problems, s uch as food. and transport, in regard to
which all the Allies were faced by common dangers
and common necessities. They were obliged to
pooi their resources and to agree upon tl^e priority
of ^ their respective needs. A whole network of
inter-allied committees, or permanent conferences,
was therefore created. These ranged from great
organizations such as the Allied Council on War
PurQhases and Finance, the Commission Inter-
i.SS

DIPLOMACY

nationale de Ravitaillement, the Allied Food
Council, and the Allied Maritime Transport
Council, to smaller committees of experts dealing
with such supplies as coal, nitrates, cotton, petro-
leum and timber. These several councils and
committees were co-ordinated into a definite pat-
tern in the shape of a pyramid, of which the base
was represented by the several sub-committees
on specific supplies, and of which the apex cul-
minated in the Supreme War Council of the Allied
and Associated Powers.

In his valuable history of the development and
functions of the Allied Maritime Transport Council,
entitled Allied Shipping Control, Sir Arthur
Salter shows how these international committees
became in course of time something more than a
mere war-time machinery of co-ordination. They
constituted a fundamental innovation in what until
then had been the usual practice of international
negotiation. In the place of a national policy
expressing itself by competitive and conflicting
diplouaacy, you had a common international interest
imposing the need of international co-operation.
Nor was^ this the only difference. Instead of
national policy trying to impose itself from above
upon the facts of a situation you had a system by
which the facts imposed themselves upon a policy.
It was found that a body of international experts,
when dealing under the pressure of a common
iS6

recent changes in diplomatic practice

danger with very concrete facts, acquired a more
continuous standard of mutual confidence and co-
operation than professional diplomatists had ever
managed to achieve. And it was hoped by many
of us that this new experiment in conducting
diplomacy from below upwards might in fact prove
a valuable innovation in international practice.

To a certain extent these hopes were realized in
the Secretariat of the League of Nations, a body
which acquired and still maintains the highest
standards of efficiency and co-operation. Yet when
once the common danger had been removed, the
great War Councils of the Allies shared the fate
of the old Amphictyonic Councils — disintegration
set in.

■ The advantages of diplomacy by conference are
self-evident. It enables those who are responsible
for framing policy to conduct negotiation. Im-
mense time is saved by this method and greater
flexibility is acquired. In the course of frequent
meetings the several Prime Ministers come to know,
and sometimes evefn to trust, each other. Real
intimacy,^’ writes Sir Maurice Hankey, “ and
friendship materially, contribute to the access of
diplomacy by conference by rendering possible
absolute frankness of discussion.’’

This is true. Yet it is possible that, in place
of friendship, antipathy may result from such fre-
quent contacts. The personal relations between

157

DIPLOMACY

Lord Curzon, for instance, and M. Poincar6 did
not assist negotiation. Even friendshif) may lead
(as at the Thoiry luncheon-party between Briand
and Stresemann) to some impulsive settlement
which has thereafter to be repudiated. The dangers
of imprecision, misunderstanding, leakage and in-
discretion are much increased. And rapidity of
discussion is not, in times of peace, invariably an
advantage.

Of recent years, and as a result of successive
discomfitures, the popularity of diplomacy by
conference has, in Great Britain at least, sensibly
declined. Berchtesgaden and Munich have con-
firmed this distaste. "The British public have
always had an instinctive dislike of these inter-
national gatherings as was shown by their suspicion
of the Congress system which the Emperor Alex-
ander and Metternich tried to perpetuate after the
Napoleonic wars. And it was generally felt that,
the autumn sessions of the League of Nations
Assembly provided all the contacts which should
normally be necessary, without investing these
meetings of ministers with that atmosphere of
exaggerated public expectancy which is the bane
of all special or sensational conferences.

Obviously, however, there are occasions when a
conference becomes essential. Yet, if it is to
succeed, the ground must be mosL carefully pre-
pared beforehand. No conference should ever be
158

recent changes in diplomatic practice

attempted until its scope and programme have
been agreed to by all the participants and until,
through the ordinary diplomatic channels, it has
been ascertained that the views of the negotiating
parties are not hopelessly at variance. The success
of the London Conference on Reparations, which
produced what was known as “ The Dawes Plan,”
was due to careful preliminary arrangements arrived
at between Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot
at Chequers. The failure of the Naval Disarma-
ment Conference at Geneva in 1926 and the even
more tragic failure of the World Economic Con-
ference of 1933, can be ascribed almost wholly to
lack of the necessary preliminary soundings be-
tween London and Washington. This golden rule
is not sufficiently understood by politicians,

II

To-day, therefore, it could scarcely be said that
diplomacy by conference has “ come to stay.” In
1920 it certainly appeared as if the lessons in co-
operation which the war had taught to Europe would
produce something like a fundamental change in
diplomatic practice. To-day the tide k setting
against the new system and towards a return to
diplomacy by professional experts acting under
written instructions. Yet, although this particular
innovation has^for the moment' declined in popu-
larity, there are other changes in diplomatic practice

159

DIPLOMACY

and functions which are likely to survive and to
develop.

It is probable, for instance, that in countries
which still enjoy representative institutions, there
will be an increased dentand for democratic control
over both policy and negotiation. This demand is
frequently made without full knowledge of the
working of the constitution and is based, as I have
said, upon some confusion between policy
and ‘‘ negotiation.’’ Yet the demand is general
and is likely todncrease in volume as a result of the
Czechoslovak crisis of August-September 1938.

Even those who are aware of the very effective
control which can be exercised by the legislature
owing to its power to refuse to ratify treaties, are
apt to contend that there should exist some addi-
tional, and more continuous, form of parliamentary
supervision over the conduct of foreign policy by a
government and its servants. In Great Britain
this movement has in the past concentrated upon
the demand for a Foreign Affairs Comnoittee of the
House of Commons, endowed with the same
privileges and prestige as the Foreign Relations
Committee in the United States, or the analogous
Parliamentary Committee in France.

The advantages of such committees are that they
enable the Foreign Secretary accurately to gauge
parliamentary opinion, while they jprovide Parlia-
ment with a safety-valve for such criticism and
160

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

suggestion as would be impossible in a public de-
bate. The disadvantages are that they impose
extra labour on the Foreign Secretary ; that they
often emphasize difficulties and disagreements
which might be solved by^ |he passage of silent time ;
that they introduce an element of party controversy
into the conduct of international affairs ; that they
-constitute a channel through which financial and
commercial interests might seek unduly to influence
policy ; and that, invariably and irremediably, they
lead to serious indiscretions and disclosures.

The parties which support the National Govern-
ment in Great Britain have of recent years experi-
mented with a , purely unofficial Foreign Affairs
Committee to which opposition members are not
admitted. This Committee exists ostensibly for the
private discussion of foreign problems and is pre-
cluded by its own rules either from testing opinion
by a votie or from addressing resolutions to the
Government. It is certainly of great value in that
it allows members to exchange views, to acquire
information, and to hear from time to time con-
fidential statements from the Foreign Secretary.,
It also enables the whips to gauge the opinion of
the party. Yet it is not an official or elected body,
and it possesses no power to impose a majority
view upon the government of the day.

i6i

DIPLOMACY

III

A further, and more compelling, cause of change
in diplomatic practice is the increased importance
of commerce. In one sense this is no new develop-
ment. It could be contended in fact that diplomacy
as an organized profession owed as much to com-
mercial interests as to political interests. It would
be possible to argue that the main impulse which
transformed the old amateur diplomacy into a
specialized service, was the impulse of trade. The
Venetian diplomatic service, which undoubtedly
laid the foundations of professional diplomacy,
was in its origin a commercial machinery. Our
own diplomatic representatives in the Near and the
Far East had commercial origins. Organizations
such as the Levant Company maintained at their
expense and with the moral support of the Govern-
ment, envoys who were half ofScial and half mer-
cantile. These agents were never certain whether
their main allegiance was owed to their own Board
of Directors or to the Government.

This dual allegiance was abolished when the
Ambassador or Minister became the personal repre-
sentative of his Sovereign. So anxious became
these plenipotentiaries to disclaim any connection
with the old “ Company Agent ’’ that, as the years
progressed, they assumed that any connection with
comhierce implied a lowering of their own status
i6z

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

from sovereign representatives to commercial travel-
lers. It is this curve of development from trade
to politics and then back to trade which explains
the distaste which those who fell within the middle
period felt for commercial activities.

Thus, during the early nineteenth century, a British
diplomatist would have felt sullied were he to
engage in pushing the, material requirements of his
nationals. He was prepared, and to any lengths,
to protect and defend their personal liberty. He
was not expected, or prepared, to assist them in
making commercial profits.

It was the Germans who first realized the utility
of combining political with commercial advantages.
The Americans followed. In the days of the old
diplomacy one political advantage was bargained
against another political advantage : by the middle
of the nineteenth century, commercial advantages
were also thrown into the balance. The concession-
hunter appeared. One of the first symptoms of
this alteration m the incidence of political interest
was the competition which arose in Turkey and
China between rival railway interests. It was this
competition which convinced the ’ chancelleries of
Europe that there was. some connection between
capitalist exploitation and political influence.

The professional diplomatist of the old school
fought for long against this commercial connection.
His idea was that in any case the political relations
163

DIPLOMACY

between different countries were complicated
enough without adding to their complexity by
official commercial rivalry. He had a prejudice
against all concession-hunters as against economic
imperialism, he believed in laisser faire, and he
was conscious that trade and finance were subjects
of which he had but slight experience. Yet he
was fighting a losing battle and by the last three
decades of the nineteenth century the principle
had become established that the functions of the
foreign service comprised, not only the protection,
but also the furtherance of private commercial
interests.

In Great Britain a Commercial Department of
the Foreign Office was established in 1866 and
thoroughly reorganized in 1872. - 4 . Commercial
Attache was appointed to the Paris Embassy in
1880 and to St. Petersburg in 1887. The business
world continued to complain that the British diplo-
matic, consular and commercial officials did not
display the same activity on behalf of their traders
as was shown by the German and the American
services. The information supplied by the con-
sular reports, or in reply to inquiries from Chambers
of Commerce, was, they said, inadequate and some-
times misleading ; the relations between embassies
or legations and the local commercial community
were distant and cold ; and, although they could
look to their diplomatic representatives for pro-
164

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

tection against flagrant injustice, they were not
accorded, as their German and American rivals
were accorded, sufficiently energetic support in
marketing their wares* Successive committees
were appointed to examine these grievances and
with useful results. In 1903 the Consular Service
was almost completely reorganized and more com-
mercial attaches were appointed. A problem of
co-ordination arose owing to the dual functions
of the Commercial Intelligence Department of the |
Board of Trade and the Commercial Department ,
of the Foreign Office. It was not until after the
war that this problem was solved by the creation
of the Department of Overseas Trade and by
placing the commercial attaches upon an entirely
new basis both as regards status and recruitment.
In place of the old system a regular commercial
diplomatic service was established, the officers of
which given titles and status analogous to

those of the political branch and were accorded
adequate provision for offices, clerical assistance
and entertainment.

There is now every prospect that this new com-
mercial service will develop its own traditions and
its own identity. It is able to supply the business
community with expert and detailed information
and with most effective assistance ; and it is warmly
welcomed by the diplomatic service itself as ridding
them of an embarrassing, and sometimes uncon-

DIPLOMACY

genial, task to which they knew themselves to be
unfitted.

Another change in the old conventions of diplo«
matic procedure has been caused by the increasing
importance of such international problems as
currency and finance. The old diplomatic con-
vention was that all negotiations must be carried
out between the head of a mission and the Foreign
Office of the country to which he was accredited ;
and it would have been regarded as a sferious
breach of etiquette were a member of a foreign
mission to hold converse with any other depart-
ment. This convention was shattered by the war.
Mr. Lloyd George, when he was Chancellor of the
Exchequer, entered into direct negotiations with
the French Minister of Finance, and when later
he became Minister of Munitions his relations with
M. Albert Thomas were continuous and close.
Moreover, it was found that many of these important
matters of controversy and discussion required
technical knowledge of the problems that they
covered, and that the ordinary diplomatist did not
possess that specialized knowledge of currency or
finance which would enable him to negotiate upon
such subjects. The excellent practice thus arose
of entrusting such negotiations to Treasury experts
and of maintaining, as financial attaches ,to certain
embassies, men who’ had spent their lives in the
study of these particular problems.

i66

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

IV

The increasing importance and power, of the
Press has also led to the appointment, to the major
embassies abroad, of an official who is known as a
“ Press Attache/’ The functions of this official
are numerous and diverse. He is expected to
read, digest and translate the articles published
in the local journals. He interviews British and
other Press correspondents and tries to secure
that the views of his government obtain adequate
publicity. And he is able to establish contacts
with local journalists who provide valuable in-
formation. .

He has a further utility. For whereas ambas-
sadors and their staffs are constantly shifting from
capital to capital, the Press Attache is usually
retained in the same post for a period of several
years. This comparative permanence of tenure
enables him to acquire great knowledge of local
politics and personalities. An ambassador, especi-
ally in some continental countries, where political
passions run high, finds it difficult to get to know
those politicians who are opposed to the government
in power. !t was delicate, if not impossible, for
instance, for a British Ambassador in Tsarist Russia
to establish any contact with Russian Liberals of
the type of I^iliukoff or Lwdff. A Press Attache
is able to maintain such contacts without causing
167

DIPLOMACY

offence. His position can thus be one of great
usefulness and considerable importance, and the
system should be extended to every important
mission.

A new and serious problem of modern diplomacy
is the problem of propaganda. In the days of the
old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an
act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the com-
mon people upon any issue of international policy.
It was Canning, in 1826, who first recognized the
efficacy of what he called the fatal artillery of
popular excitation.” Prince Metternich did not
share this view, although it caused him much
disquiet. He accused Canning of seeking to acquire
popularity — a pretension that is misplaced in a
statesman.”

If Canning was the first British statesman deli-
berately to recognize public opinion as an instrument
of policy, he was careful to lay down the condition
that such opinion must be founded upon truth and
justice. Those continental statesmen who adopted
his theory in the later half of the nineteenth* century
dispensed with this condition. Bismarck and his
, imitators were accustomed to invent incidents or
to distort facts in order to inflame public opinion
upon some specific issue. Yet, although Bismarck,
and even Billow, did not hesitate to inspire un-
truthfulness in others, they refrained from telling
demonstrable lies themselves. In fact, until the
168

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

war of 1914-18 came to degrade all international
standards, it was still considered unfitting and
unwise for a statesman to make public pronounce-
ments to his own people .which public opinion
in other countries would know to be totally
untrue.

The war abolished all such delicacies of con-
science. Even the British (who are a truthful race)
gradually acquired a taste for propaganda, and
proved that they also could tell deliberate lies.
British war propaganda was perhaps neither so
brilliant as Adolf Hitler assures us, nor as efiicacious
as Mr. Squires contends ; but by the last years of
the war it had become a highly organized system
and certainly provided a formidable weapon of
popular excitation.

Since then, the invention of the wireless has
given a vast impetus to propaganda as a method of
policy. .Herr Hitler has himself devoted many
years of study to the problem and has embodied
his conclusions in the earlier sections of “ Mein
Kampf,^* He affirms the axiom that the masses
are more easily stirred by the human voice than
by any other form of communication. Jfet propa-
ganda by wireless must, if it is to be successful,
recognize certain principles. In the first place, so
Herr Hitler assures us, it must aim at the lowest
types of mind. It must avoid all intellectual
considerations and must seek to arouse the emotions
169 F 2

DIPLOMACY

only. Its method must be one of “ inspiring
fanaticism and occasionally hysteria/* There must
never be any suggestion that there can be something
to be said for the other side. There must be no
subtleties or reservations but “ only a positive and a
negative, love and hatred, right and wrong, truth
and lies, never any half and half.” And above
all, so Hitler tells us, the lies must be enormous ;
it is no use, in his opinion, telling little lies ; a
propaganda lie must be of such gigantic proportions
that listeners will never suspect that it could be
invented.

It is evident that this system of propaganda by
wireless can in certain circumstances do immense
damage to international relations. Thus the in-
cessant anti-British propaganda which Signor Mus-
solini broadcast from the Bari station in Arabic was,
had the British Government so chosen to take it,
a definitely unfriendly act. Its suppression became
one of the main objects of the Anglo-Italian agree-
ment. And it is evident that if nations are to
address each other in terms which are deliberately
intended to arouse hysteria among the lowest types
of the population, the old courtesies of diplomatic
intercourse will wear a trifle thin.

A further danger of propaganda is that those
who use it are liable to become its victims. Thus,
when in 1919 Signor Orlando, in order to impress
President Wilson with the depth of Italian popular
170

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

feeling regarding Fiume, organized an intense
propaganda in his own country, he found that
such violent emotions had been aroused that it
had become impossible for him to accept a reason-
able solution. An even sadder instance is that
provided by the Nazi propaganda over the Sudeten
Germans ; passions were unleashed which became
uncontrollable and Herr Hitler found himself in a
position where even a diplomatic triumph would
have been regarded as a defeat.

It is difficult to suggest by what means diplomacy
can mitigate the dangers of this terrible invention.
International agreements on the subject are evaded
or ignored ; counter-propaganda only intensifies
the conflict. The most that can be hoped is
that the very virulence of the method, the
actual iteration of demonstrable untruths, may in
the end defeat its own purpose. And that the
best antidote to the hysterical school of broad-
casters is a policy of truth, under-statement and
calm.

It is difficult to state with any accuracy what
sums are expended by the several governments
upon' their propaganda services. It is esti-
mated that Germany spends some £4,ooo,ood
to £ 6 , 000,000 annually on foreign propaganda.
France spends some 1,200,000 and Italy the
equivalent of. nearly 3^1,000,000. In Great Britain
no sums are allocated for propaganda as such,
171

DIPLOMACY

although grants are given to the British Council as
follows :

1935 •

. Xs.ooo

1936 .

. £15,000

1937 •

. £60,000

1938 .

. £100,000 with a possible

addition of £40,000

The British Council is an officially created and
subsidized body the purpose of which is to make
British life and thought more widely known abroad,
to encourage the study of the English language,
and to render available abroad current British
contributions to literature, science or the fine arts.
Apart from the sums allocated to the British Council
no British funds are spent on propaganda.

V

Of all the innovations which affected diplomacy
since the war, the most important is the League of
Nations. It is not my purpose to examine the
origins of the League idea, or to consider what
were the causes and mistakes which have rendered
it, at moments of trial, inadequate to its own
purposes. It is easy to say that it is based upon a
conception of international unselfishness „ which,
were it a true' conception, would render any league
unnecessary. It is eksy to say that, the League
became impossible so soon as any one Great Power
17a

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

either left or defied it ; that its identification with
the maintenance of the Peace Treaties destroyed
from the outset its moral authority ; that its con-
duct at the time of the Silesian settlement or the
Corfu incident should have warned all but senti-
mentalists that it was essentially opportunist and
timid ; and that the instinct of self-preservation
which is at the root of all policy must deter any
country from risking an unsuccessful war for the
sake of another. Such criticism is self-evident ;
but it is not final. The League idea is certain,
unless force triumphs in Europe, to emerge again.

Meanwhile, the continued existence of the League
since 1920 has modified in some important respects
the older practices of diplomacy. Apart from the
fundamental conception of an organization of
mutual insurance against war; apart from the
surrender of national sovereignty which a strict
adherence to the Covenant would imply; the
League represents an innovation in all previous
attempts at international co-operation, and for
three main reasons. In the first place it is based
upon a covenant or body of rules and principles.
In the second place it holds annual meetings in a
definite Tocality and at a definite time. And in
the third place it possesses a permanent secretariat
of trained international experts.

This third innovation, as I Tiave indicated above,
is not the least in importance. Men and women

173

DIPLOMACY

of different nationalities are collaborating con-
stantly together for certain common aims ; they
have no desire to impose any national doctrine or
to serve any national interest ; their ambition is to
ascertain the truth about the political and economic
factors which make for unrest ; and in pursuing that
ambition they acquire a truly international spirit and
are able to transfer something of that spirit to the
politicians who attend the Councils and Assemblies.

Even if it could be argued that the League has
ceased to be a determining factor in political appease-
ment, it could not be denied that its economic and
social activities are of the greatest importance. It
is to be hoped that, if the world recovers its sanity,
it will be through such organizations that it will
come to realize again that co-operation is a better
thing than conflict.

A further, and so far more successful, experi-
ment in international co-operation is the ^British
Commonwealth of Nations. The independent sta-
tus acquired by the British Dominions was
emphasized by their direct representation at the
Paris Conference and by their signature, as separate
countries, pf the treaties of peace. The Imperial
Conference of 1926 defined the position of the
Dominions in the following terms :

** They are autonoiiious Communities within the
British Empire, equal in status, in no way sub-
174

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

ordinate one to another in any aspect of their
domestic or external affairs, though united by a
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely
associated as members of the British Common-
wealth of Nations/’

This principle was given legislative sanction by
the Statute of Westminster of December ii, 1931.

The British Commonwealth of Nations is a
completely new experiment in the adjustment of
the relations between independent States. No
previous league, federation, or coalition has in
this way dispensed with all written constitutions
or treaties of alliance. It is evident that so
fundamental a departure from all previous prece-
dent must raise many new problems, not the least
of which are those connected with the framing
and conduct of foreign policy.

Co-ordination between the several members of
the Commonwealth is secured by three main
methods. In the first place a conference of all
the members is held every four years. In the
second place each member may be represented in
the capital of each other member by a High
Commissioner. And in the third place the
governments of the several Dominions may, if
they so desire, receive full information from the
British Government regardifig current issues in
foreign affairs or on questions which are of

17s

DIPLOMACY

common interest to all the members of the Com-
monwealth.

The Dominions may, if they wish, maintain
diplomatic representatives of their own in foreign
capitals with the rank of envoys extraordinary and
ministers plenipotentiary. Thus Canada has her
own envoys in Paris, Washington and Tokyo ;
South Africa in Rome, Washington and The Hague ;
and Eire in France, Germany, the United States
and at the Vatican. Conversely the French main-
tain legations in Canada and Eire ; the United
States in Canada, South Africa and Eire, and
so on.

These Dominion Legations report direct to their
own governments and have no special connection
with the British Embassies in the capitals where
they exist. Although the Dominion governments
have not as yet established regular Foreign Offices
yet a section of the Prime Minister’s offices is
staffed, in Australia and Canada at least, by spec-
ialists in foreign affairs. In 1935 Australia created
a special ‘ Department of External Affairs ’ which
has now a staff of seventeen. A similar develop-
ment is taking place in Canada.

This glorious experiment is not, as yet, fully
understopd by foreign diplomatists. They imagine
that members of the British Commonwealth are
bound by some secret compact to support each
other in all international negotiations, and they
176

RECENT CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

are apt to resent the fact that the British Govern-
ment should (as they imagine) be able to control
the votes of her Dominions at any international
conference. This assumption is incorrect. There
is nothing which need prevent a Dominion govern-
ment from taking a wholly independent line in
foreign policy. The only stipulation which exists
is that passed by the 1923 Imperial Conference
under which members of the Commonwealth are
asked not to negotiate treaties with foreign govern-
ments ‘‘ without due consideration of its possible
effect upon other parts of the Empire, or on the
Empire as a whole.”

So loose a confederation would certainly crumble
were it not united by strong ties of sentiment and
by the fact that, whereas the interests and ambi-
tions of the several members seldom come into
acute conflict, their, needs^ of security and self-
preservation hold them together*

177

CHAPTER VIII

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

Precedence among States — Instances of the struggle for
precedence — Great and Small Powers — ^The modem
practice of raising the status of Legations into Embassies
— Precedence of ambassadors in various countries — ^The
appointment of an envoy — ^How he is selected — ^The
“ agrement — ^The arrival of an envoy — ^He presents his
letters — Differences in ceremonial — ^The recall of an
envoy — The Chauvelin case — ^The case of M. de St.
Quentin — The recognition of insurgents and revolu-
tionaries — Rupture of diplomatic relations — ^How an
envoy reports to his own government — ^His communi-
cations with the government to which he is accredited —
The functions of an envoy — Subjects with which he
deals — Social activities — ^Procedure at conferences and
congresses

Having discussed the various types of diplomatic
theory and practice and having considered the
changes which have been introduced since the war,
I now propose to examine certain rules of procedure
which hayje survived the vicissitudes of the last
hundred years and which are still generally recog-
nized by civilized governments as being those most
conducive to orderly diplomatic intercourse.

I have already referred to the question of pre-
cedence and have drawn attention to the fact that

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

it was many centuries before the nations of the
world came to agree upon this vexed problem.
Immense importance was attached by the old
diplomacy to the precedence, or order of import-
ance, of the several States.

In the old days the Pope claimed the right to
decide in what order the nations of the world
should be listed, and there exists a memorandum
of 1504 in which this order is laid down. The
Pope, not unnaturally, placed himself first among
the monarchs of » the earth. The Emperor came
second and after him his heir-apparent, “ The
King of the Romans.’’ Then followed the Kings
of France, Spain, Aragon and Portugal* Great
Britain came sixth on the list and the King of
Denmark last. This papal class-list was not
accepted without demur by the sovereigns con-
cerned. It often happened that a French Ambas-
sador h^d been instructed by his sovereign in no
case to yield precedence to the Spanish Ambas-
sador, whereas the latter had received exactly
similar instructions. Undignified scehes took place
at court functions ; at a court ball in London in
1768, a scuffle took place between the French and
Russian Ambassadors which terminated in a duel.

A classic example of these struggles for prece-
dence is the case of the Spanish Ambassador’s
carriage in 1661. It was in those days the custom
for foreign envoys to make their entry with a great
179

DIPLOMACY

apparatus of state. Their foreign colleagues were
expected to send their gala coaches in order to add
magnificence to the procession. Thus when, on
September 30, 1661, a new Swedish envoy dis-
embarked at the Tower wharf in London, both the
Spanish and the French Ambassadors had sent
their coaches to greet him. The Swedish envoy
sanded, entered the royal coach which had been
lent to meet him, and drove off. The French
Ambassador’s coachman edged his horses immedi-
ately behind the Swedish equipage, an action which
was regarded by the coachman of the Spanish
Ambassador as a direct insult to the King of Spain.
A struggle ensued which (since each coach had been
accompanied by some 150 armed men) assumed
serious proportions. The French coachman was
pulled from his box, two of the horses were ham-
strung, and a postilion was killed. Louis XIV
thereupon severed diplomatic relations witjj Spain,
and threatened to declare war unless a full apology
were given and the Spanish Ambassador in London
were punished. The King of Spain, anxious to
avoid hostilities, agreed to make the necessary
apologies and reparation.

It was not only at official receptions that this
conflict over precedence destroyed amity and
interrupted business. Before any international
conference there would be long, and occasionally
fruitless, negotiations regarding the order in which
180

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

the representatives of the several countries would
sit at the conference table. Even when that point
had been settled, a further difficulty arose as to the
order in which they would append their signatures,
A device was invented, called the ‘‘ alternat/’ by
which each representative signed his own copy of
the treaty first ; yet even this device provided for
no regular order in which the other signatures
should follow.

By Article 4 of the R^glement, laid down by the
Congress of Vienna in 1815, it was agreed that
diplomatic representatives should take rank accord-
ing to the date of the official notification of their
arrival. It also became established that pleni-
potentiaries at a conference should sign treaties in
alphabetical order.

This put an end to the more acute controversies
regarding precedence, but it left certain other
points unsettled. The generally accepted idea was
that only Great Powers could exchange ambas-
sadors, whereas the diplomatic representatives des-
patched or received by the Small Powers (or, as
they were tactfully called, ‘‘ Powers with limited
interests ’’) should be of the rank of* minister.
Yet who is to say which power is /‘great’’ or
“ small ” ? At the Paris Conference of 1919 the
five Great Powers of the United States, France,
Great Britain^ Italy and Japan styled themselves
“ The Principal Allied and Associated Powers/’

i8i

DIPLOMACY

and assumed the right to form the main Council
of the Conference to the exclusion of their smaller
allies. Yet the empirical nature of such distinctions
is shown by the variations in diplomatic rank
between the several Powers which have taken place
in recent years. At the beginning of Queen Vic-
toria’s reign Great Britain regarded only three
Courts as worthy of receiving ambassadors, namely,
Paris, St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Vienna
was raised to an embassy in i860, Berlin in 1862,
Rome in 1876, Madrid in 1887, Washington in
1893, Tokio in 1905, Brussels in 1919, Rio in 1919,
Lisbon in 1924, Buenos Aires in 1927, Warsaw in
1929, and Santiago in 1930. Since then, British
Ambassadors have also been appointed to China,
Egypt and Iraq. Many of these appointments
have been made without regard to the power,
status, or “ precedence ” of the countries concerned.
It is customary to deride these controversies over
formal precedence and to assume that we to-day
are wiser than our forefathers. Yet any student of
diplomatic practice will agree that when they
squabbled there was always some reasonable
nucleus for their disputes. To-day we often speak
of “ national prestige ” or ‘‘ national honour ” :
these important factors of power were, in the earlier
centuries, symbolized by the order of precedence.
It represented to them something analogous to what
** insults to the flag ” represented to later generations.

182

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

Even after the Congress of Vienna, this prece-
dence question was not wholly solved. A country
which enjoyed Legation rank was anxious to achieve
Embassy rank, if only for purposes of national
self-esteem. Thus when once the appointment of
ambassadors to capitals other than those of ad-
mittedly Great Powers became a general, if invidious
practice, it happened that other Powers* who
regarded themselves as the equals of those thus
honoured became incensed. And so far from the
appointment of ambassadors being a rare and
exclusive privilege, a situation developed in which
the denial of such appointment became an insult.
As a result ambassador-currency became inflated.

Even in those countries who are generally re-
garded as “ Great,” the precedence of ambassadors
is subject to variations. In monarchical countries
the diplomatic body have precedence immediately
below the members of the reigning family. In
Great Britain Ambassadors are given precedence
over anybody below the rank of Royal Highness.
Ministers are listed after dukes but before mar-
quesses. In France the Ambassadors and Ministers
have to sit below the Presidents of the Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies. In Washington the
Vice-President has pride of place. In' the South
American Republics an attempt has often been
made to seat foreign envoys below the members of
the Cabinet. This has not met with success. Yet,
183

DIPLOMACY

in present days, these things are settled by rules
which are known by all and tacitly admitted. It
is improbable that even a totalitarian ambassador
would to-day consider it desirable to organize a
scene.

11

I now come to the actual procedure which
governs the appointment of a diplomatic envoy
from one State to another. I shall take as my
example of the usual practice the system adopted
in the British Foreign Service.

The head of some mission retires, or is trans-
ferred elsewhere, and it becomes necessary to
choose his successor. In theory, this choice rests
entirely with the Foreign Secretary, yet he will be
guided in his selection by the advice of his per-
manent officials. In former days this advice was
tendered by his own Private Secretary; more
recently, it was found that this system was regarded
as invidious, and a small appointments-committee
of senior officials has been established for this pur-
pose. If the post which has to be filled is of great
importance the Foreign Secretary will consult
with the Prime Minister or even the Cabinet as a
whole. In the British service there is nothing to
prevent the Secretary of State from appointing
someone outside the professional ranks. Some of
the most successful British Ambassadors (and
184

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

notably Lord Bryce, Lord D’Abernon, Lord Crewe
and Lord Derby) had never been members of the
Diplomatic Service. The present tendency is
only to make these outside appointments in excep-
tional circumstances.

Having decided on a suitable person, the Secret
tary of State then writes him a private letter offering
the post. It is always possible that the incumbent
may plead ill-health or domestic reasons and may
ask to be excused. The British Foreign Office is
considerate in such cases. If he accepts, the next
step is to obtain the agrement of the country to
which he is to be sent. It is customary to make
private enquiries before asking officially whether a
given individual is likely to prove a persona
grata. The government to which the enquiry
is addressed will, if in any doubt, consult their own
embassy as to the character and antecedents of
the person suggested. If the agrement is refused,
some mortification will result, and the rejected
envoy will be. glad if he has had sufficient discretion
not to inform his friends of the offer which had
been made to him.

If the agriment is given, the incumbent of the
post will return to London and make the necessary
preparations for his departure. In former days an
ambassador or minister proceeding to a new post
was provided ^with written instructions, and many
of these instructions were in the nature of important
i8s

DIPLOMACY

State Papers. Now that the head of a mission
abroad can ask for instructions at any moment this
practice has lapsed. Such instructions as he
receives will be conveyed in verbal interviews with
the head of the department concerned and with
the Secretary of State. There will also be available
for him at the Foreign Office the annual reports
of his predecessors, the reports upon local nota-
bilities, and the reports upon the members of the
diplomatic body in the capital to which he is being
sent. A study of these reports will enable him,
before leaving, to obtain a rough idea of the prob-
lems, personalities and colleagues with which and
whom he will have to cope.

He will then notify the staff of his future mission
of the date and hour of his arrival. The old cere-
monies of a state entry have in modern diplomatic
procedure been abandoned. In Persia, until quite
recently, it was still the custom to greet a new
minister at the frontier at a ceremonial reception
or ‘‘ istiqbaiy Yet even this kindly function has
now been abolished, and the modern practice is to
defer all ceremony until the official audience at
which th^ new ambassador or minister presents
his credentials.

The ceremonial prescribed for such occasions
differs in the several countries. In Spain; before
the revolution, the ambassador and his staff were
conducted from the embassy in a long file of gala

. i86

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

coaches with all the panoply of a royal procession.
On arriving at the Palace they were greeted by the
court officials and led to the royal presence through
tapestried corridors lined by halbadiers.

In Washington the procedure is less decorative.
The Ambassador drives in his own car to the State
Department, whence he is accompanied by the
Secretary of State to the White House. They enter
the Blue Room and the Secretary of State then dis-
appears for the purpose of notifying the President
that they have now arrived. The President then
enters, accompanied by his Secretary. The Ambas-
sador reads his address and the President replies.
The proceedings are then terminated.

The speeches delivered on such occasions are of
a purely formal character and it is considered a
breach of etiquette to mention in them any subject
of controversy which may exist between the two
governnjents.

Having presented his letters of credence, the
envoy is then regarded as well and truly accredited.
His next duty is to call upon the members of the
Cabinet and upon his diplomatic colleagues. It
will be many days before he has completed these
irksome duties and is able to settle down to his work.

in

The presentation of letters of credence at the
outset of a mission is a more important, and more
187

DIPLOMACY

ceremonial, function than the presentation of letters
of recall at its termination. It is, for instance, a
quite usual practice that an ambassador should be
transferred from one post to another without pre-
senting such letters, and in that case they are
delivered by his successor at the same time as he
presents his own letters of credence.

Apart from the normal procedure which is fol-
lowed when an envoy is either accredited or re-
called, there are certain rules which apply to
abnormal situations. Such a situation arose at the
end of 1792 between Pitt and Chauvelin, the
Minister of France. Chauvelin ’s letters of credence
had been in the name of Louis XVI, and when that
monarch was deposed on August 10 he remained
in England, but was only recognized as the agent
of a de facto government in Paris. He continued,
however, to address Notes to the British Govern-
ment in an ofiEcial capacity and on December 31,
1792, Pitt instructed Lord Grenville to address to
him a sharp reminder:

“ I have received, Sir, from you a Note in which,
styling yourself minister plenipotentiary of France,
you communicate to me, as the King's Secretary
of State, the instructions which you state to have
yourself received from the executive council of the
French Republic.

You are not ignorant, that since the unhappy
188

POINTS OF DIPLOMA’PIC PROCEDURE

events of the loth of August, the King has thought
proper to suspend all official communications with
France. You are yourself no otherwise accredited
to the King, than in the name of His Most Christian
Majesty. The proposition of receiving a minister
accredited by any other authority or power in
France, would be a new question, which, whenever
it should occur, the King would have the right to
decide according to the interests of his subjects,
his own dignity and the regard which he owes to
his allies, and to the general system of Europe.

I am therefore to inform you. Sir, in express
and formal terms that I acknowledge you in no
other public character than that of minister from
His Most Christian Majesty, and that consequently
you cannot be admitted to treat with the King’s
ministers in the quality, and under the form, stated
in your Note.’’

When, three weeks later, Louis XVI was executed,
M. Chauvelin was dismissed the country.

An analogous difficulty arises when a sovereign
has assumed a title which is not recognized by other
countries. Thus when the King of Italy was
named Emperor of Ethiopia by Mussolini a situa-
tion of great diplomatic complexity was created.
The former French Ambassador had already left
Rome and his^ successor, M. de St. Quentin, had'
already been appqinted. It was evident that the
189

DIPLOMACY

latter would not be received in Rome if he failed
to bring with him proper letters of credence, yet
in those letters the name and titles of the King of
Italy would have to be set out in due form. If
that superscription omitted the words ‘‘ Emperor
of Ethiopia/’ M. de St. Quentin would not have
been granted an audience ; if they contained them,
it would mean that France had officially recognized
the conquest of Abyssinia. For many months this
problem proved insoluble, and France was until
recently only represented at the Quirinal by a
charge d’affaires.

In the event of the death or abdication of a
sovereign new credentials are necessary, but they
are not usually presented with similar ceremonial.
The death or retirement of a president does not
affect the validity of letters of credence delivered
either to or by his predecessor.

A far more complicated problem is raised when
a regime to which an envoy has been accredited
is overthrown by revolution. There is, as I have
said, no general rule governing the recognition of
governments established by revolutionaries or insur-
gents. The decision to recognize or not to recog-
nize is determined by expediency, although the
principle is generally followed that no revolutionary
government is recognized until it has established
some degree of orderly administration over a suffi-
ciently wide area. The practice adopted by the
190

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

British Government in such cases has never been
uniform. Sometimes recognition has been with-
held for a long period. At other times de facto
recognition has been given almost at once. Occa-
sionally, recognition has been conditional, as when
British recognition of the Portuguese Republic was
made conditional upon confirmation of the new
regime by a general election. And on occasions
(such as the Greek plebiscite of 1924, or the 1930
revolution in the Argentine) full de jure recognition
has been accorded immediately.

It is often necessary, none the less, to open
contact with a revolutionary government and this
is done by means of an accredited agent. Such
agents do not deliver letters of credence, since that
would imply recognition, but are provided with a
Note signed by the Secretary of State and indicat-
ing that they are authorized to negotiate with the
authorities upon a de facto basis.

Complicated, and even painful, as the opening of
diplomatic relations may sometimes be, it is their
rupture which causes the greatest anguish. The
termination of a mission may be due to several
causes, only some of which are agreeable. Thus,
an envoy may make himself so objectionable to
the government to which he is accredited that his
recall is demanded. In that event he is generally
allowed to proceed on indefinite leave of absence.’’
In extreme cases he is actually handed ,his pass-
191

DIPLOMACY

ports ’’ or told to leave the country, as happened
to Chauvelin and Bulwer. It may occur even that
the State to which he has been accredited ceases
suddenly to exist, as Austria ceased in 1938. It
may be that war is declared. Or it may be that
one government decides to “ break off diplomatic
relations.” This latter expedient is by no means
always a prelude to war and is often resorted to as
a means of expressing profound moral indignation.
Thus the British Minister was withdrawn from
Belgrade after the assassination of King Alexander
and Queen Draga, even as a similar diplomatic
rupture occurred when Colonel Plastiras murdered
M. Gounaris and his ministers in November igzz.

IV

Once an envoy has presented his letters of
credence and paid his official calls he is said to
have ** assumed his funptions.” These functions
fall, for the most part, under two headings ; he
reports to his own government and he negotiates
with the government to which he has been
accredited.

His reports to his own government will take
different forms. There is in the first place the
formal despatch, which is addressed to the Secre-
tary of State, carries a serial number, and is signed
by the head of the mission. These despatches are
drafted in a prescribed form. They begin ‘‘ Sir ”
192

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

(or “ My Lord ’’ if the Foreign Secretary be a peer)
and they generally open with some phrase giving
a reference to previous correspondence on the
same subject. Despatches from a Foreign Secre-
tary tO' an ambassador or minister abroad are also
framed in a similar form. The words used in ter-
mination vary according to the rank of the person
addressed. To an ambassador, the Secretary of
State signs as follows :

I am, with great truth* and respect,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

In former days the additional word “ humble
was added after ‘‘ obedient ” but Lord Curzon,
when he became Foreign Secretary, considered
this word inapplicable to the circumstances and it
was thereafter abandoned. To a minister, the
termination is identical except that the word
‘‘ regard ’’ is submitted for the word “ respect.”
To a charge d'affaires, both the respect and the
regard are omitted and the line ends (somewhat
curtly perhaps) with the word “ truth.”

In all urgent matters an envoy will communicate
with his government by code telegram. These
telegrams are alsb numbered. In recent years the
telephone has also been much used in diplomatic
communication.

On secondary matters, or matters of only tech-
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DIPLOMACY

nical importance, the envoy will report in the form
of a memorandum (sometimes supplied by one of
his staff) enclosed in a short covering despatch.
Reports from consuls, or memoranda of incidental
importance, are sent under cover of a “ Printed
Letter ” drawn up in the third person.

In addition to these official despatches (which are
entered in the Foreign Office registries and printed
for circulation, if necessary, to the ' Cabinet and
other missions abroad) there exists the practice of
writing private letters by bag addressed either to
the Secretary of State or to 'the Permanent Under-
secretary. Many controversies have arisen over
the question whether such private correspondence
is the property of the State or of the writers and
recipients. Lord Salisbury, when he retired, took
all his private letters with him down to Hatfield
and considerable confusion was thereafter occa-
sioned by gaps in correspondence. Si** Eyre
Crowe, when Under- Secretary, had a prejudice
against private letters and did his best to discourage
the practice. Yet, in fact, there are many things
which can be said in a private letter which could
scarcely be- said in the formality of an official des-
patch, and the practice, when not exaggerated or
abused, is a useful one.

In his communications with the government to
which he is accredited an ambassador will also
adopt several different methods. There is the
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POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

OfScial Note which is signed and drafted in a
conventional form. There is the Note Verbale
which differs only from the Official Note by being
unsigned. There are memoranda, and aide-
memoires. And there are verbal representations,
which adopt every gradation of formality, from the
official demarche to a casual conversation at some
social function.

/ Those who have no experience of diplomacy,
frequently wonder how an ambassador spends his
time and what are the subjects on which he reports
to his government. It will perhaps throw some
light upon the functions of an envoy if I describe
a typical twenty-four hours in an ambassador’s life.

He will, if he is wise, begin "his morning by
dictating to his stenographer, in diary form, the
events and conversations of the previous day. He
will then read with care the local newspapers and
consult* with his Press attache upon the significance
of any given article. By that time his chancery
will have decoded the telegrams which have come
in overnight. These telegrams may contain in-
structions or ask for information and advice. He
will draft his replies to these telegrams and, if
necessary,- fix an appointment with the Foreign
Minister or Under- Secretalfy. The despatches and
letters which have arrived by the morning’s post
will by then* have been opened, entered in the
registry, and minuted for suggested action by the
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DIPLOMACY

Staff. Matters affecting the military, naval, air,
commercial or financial attaches will have been
referred to them for their comments. The ambas-
sador will read the more important of these des-
patches and letters and give instructions as to the
action to be taken. By midday the interviews will
begin. It may be that some foreign colleague
comes to‘ consult him, that some prominent journa-
list desires an interview, that a commercial magnate
asks for assistance, that some consul has to come
up to the capital to report or that some distressed
fellow-citizen, either resident or travelling in the
country, needs comfort and advice. A large pro-
portion of the time of embassies and legations is
absorbed by complaints of ill-usage on the part of
their nationals.

In the afternoon the ambassador may see the
Foreign Secretary and in that event he will need,
immediately on his return, to write a repoft to his
government while his memory is still fresh. More
telegrams will have come in and more despatches
have to be either read or written. An embassy
has no regular hours and no week-ends. At
moments of calm,‘ there may be many hours for
relaxation. In times of crisis every member of the
staff is glad to work* both day and night.

What, then, are the subjects which form the
topic of all these reports, negotiations and des-
patches ? Let us take as an example the envoy
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POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

of a small power in London. There will be cer-
tain matters bf direct interest to his country on
which he will negotiate with the British Govern-
ment, His government may desire a loan, or a
reduction of the tariff on their exports, or British
support at Geneva, or a word of warning to be
given to one of their neighbours. All this will
require a considerable amount of correspondence
and many interviews. Yet in addition to this he
is expected to keep his government informed of
the main trends of British policy. He would be
expected, for instance, to inform them of the
parliamentary position of the government in power ;
of the strength of the opposition ; of the attitude
of the Trades Union Congress ; of the relations
between the Prime Minister and his colleagues ;
of the progress of the British armament programme ;
of the state of public opinion in regard to other
Powers*; of the condition of employment, health
services and finances ; of the incidence of taxa-
tion ; of the cost of living ; and, in fact, of any
development or event which would enlighten his
government on conditions and personalities in
Great Britain, so as to enable them to' base their
policy upon a sure knowledge of existing facts and
of probable future tendencies.

The social activities of an envoy are also of
importance. *He is expected to maintain a style
commensurate with the dignity of the country he
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DIPLOMACY

represents. He is expected to entertain frequently,
to give large official dinner-parties and balls, and
to invite olSicials, colleagues and men of business
to constant informal meals. He is required to
cultivate the intimacy of persons of eminence or
influence in the country in which he resides ; to
display a lively interest in local industries, art,
sport and letters ; to visit the provinces and acquaint
himself with industrial and agricultural conditions ;
and to keep in friendly contact with those of his
countrymen who share his exile.

All this takes time.

V

Such then is the general life and procedure of the
diplomatist. For the more detailed points of
precedence or etiquette the reader is referred to
Sir Ernest Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice.
It remains, in concluding this chapter, to say a few
words about the usual procedure at conferences
and congresses.

The invitations to a conference are generally
issued by the government of the country in which
the conference is to be held. This rule is not
always observed. The invitations to the Algeciras
Conference were issued in the name of the Sultan
of Morocco, although the Conference was held in
Spain.

The delegates or plenipotentiaries nominated
198

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

by the several parties to the conference vary in
status according to the importance of the subjects
to be discussed. At the great conferences of
history the Powers have usually been represented
by their prime ministers or foreign secretaries.
At minor conferences some diplomatist is generally
chosen as delegate. For technical conferences it is
usual to select specialists.

It is customary, although not obligatory, to
elect as chairman of the conference the senior
delegate of the country in which the conference is
held. When the conference is held in a country
which is not itself participating in the conference
some dfficulty is liable, under this heading, to arise.
Thus the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 was
opened by the President of the Swiss Federation,
who thereafter withdrew. A controversy then
arose as to whether the British, French or Italian
senior •delegates should take the chair. A com-
promise was arranged under which each of the
three should preside in turn. Lord Curzon evaded
this compromise by insisting that it only applied
to plenary sessions and not to sessions when the
conference met as a committee. He then secured
that it always should meet in committee, and as
he was himself chairman of the" main political
committee he retained the chair at all but two
meetings.

The Secretary General of a conference is usually
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DIPLOMACY

selected from among the officials of the country
where the conference is held. When the confer-
ence takes place in a neutral country, the Secretary
General is apt to be a member of the French
delegation. He has under him a composite staff
composed of the secretaries of the other delegations.
The function of this body is to arrange the work
of the conference, prepare the agenda, and above
all to draft and circulate its minutes.

At important conferences, at which a large
number of countries are represented, it is usual
to restrict the plenary -sessions to a few formal
occasions. The subjects to be discussed are gener-
ally divided up into categories, and committees are
appointed from among the several delegations to
examine these subjects and to report to the main
conference. The recommendations of these com-
mittees are usually put into proper form by a
“ Drafting Committee consisting of expert-jurists.

At the Paris Peace Conference an unusual and
somewhat drastic method was employed. The
Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrogated
to themselves the whole conduct of the Conference,
and formed themselves into a Council of Ten on
which sat the first and second delegates of the
five Great Powers. At a later date even this body
was not found to be sufficiently exclusive and the
direction of the Conference passed to the Council
of Four, consisting of M. Clemenceau, President
200

POINTS OF DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE

Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Orlando.
The smaller Powers were only invited to attend the
plenary sessions, which, in consequence, were few
and very far between.

A difficult problem which arises at all confer-
ences is the problem of publicity. The usual
practice is for the conference to agree before the
end of a meeting upon the terms of a communique
to be issued to the Press. It invariably happens,
however, that each delegation has its own pet cor-
respondents to whom additional, and frequently
quite inaccurate, information is divulged. Much
bitterness and anxiety is caused by this in-
convenience.

When agreement has been reached at a con-
ference the results are embodied in a Treaty, Final
Act, Convention or Protocol, and the signatures
and seals of the several delegates are attached. The
treaty 4s then handed over for safe custody to the
Foreign Office of the country in which it has been
signed. It is there also that the ratifications, if
forthcoming, are eventually deposited.

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G2

CHAPTER IX

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

The British system — Origins of an organized diplomatic
service — ^The reforms introduced from Pitt to Grey —
The nomination system — ^The income qualification —
Steps which a candidate should take to gain admission
— ^The referees — The Selection Board — ^The examination
— ^Ranks and salaries in the present Foreign Service —
Differences between British and foreign practice — ^The
German, French and American systems — ^The Consular
Service — ^The problem of fusing all branches into one
single service — ^Arguments in favour of such fusion

In previous chapters I have shown how, with
increasing contact and communication between
States, it was found useful to base international
relations upon some recognized system of procedure
and to entrust the execution of that procedure to a
permanent staff of professional negotiators. That
staff is to-day described as “ the diplomatic service
or ** the foreign service/’ In my present chapter
I propose to examine how the British diplomatic
service became an organized profession ; what are
the regulations which' to-day govern its recruitment
and internal organization and how the British
system compares with that adopted in the United
States, France and Germany.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE

No recognized diplomatic service existed in
Great Britain until after the Congress of Vienna in
1815. When I entered the service/’ wrote Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe, “ there was, so to speak,
no such thing at all.” In the eighteenth century
there were only two Departments of State, which
were called the Northern and the Southern Depart-
ments. These Departments dealt, upon no very
stable system, both with external and internal
affairs. When Pitt was Prime Minister he had
two Under-Secretaries and nine clerks attached
to his office, but their functions were as various
as those which are now exercised by the Prime
Minister’s secretariat. In 1782 the Northern
Department became the Foreign Department,”
and in 1790, when this Department was transferred
to Downing Street, the rudiments of a Foreign
Office were created. A permanent Under-Secre-
tary w5s appointed with a salary of £1,500 a year*
He was assisted by a chief clerk, two senior cl€1:k$,
nine junior clerks, a Latin secretary, and a ‘‘ De-
cipherer of Letters.” In iSzz this staff was
increased and the first steps were taken to create
a regular service of officials who would be attached
to missions abroad.

Until that tinae it had been customary for an
ambassador to select his own staff from ^such
eligible young gentlemen as were personally recom-
mended to him, much' as a 'viceroy selects his
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DIPLOMACY

aides-de-camp to-day. These young men were
not paid by the State, although in exceptional
cases they were accorded some expense allowance
out of the ambassador’s personal salary. They
were housed and fed in the embassy and formed
part of what was technically known as “ the Ambas-
sador’s family.”

This system of recruitment lingered on through-
out the nineteenth century. In mid-Victorian
times it was quite usual to find a secretary of
embassy working upon a purely" voluntary basis ■
even after sixteen ;^ears of service. And so late
as igi8 a young man who entered the Diplomatic
Service was obliged to guarantee that for the first
two yeai's he would be possessed of a private in-
come of not less than £400 a year. One of the
most important recommendations of the Macdonnell
Committee of 1914 was the abolition of this income
qualification, and when in 1920 the wholfe scales
of salary were adjusted so as to enable the junior
members of the Diplomatic Service to support them-
selves without private means a great step was taken
towards the democratization of the foreign service, /

Originally the appointment, or nomination, of
an attach^ in the British diplomatic service rested
entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State.
The only qualifications demanded were the pos-
session of a private income of not leSs than £400
and two months’ probation in the Foreign Office.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE

In 1856 Lord Clarendon introduced an entrance
examination with a high qualifying standard in
French and handwriting. Under Lord Granville
this qualifying examination was altered to a com-
petitive examination. In 1871 a Select Committee
recommended that candidates for the diplomatic
service need only have an examination in hand-
writing provided they had taken their degree at
Oxford or Cambridge. This recommendation was
not adopted. In 1905 Lord Lansdowne changed
the whole system of entry by decreeing that candi-
dates for the Foreign Office or the Diplomatic
Service should pass the usual Civil Service examin-
ation plus a high qualifying standard in French
and German. A further reform was instituted by
Sir Edward Grey in 1907 when he removed the
selection of candidates for nomination from the
hands of the Private Secretary and entrusted it to
a Selection Board ’’ upon which outside bodies
were represented. Until 1918 the Foreign Office
and the Diplomatic Service had been regarded as
separate organizations and a candidate could choose
which of the two branches he desired to compete
for. In July of that year Lord Cecil informed
the House of Commons that in future these two
branches would be fused into a single organization
to be known as “ The Foreign Service/’ and that
the property® qualification was henceforward to be
abolished.

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DIPLOMACY

Such are the main changes which have been
introduced into the British foreign service since the
days of Pitt. It remains to examine what were the
ideas behind these changes.

Ii

It will have been seen from the above that, until
1918, a young man could not become a member
of the British foreign service until he had satisfied
three main conditions, namely (i) guaranteed a
personal income of ^400 a year ; (2) received a
nomination entitling him to enter the examination ;
(3) passed the examination. Condition No. i
has now been abolished ; the nomination and the
examination (although much altered) still remain.

Let us first discuss nomination. Under the old
system, as it existed in Lord Clarendon’s day,
the examination was less important than the nomin-
ation. It has been said that the system** led to
nepotism and it would in fact be impossible to
maintain it to-day. Yet it had its merits. In the
first place the Secretary of State, before granting
a nomination, took great pains to ascertain whether
the young man in question was suited to a diplomatic
career and likely to do credit to his country in that
capacity. In the second place, having obtained
his nomination and passed his qualifying test, he
was only admitted as an attache .on probation.
Whereas the nomination may have led to
206

THE FOKEIGiN bEKVlGE

favouritism, and whereas the examination was
largely a formality, the probation period was most
exacting. It was possible for the head of a mission,
by constant observation of an attache, to report
whether, at the end of his probation period, he
should or should not be admitted as a salaried
member of the profession. The percentage of
rejections was a high one and it was this system
of gradual “ weeding-out ” which provided Great
Britain with her excellent ambassadors of 1880 to
1910.

The competitive system introduced by Lord
Granville was not, in practice, an improvement on
the former method. The old system of nomin-
ation remained in force, but the examination,
instead of being a formality, became a very practical
reality. Even as an examination, it was ill-con-
ceived. An exacting standard was demanded in
French, German, Italian, Spanish and geography..
It thus became essential for any young man who
hoped to prevail over other competitors (some of
whom might be of mixed parentage and therefore
bilingual) to spend some four years on the continent
after leaving school. In the intervals of living in
foreign families or pensions the candidates would
cram geography at the institution of Mr. Scoones.
The products of this system were not at all the
products that the State required. It was found
that these young men might be extremely proficient
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DIPLOMACY

in languages, but that they knew little else. Nor
was this all. It had been easy enough to weed
out the probationers under the old system since
their nomination as attaches had been merely an
act of favour : it was far more difficult to reject a
young man at the end of his probationary period
if he had spent years of his youth in studying for a
difficult competitive examination.

It was for this reason that in 1905 Lord Lans-
downe insisted upon a candidate passing the
ordinary Civil Service examination plus a qualifying
examination in French and German. By reducing
the amount of languages which must be taken and
by insisting upon the ordinary Civil Service standard
he drove his young candidates away from the
Florence family or the Malaga pension and towards
the more constructive discipline of the British
universities. This was certainly an improvement.

The problem of nomination still remains. A
candidate who wishes to enter the Foreign Service
is still obliged to appear before a Selection Board
before he can even enter the examination. This
Board does not consist exclusively of members of
the Foreign Service, but contains members of Parlia-
ment from all parties, a representative of the
Civil Service Commission and a representative of
the universities. The Board are not guided in
their selection by social qualifications or charm ;
their sole aim is to nominate those young men
208

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

who seem to possess the type of personality likely
to be effective in modern diplomatic intercourse.
Yet the fact remains that many candidates who
might wish to present themselves for nomination
are deterred by the legend that they will be judged
only upon their social glamour or antecedents.
It will be many years before that legend is killed.

HI

What, therefore, are the practical steps which a
young man should take if he desires to enter the
British Foreign Service ?

In the first place he should realize that the
competition for entry is severe and that he has
small chance of succeeding in the examination unless
he has reached the standard of a good honours
degree. The cramming establishments of England
and the dancing-halls of the continent are littered
with indolent young men who state that. they are
studying for the diplomatic service.” The parents
of these young men should realize that they have
little chance of gaining admission when they come
up against competitors who may have gained
honours at Oxford or Cambridge. They are
merely wasting their time.

Supposing, however, that a youth of intelligence
and industry is determined to compete for a post
in the, Foreign Service, his first action should be
to write to the Secretary, Civil Service Commission,
2og

DIPLOMACY

Burlington Gardens, W.i, and ask to be furnished
with the regulations governing application, nomin-
ation and examination. He will then receive a
batch of perfectly legible instructions telling him
exactly what he ought to do. He will probably find
that his parents (who are unaware that the whole
system has been changed) are convinced that the
moment he leaves school he must plunge into the
study of foreign languages. This is a dangerous
illusion. The standard required in French and.
German to-day should be easily acquired by any
gifted young man of ordinary application, provided
that he spends his long vacations, and some six
months after taking his degree, in France and
Germany. What is essential is that his proficiency
in the other subjects which he may select as his
quota for the examination must be up to the
standard of university honours. It will be difficult
for him to attain that standard without attending
the university. And, in fact, the boulevard or
Italianate type of young Englishman is not the type
which either the Foreign Office or the examiners
desire to obtain.

Among the many papers which the applicant
will receive from the Civil Service Commission will
be an Application Form.” This form must-be
completed and sent to the Secretary of the Civil
Service Commission not later than *the first of
March in the year in which the applicant wishes
‘ zio

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

to appear before the Selection Board. By complet-
ing this form the aspirant asks to be admitted
before the Selection Board at its next meeting on
the first Tuesday in May following. He is required
to give the obvious particulars regarding his age,
nationality, education and so on. He is also
expected to provide the names of two “ referees ”
who shall be ** responsible persons,*’ but not
relations or connected with the applicant’s school
or university.

This matter of referees occasionally causes ‘^ome
heart-burnings to the applicant aiid his parents.
The old legend that the Board of Selection will
be impressed if the, two referees are of ducal rank
has caused much distress to parents, the Board and
the two dukes involved. The best type of referee
is the man or woman whose name is likely to be
known to the Board as that of a person of public
experience and sound judgment. It is preferable
for the applicant to have a solid if undistinguished
referee who can state honestly that he has known
the applicant for many years, than a decorative
referee who merely says, “ This young man is the
son of one of my warmest supporters in my con-
stituency,^’ Referees with news-value are no good
at all.

Having sent in his form of application, the
aspirant will be informed that hp will be inter-
viewed by the Board at such and such a time

2II

DIPLOMACY

on the first Tuesday in the following May. He
will arrive punctually at Burlington Gardens with
beads of perspiration on his brow. He should keep
certain simple rules in mind. He should realize
that the Board is composed of humane and experi-
enced people who are perfectly well aware that he
is passing through a grave ordeal and that he is
not at his best. He should be very careful to
avoid affectation, untruthfulness, ostentation or the
more pungent brands of hair-wash. He will be
unable to avoid self-consciousness, and a certain
ingenuous bashfulness will not be out of place.
He wilTnot be asked difficult questions, but easy
questions. He should reply to these questions as
simply as possible, avoiding all epigram or paradox.
He must remember above all that the whole purpose
of the interview is to discover whether he be a
young man of probity, character and common sense.
If he bears these rules in mind, he may well feceive
his “ nomination or, as the phrase now goes, be
“ admitted to a competitive examination for appoint-
ment to the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service.’’

The first problem that will then arise is the
problem of age. A young man may appear before
the Board of Selection any May after his nineteenth
birthday. He cannot, however, take his examin-
ation unless he be over twenty-one or under twenty-
five. It is advisable to appear before^ the Selection
Board at a fairly early date, since, in the event
2X2

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

of rejection, no time should be lost in ^'deciding
upon some other profession. A candidate who is
not a British subject by birth, or who is mai'iied,
or who has an extremely delicate constitution, had
better not apply.

The examination generally takes place in July
of each year and a candidate would be well advised
to present himself the first July after his twenty-
first birthday. If he fails, then he has three further
chances before he is disqualified by having passed
the age limit of twenty-five. The papers sent him
by the Civil Seiwice Commission will contain a
syllabus of the examination with a statement of what
marks are given for each subject. Certain subjects
are obligatory. Every candidate must take French
and German, a period of Modern ^ History ,and
Elementary Economics. He must also be examined
in English and will have to write an essay upon
some general subject. A very important feature
of the examination is the Oral Examination, for
which as many as 400 marks are given. This
examination is in fact what the Americans call a
** personality test/’

Apart from these obligatory subjects, the candi-
date has a very wide range. He should realize
from the outset that the examination as a whole
has been devised to fit in with the university
curriculum. Thus he will obviously take for his
examination for the Diplomatic Service the same
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DIPLOMACY

subjects as he took for his university degree,
whether it be Greats,’’ Modern Greats, History,
Classics, Mathematics or Modern Languages^ .The
implication is that a university trainings is almost
obligatory as a condition of entry. That would be
to exaggerate the position. A very gifted and
assiduous young man might possibly succeed in the
examination without having set foot in any univer-
sity in England, Scotland or Wales. Yet he would
find himself competing with other candidates who
had all the advantages of university tuition, and
his battle would be a hard one.

When a candidate has successfully competed in
the examination he is obliged to undergo a medical
examination before final admission. This test
should not prove insuperable for any youth of
averagely sound constitution. Once he obtains
.his certificate of qualification, he can regard him-
self as a member of the foreign service. He will
be informed by the Private Secretary of the Foreign
Office where and when he should attend.

The old rank of attache, under* which a member
of the foreign service worked for two years without
pay, has now been abolished. A candidate who
has been successful in the examination now enters
directly as a Third Secretary with the salary attached
to that grade. If working at home he will receive
j£a75 a year, rising to £625. If he is serving abroad
he will receive ,£300 from the first moment plus
214

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

foreign allowance, which varies according to the
expense of the post to which he has been appointed.
These allowances are graded from ;£iSo to £450
for a bachelor and from ^£300 to £650 for a married
man. He will also receive a grant for local rent
and a contribution to the expense of purchasing
uniform.

After five years the Third Secretary is promoted
a Second Secretary, but his pay and allowances
are not increased. From that grade he passes,
at specified, and at times at weary intervals, through
the ranks of First Secretary, Counsellor, Minister
or Under-Secretary until he becomes an Ambas-
sador. On his retirement he will receive a pension
proportionate to the rank he has attained.

IV

The methods of recruitment, entrance and
appointment are not identical in every country.

In Germany, the Diplomatic and Consular Ser-
vices are regarded as one. Candidates have to
have the same qualifications for entry and they pass
the same examination. A man thus spends a cer-
tain proportion of his career in a diplomatic mission
and a certain portion as a member of a consulate
or consulate-general. , A candidate wishing to
enter fhe German foreign service has to pass
through seveM stages of probation^ He must first
pass a difficult examination in French and English.

2^5

DIPLOMACY

He is then taken on for a year in the Foreign
Office on probation. At the end of that year he
has a second examination. If successful in that
examination he is sent, again on probation, to a
mission or a consulate abroad. He is then recalled
to Berlin and, after three months’ intense study,
examined in international law, economics and
history. Only then does he receive the title of

Attache.”

In France the system, which dates from 1875,
even more complicated. There are two types of
examination, known respectively as ‘‘ Le Grand
Concours ” and “ Le Petit Concours.” Those
who are successful in the more difficult of these
two examinations, either enter the Diplomatic Ser-
vice as attaches, or become “ Consuls Suppleants.”
Those who only take the easier of the two examin-
ations become “ Attaches de Consulat.” The
difference between the two types of consul is that
whereas the first type become at once “ Consuls of
the third class,” the second type have to pass
through an intermediary stage of being Vice-
Consuls.

The French system differs from the British
system in that the gulf between the diplomatic
and the consular services is less wide. The only
difference is that promotion is more rapid for those
who have taken the ‘‘ Grand Concours ” than
for those who have only passed the ‘‘ Petit Con-
216

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

cours/^ Yet it is still possible for gifted men who
have entered as “ Attach6 de Consulat ” to reach
to the very top, and M. Alphand, at present French
Ambassador in Berne, started his career by passing
the ‘‘ Petit Concours.’’

The Grand Concours is a terrible ordeaL
It lasts for some two months, and is conducted
upon the “ weeding-out ’’ system. Thus the first
examination is in the English and German languages,
and counts for one quarter of the total marks. A
candidate at this stage is examined by a committee
of university professors presided over by a Coun-
sellor of Embassy or a Consul-General.

If a candidate, passes this first stage, he then
enters the second stage which is called le stage
professionel.'^ He has to appear before a com-
mittee of five members of the French foreign
service, to write an essay and a precis and to pay
visits of not less than ten minutes to each member
of the committee. If he survives this ordeal he
then has to take his final examination^ which is
conducted by university professors under the chair-
manship of an ambassador. During this stage he
is examined in history, geography and international
law. This examination is both written and oral.
The competition is generally severe, some fifty or
sixty candidates competing for an average of five
vacant posts.’*

The system now followed in the United States of
217

DIPLOMACY

America is even more interesting. In the old days,
before America became a World Power, it was
customary to give diplomatic appointments as
rewards for political services. To the more
important posts men of ability and reputation were
almost always appointed : yet it often occurred
that some minor legation was awarded to a poli-
tician whose intelligence and conduct were not
consonant with the dignity of the United States.
Nor was this the only disadvantage of the ‘‘ spoils
system.’’ The theory was that, since all diplomatic
appointments were in the gift of the President, they
should ‘be surrendered when one President was
succeeded by another. This meant that a change of
administration brought with it a complete change
in the diplomatic personnel. It thus came about
that the American diplomatic service was staffed
by a constant succession of temporary amateurs
who often found themselves at a disadvantage when
dealing with their professional colleagues. It was
the blatant inefSciency and wastage of this system
which led American public opinion to call for a
reform in the direction of creating a professional
foreign service staffed by permanent officials. This
demand took effect in the Reorganization Act of
the American Foreign Service,” which was first
put into effect in May 1924.

Under this Act the diplomatic and* consular ser-
vices were fused into a single organization and the
218

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

implication was that the service thus created would
offer a good career to any ambitious young man.
The entire service is to-day interchangeable as
between, the consular and the diplomatic branches,
although in practice these interchanges occur more
frequently in the lower grades of the service than
in the higher.

The number of political appointments has mean-
while been reduced. Of the seventeen American
embassies which exist to-day, nine are manned by
career men who have been promoted through the
ranks of the profession, one is now (September 1938)
vacant, and seven are filled by political appointees.
Of the thirty-nine separate American legations,
two are vacant and of the- remaining thirty-seven
one half are manned by career men and one half by
political appointees.

Recruitment for the American foreign service is a
simple matter. Any young man is entitled to apply,
but his application does not necessarily mean that
he will be allowed to take the examination. The
State Department examine the young man’s cre-
dentials and his educational record and if these
are unsatisfactory permission to stand for the
examination is withheld. The examination is
to-day very severe, and entails, as in Great Britain,
a high standard of university' education.

219

DIPLOMACY

V

In Great Britain young men who do not feel that
they are likely to compete successfully- in the
examination for the Diplomatic Service and the
Foreign Office, and who yet desire to join some
branch of the foreign service, may seek to enter
either the Consular Service or the Assistant Officer
grade in the Department of Overseas Trade.

The procedure which, in the event of that desire,
they should follow is similar^to that outlined ‘above
for entiy into the foreign service. They should
apply to the Secretary of the Civil Service Com-
mission in Burlington Gardens and study the
documents which he will send them. They also
will have to pass through three stages, namely
approval by a Board of Selection, a competitive
examination and a medical examination. Candi-
dates for the Consular Service will find that the
competitive examination is less exacting than that
laid down for diplomatic candidates, whereas the
medical examination is more severe. * Nor are the
conditions of employment, salaries or allowances
identical as between the two services.

The duties of a consular ojfficer are not the same
as those expected of a diplomatist. His main
functions are commercial and notarial. He is
expected to report upon commercial developments
at his post and to furnish assistance and information
220

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

to trade interests. A large part of his time will be
taken up with assisting British shipping and seamen
under the Merchant Shipping Acts and the Insur-
ance Acts. He will also be required to register
births, deaths and marriages and to deal with the
awkward, and indeed painful, problem of the
repatriation of distressed British subjects.

In the days of the capitulations, consuls also had
judicial functions to perform. These are gradually
dropping out of practice. Yet the glamour which,
in eastern countries, hangs round the person of a
consul has not as yet departed and there are many
occasions upon which a consular official of intelli-
gence and energy can furnish to his chiefs with the
most valuable political information.

The British consular service is among the finest
in the world. Complaints used in the past to be
made that our consular officials did not furnish to
their nationals that energetic support which the
German and American officials were expected to
‘accord. This criticism has now diminished, largely
owing to the active impulse given to the consular
service by the Department of Overseas Trade
working through tl^ Commercial Counsellors in
the several embassies and legations.

In the British foreign service the diplomatic
and the consular branches are not interchangeable
and in fact a gulf is fixed between them. This, in
my opinion, is a serious mistake. From time to
221

DIPLOMACY

time proposals have been made, and schemes
advocated, under which the whole foreign service
should be one large organism subject to the same
rules of recruitment, examination and promotion.
As yet, none of these schemes has come to fruition.
The main difficulties are those of finance and vested
interests. The financial problem, including the
adjustment of salaries, is very serious, but could
doubtless be surmounted were the Treasury con-
vinced that fusion was necessary. The problem
of vested interests is also a real one, but has been
much exaggerated. The argument is that it would
be unfair upon a man who had devoted much of
his time and capital to reaching the standard of the
diplomatic examination if he were suddenly placed
'on the same level as a man who had not made
similar efforts or sacrifices. There is much force
in this argument but it, also, is not insurmountable.

Under the present British system it is exceptional
for a consul to reach diplomatic rank. Men of
exceptional ability have, it is true, been appointed
ambassadors from the ranks of the consular service.
Such appointments are few, invidious, and far
between. I am convinced none the less that the
service as a whole would benefit were the two
branches to be completely fused with each other.
And for the following reasons.

The main weakness of the Briti^ Diplomatic
Service, as of the Foreign Office, is the accumulation
222

THE E0REI6N SERVICE

in the higher ranks of men who, although they
have made no serious blunders and have displayed
adequate judgment and energy, are not really fitted
for the responsibilities of their posts. It is difficult
to relieve such congestion without imposing hard-
ship upon quite worthy people. On the other
hand, the feeling that a solid wedge of worthies
blocks promotion is apt to tempt the more ambitious
man to leave the service while he is still young.
This tendency is often exaggerated by outside
observers who contend that the more ambitious
men always leave. That is not true. But the fact
Jremains that the more sedentary members of the
profession acquire the conviction that they will
eventually get their legation if only they avoid
making mistakes ; and that the more active mem-
bers are sometimes discouraged by the vision of
this large waiting-list among their official superiors.

The consular service on the other hand suffers
from lack of opportunity and outlet for ambition.
Things have been much improved during the last
twenty years and the theory that the consular
officials were necessarily the social and intellectual
inferiors of the diplomatic officials has, I am glad
to believe, largely died out. Yet faults remain.
These faults would, in my judgment, be largely
abolished if the two services were completely fused.

On the one hand you would obtain by this
fusion a greater number of posts wherewith to
223

DIPLOMACY

satisfy your worthy incompetents and at the same
time a larger number of posts whereby to encourage
initiative and ambition in the young. Instead of
feeling obliged to reward an elderly and .indolent
counsellor with the post of minister, it would be
possible to award him the not undignified shelf of
some consulate-general. Instead of stifling the
initiative and ambition of a young vice-consul by
blocking his rise to any but a consular post, you
could hold out to him the prospect of becoming
ambassador at some great capital. Even in the
junior ranks of the service interchangeability would
promote greater prowess. Had I myself spent
two years as a Vice-Consul at Adana, I should have
learnt much more about Turkey than I did as
Third Secretaiy to the Embassy at Constantinople.
Had the Vice-Consul at Adana spent one year, on
completely equal terms with the embassy staff,
at Constantinople, he would have acquired greater
political and social acumen. No arguments will
convince me that the fusion of the two services
would not be of great advantage to both.

Yet there is one condition which I should make.
The advantage of the old diplomatic service was
that, being a small group of men, it was possible
for those in whose hands lay the appointments to
have a shrewd idea of the personal value of each
member. If the service were enlarged by fusion,
this personal method of appraisal would become
224

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

less certain and more fortuitous. A filter would
thus have to be devised. For this purpose I should
suggest some institution analogous to the Staff
College. Under such a system young men of the
joint or amalgamated foreign service would be
obliged, after say eight years of service, to decide
whether or no they would enter for the Staff Col-
lege. It would generally be understood that only*
those who passed through the Staff College course
would be eligible for the higher appointments. The
course would in itself be devised to increase the
economic and political knowledge of those who
underwent it. And you would thereby get an
elite drawn from the whole service from which,
without invidious personal discriminations, the
higher posts could be filled.

Yet, such is human frailty, it may be many
years before this essential reform has been achieved.

CHAPTER X

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

The expression “ diplomatic language ” as implying
cautious under-statement — ^Advantages and disadvan-
tages of “ diplomatic language ’’ — ^Latin as the original
common language of diplomacy — Gradually superseded
by French — Decline after the war in the use of the
French language — Its suitability as a diplomatic medium
— Diplomatic phrases which are becoming obsolete —

Glossary of some current diplomatic expressions

The ’expression “ diplomatic language is used
to denote three diiferent things. In its first sense
it signifies the actual language (whether it be Latin,
French, or English) which is employed by diplo-
matists in their converse or correspondence with
each other. In its second sense it means those
technical phrases which, in the course of centuries,
have become part of ordinary diplomatic vocabu-
lary. And in its third, and most common, sense
it is used to describe that guarded under-statement
which enables diplomatists and ministers to say
sharp things to each other without becoming
provocative or impolite.

I propose in this chapter to begin by discussing
the last of these three meanings, then to examine
226

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

shortly the actual language employed by diploma-
tists, and at the end to provide a glossary of the
more current technical terms used in diplomatic
intercourse.

Diplomacy,’’ if I may repeat Sir Ernest Satow’s
definition, ** is the application of intelligence and
tact to the conduct of official relations between the
governments of independent states.” The need of
intelligence is self-evident, but the equally vital
need of tact is often disregarded. It is this latter
need which has led diplomatists to adopt a paper
currency of conventionalized phrases in place of
the hard coins of ordinary human converse. These
phrases, affable though they may appear, possess
a known currency value.

Thus, if a state,sman or a diplomatist informs
another government that his own government
cannot remain indifferent to ” some international
controversy, he is clearly understood to imply that
the controversy is one in which his government will
certainly intervene. If in his communication or
speech he uses some such phrases as ‘‘ His Majesty’s
Government view with concern ” or “ view with
grave concern,” then it is evident to all that the
matter is one in which the British Government
intend to adopt a strong line. By cautious grada-
tions such as these a statesman is enabled, without
using threatening language, to convey a serious
warning to a foreign government. If these warnings
227

DIPLOMACY

pass unheeded he can raise his voice while still,
remaining courteous and conciliatory. If he says,
“ In such an event . His Majesty’s Government
would feel bound carefully to reconsider their
position,” he is implying that friendship is about
to turn into hostility. If he says “ His Majesty’s
Government feel obliged to formulate express re-
servations regarding ...” he is, in fact, saying
“ His Majesty’s Government will not allow . .
The expression “in that event, my Government
will be obliged to consider their own interests,” or
“ to claim a free hand,” indicates that a rupture of
relations is being considered. If he warns a foreign
government that certain action on their part will
be regarded “ as an unfriendly act,” that govern-
ment interpret his words as implying a threat of war.
If he says that “ he must decline to be responsible
for the consequences,” it means that he is about
to provoke an incident which will lead t© war.
And if lie demands, even in terms of exquisite
politeness, a reply before “ six o’clock on the
evening of the a5th,” then his communication is
rightly regarded as an ultimatum.

The advantage of this conventional form of com-
munication is that it maintains an atmosphere of
calm, while enabling statesmen to convey serious
warnings to each other which will not be mis-
understood. The disadvantage is that the public
and sometimes even the statesmen themselves, are
aa8

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

not acquainted with the actual value, in diplomatic
currency, of the expressions used. " On the one -
hand an ignorant or incautious use of one of these
phrases may give to a given situation a gravity which
it does not possess. On the other hand, when a
really serious crisis arises, the public is apt to
assume from the mildness of the language used that
the crisis cannot be as grave as “ the alarmists
had given them to suppose.

In extreme cases, moreover, the habit of diplo-
matic ambiguity, or of diplomatic understatement,
leads to actual misunderstanding. I remember
before the war reading a despatch from some Consul-
General in which he informed the Foreign OfEce
that one of the Vice-Consuls under his charge does
not, I much regret to report, take that care of his
health which his medical advisers would recom-
mend.” The poor man was, in fact, in the last
stages* of delirium tremens.

Such exaggeration of the practice is not common,
and in all important international controversies
these paper-currency phrases are most carefully
scrutinized before they are used. It may be said
that the advantages of phrasing communications
between governments, or inqiportant pronounce-
ments on foreign affairs, in “ diplomatic language ”
far outweigh any disadvantages which the system
may possess,

229

DIPLOMACY

n

Until the eighteenth century the common lan-
guage, or lingua franca of diplomacy was Latin.
Not only did diplomatists write to each other in
Latin but they even conversed in that medium.
Such treaties as those of Westphalia (1648), the
Anglo-Danish Treaty of 1670, and the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1674 were all drafted and signed
in Latin and this was in fact the general practice.
During the course of the eighteenth century the
French made repeated efforts to secure the adoption
of their own language as the language of diplomacy.
These efforts were stubbornly resisted by the other
Powers. Thus, although the Treaty of Aix 4 a-
Chapelle of 1748 was signed in French, a special
article was inserted to the effect that this was not
to create a precedent. -A similar reservation was,
at the insistence of the other signatory Powers,
inserted into the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the
Treaty of Versailles of 1783, and even in the Final
Act of the Congress of Vienna.

In spite of these reservations, the French language
had, by the middle of the eighteenth century,
firmly established itself as, in all but name, the
official language of diplomacy. At the Congress of
Vienna in 1815 and the Congress of Paris in 1856
the proceedings were conducted in Frenph through-
out. It was in fact not until the Paris Conference
230

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

of 1918-19 that English was given equality of rights
with French. “ The Present Treaty ’’ — ^thus runs
the ratification clause of the Treaty of Versailles —
“ of which the French and English texts are both
authentic. . . It was that clause which finally
disposed of the claim of French to be the official
language of negotiation.

This was perhaps inevitable. It was evident that
the supremacy of the French language gave to
French diplomatists an advantage over their col-
leagues. In the days of the old diplomacy, when
the diplomatists of all countries were obliged to
be almost bilingual, this advantage was not so
preponderant. But with the advent of democratic
diplomacy, and the frequent handling of nego-
tiations by the elected representatives of the people,
it became a practical impossibility to converse in
French. Sir Edward Grey, for instance, could
scarcely speak French, although he claimed to
understand it. President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd
George were no linguists, and the practice thus
arose that the representative of each country could,
if he desired, speak in his own language, his words
being thereafter translated by an interpreter. This
practice has not proved so inconvenient as many
suppose. A trained interpreter can translate a
statement or a speech with great lucidity and speed ;
Professor J^antoux, who interpreted during the
Paris Conference, brought to his task a touch of
231

DIPLOMACY

gemus. The delay entailed is not inconvenient
to a negotiator who, having gathered the gist of the
previous remarks, is able, during the period of
translation, to ruminate on his own reply.

It was not only in conferences and congresses
that French held its supremacy. Ordinary diplo-
matic intercourse was, until the Treaty of Versailles,
conducted almost exclusively in that language.
The Far East, where English was the common
tongue, was an exception to this rule. In Europe
the whole process of notes, memoranda, and
ofEcial or social convers|tion, was conducted in the
French language. In the Russian diplomatic ser-
vice of Tsarist days many of the Russian Ambas-
sadors used French in their despatches to their
own government. And to this day, throughout
Europe, it is customary to accept French as the
current medium of diplomatic intercourse.

It is in some ways to be regretted that the old
practice is disappearing. It is of obvious con-
venience that there should exist some common
language in which Lithuanians can converse with
Portuguese, or Greeks with Danes. The absence
of such a generally accepted medium of communica-
tion leads to difficulties. The Embassy of a Great
Power in London recently issued invitations for an
official reception in its own nordic tongue. The
representative of a Middle Eastern potentate replied
to this invitation in Arabic. It was only with
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DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

jdifEculty that the Ambassador could discover
whether his guest had accepted or refused.

Nor can it be questioned that the French language
possesses qualities which entitle it to claim pre-
cedence over others for all purposes of diplomatic
intercourse. It is impossible to use French cor-
rectly without being obliged to place one’s ideas
.in the proper order, to develop them in a logical
sequence, and to use words of almost geometrical
accuracy. If precision is one of the major virtues
of diplomacy, it may be regretted that we are
discarding as our medium of negotiation one of the
most precise languages ever invented by the mind
of man.

HI

I now pass to a definition of some of the more
technical phrases employed in current diplomatic
usage? One may observe incidentally that many
of the expressions which were of common usage
in the nineteenth century are now obsolete. No
Secretary of State would to-day refer to his
colleagues in the Cabinet as “ His Majesty’s Ser-
vants.” The phrase “ The European System ” is
to-day devoid of meaning, while even the “ Concert
of Europe ” scarcely survived the European War.
Diplomatists no longer describe the German or the
Soviet Governments as “ The Northern Court§.”
The Russian Ambassador is no longer referred to
233 H2

DIPLOMACY

by the Kremlin as ‘‘ our Ambassador at the Court
of St. James’.'' It would cause bewilderment if
a minister were to refer, as Wellington referred, to
a massacre as the transactions complained of.”
And the confusion which occurs over the use of the
title “ Excellency ” would have much distressed a
diplomatist of the pre-war vintage.

A welcome change is the decline in the practice
(so dear to the foreign correspondents of English
newspapers) of calling the several Foreign Offices
by pet names. We still, occasionally, speak of the
French Foreign Office as ‘‘ The Quai d’Orsay,” and
of its German counterpart as “ The Wilhelm-
strasse.” Yet “ The Haus am Ballplatz ” is no
more : and the expression ‘‘ The Sublime Porte ”
(which even in its halcyon days was a mistranslation
of the words Bab Ali ” or ‘‘ Gate of Sublimity ”)
will shortly be recognizable only by students of
diplomatic history. *

I now pass to my glossary. My main authority
for the definitions given is Sir Ernest Satow’s
classic work, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice^ a
revised edition of which was published in 1932,
after having been scrupulously brought up to date
by Mr. H. Ritchie.

Accession. It is a frequent practice to insert an
“ accession clause into an international treaty
under which Powers who were not fepresented at
the negotiations and who did not sign the original

234

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

treaty can/* accede ’’ to it later. A good instance
is Article 22 of the International Opium Convention
of January 23, 1912, which provides that ** Powers
who have not been represented at this Conference
shall be admitted to sign the present Convention.’’

Accord. Matters of general international concern
which are not of sufficient importance to justify
a formal treaty or convention are frequently
arranged by means of an “ accord ” or “ agree-
ment,” The subjects dealt with by such agree-
ments are copyright, public health, pharmacopoeial
formulas, and so on.

Acte Final. It often occurs that at the conclusion of
some conference or congress it is found convenient
to draw up some formal summary or statement
of its proceedings. Such statements enumerate
the treaties signed as a result of the conference,
and often contain certain expressions of opinion,
or agreed comments, on the subjects discussed.
Such a summary is sometimes called ** Acte,”
** Protocol,” or “ Proems Verbal Final.” But the
expression ** Acte Final ” is more correct.

Ajd Referendum. A negotiator often finds it convenient
to accept some proposition on the part of those
with whom he is negotiating without comnjitting
his own government. He therefore accepts it
“ ad referendum,” meaning thereby ** subject to
the approval qf my government.”

Agr^ment or Agr]§ation. When one government
wishes to accredit an ambassador or a minister
to another government, it is necessary that the
individual selected should be approved by the
government of the country to which he is being
sent. It is customary, in order to avoid personal

235

DIPLOMACY'

embarrassments, to sound a* foreign government
privately before making a formal application for an
agrement. A famous instance of an agrement
having been withheld was when the Emperor
Nicholas of Russia refused to accept Sir Sti^tford
Canning as British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Asylum. It is generally accepted practice that a
political refugee who takes asylum in a foreign
country should not be deported back to his own
country from which he has escaped. A more
difficult question arises when a political refugee
takes asylum, not in a foreign country, but in a
foreign embassy or legation in his own capital.
In some Oriental countries, notably in Persia, this
system is much abused and whole tribes of poli-
ticians and their families take refuge or “ bast **
in a Legation compound in order to escape the
vengeance of their master. Prolonged negotiations
are often necessary before such refugees can be
induced to depart.

Attach^. There are three t3rpes of attach^. The first
are naval, military, air or commercial attachfe who
are generally senior officers and who are attached
to a mission for specialized services. The second
^ are diplomatic attache who represent the lowest
grade of diplomatic secretaries. Of recent years
this grade has in many countries been abolished
and the name of attach^ changed to Third Secre-
tary. The third type is that of the Honorary
Attach^, who is an unpaid volunteer, who is not a
permanent member of the service, but who is
generally a young man of private means and
excellent connections who spends a space of time
in an embassy nr legation between finishing his

5^36

university career and settling down to the serious
business of life.

Bag, the. An ambassador or minister communicates
with his government either by cypher telegram,
by •telephone, or in the form of written reports
and despatches. The latter are placed in mail
bags which are carried by special couriers or
‘‘ King's Messengers,” Occasionally the Foreign
OiEce bags are entrusted to the safe keeping of
the captains of British vessels and the whole
courier service has of late been much reduced.
The King's Messengers or couriers are provided
with special passports and their bags are inviolable.
In the old days members of missions abroad were
allowed to send and receive “ by favour of the
bag ” not only their private correspondence but a
large number of commodities. This privilege
has now been much restricted in so far as the
British diplomatic service is concerned. The day
on which the bag ” arrives or leaves is always
one of great activity in missions abroad. It is
called “ bag-day.” The French use a similar
expression — “ la valise.”

Belligerent Rights. This expression is one which
concerns international law rather than diplomatic
practice. Under international law a government
which is engaged in war possesses certain recognized
rights and duties. The most important of these
rights is that which enables them to declare a
blockade of the coasts and ports of their enemy.
Insurgents and revolutionaries do not possess these
rights until they are recognized as “ belligerents.”
The general practice has been to grant belligerent
rights to insurgents the moment 'it is clear that

237

DIPLOMACY

the situation has passed from the stage of a rebellion
into the stage of a civil war. But there is no
absolute rule governing such procedure.

Bilateral. See under Treaties.

Capitulations. The Powers were able in the course
of centuries to impose treaties on certain non-
Christian countries, under which their own
nationals residing in the country should enjoy
special priyileges and immunities. Among these
privileges was exemption from taxation and
from trial by native courts. These treaties were
called ‘‘ Capitulations and the whole infinitely
complicated system was called The Capitulatory
System.’’ The Powers who enjoyed the benefits
of such treaties were called the ‘‘ Capitulatory
Powers ” as distinct from those smaller Powers
who were outside the system. After the war,
Turkey and Persia abolished the capitulations
with the consent of the Powers.

Casus Belli. A casus belli is an act committed by one
country against another country of such a nature
as to justify war. Thus the invasion of Egypt by a
foreign Power would be regarded by Great Britain
as a casus belli.

Casus Fcederis. A casus foederis is different from the
above. It means some action or event which
brings into operation a particular treaty of alliance
and justifies one party to that treaty in calling upon
another party to come to his assistance. A German
invasion of Czechoslovakia would have constituted
a casus foederis in that the Czech Government
could then have called upon the French and Russian
Governments to fulfil their treaty obligations.

Chancelleries. A confusion is often made between
238

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

the word ‘‘ Chancellery ’’ and the word “ Chan-
cery/’ A chancellery was originally the secretariat
of a chancellor. It is now employed only to
designate those ministers and officials who control,
or advise upon, foreign policy. The phrase The
Chancelleries of Europe ” is in practice indis-
tinguishable from the phrase “ The Foreign Offices
of the Powers.” The word Chancery ” desig-
nates the actual office of a head of a diplomatic
mission, namely his first, second and third secre-
taries, plus the attendant clerks. It is also used
to designate the premises in which they exercise
their functions. A ‘‘ Chancery Servant ” corre-
sponds to the “ Office Messenger ” in a govern-
ment department.

Charg]^ d’affaires. When an ambassador or minister
goes on leave he entrusts the conduct of his mission
to the next senior officer of the staff, either the
counsellor or the first secretary. This official
becomes, for the time being, head' of the mission,
conducts negotiations with the foreign government,
and reports to his own government. On occasions
when it is desired to manifest displeasure with a
foreign government the charge d’affaires is main-
tained for a long period and no successor to the
departed ambassador or minister is appointed.
No agrement is required in the case of a charge
d’affaires.

CoMPROMis D ’Arbitrage. When two countries agree
to submit a dispute to arbitration it may be found
convenient to draw up a compact defining the
course of procedure to be followed. This compact
is called a ‘‘-Compromis d’Arbitrage,” or more
usually a “ Compromis.”

^39

DIPLOMACY

C^JoRDAT. When the Pope signs a treaty with the
head of a State it is called a concordat.” These
treaties begin with the words “ In the name of
the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.” One of
the most striking of recent concordats ^is that
between the Pope and the King of Italy for the
settlement of the'- “ Roman Question,” which
was signed at the Lateran on February ii, 1929.

CoKFERENCE AND CONGRESS. 'There is no accepted
difference between these two words. It is some-
times contended that a congress is a more impor-
tant version of a conference, or that the word
‘‘ congress ” is used when territory is redistributed
after a general war, or when practically all the
Great Powers are represented. History does not
show that such distinctions have been made in
practice, for whereas there was the Congress of
Vienna, the discussion, held in Paris after the
war of 1914-18 was styled a “ conference.” It
might be argued with greater justification that
the word “ conference ” is more applicable to
meetings at which only the victors in a war, or the
directly interested parties, are represented^^ and
that when both the conquered countries and
neutral countries are admitted the word “ con-
gress ” is more correct. Even this distinction
would be questioned by purists.

Convention. A convention is a less important form
of treaty, namely one which is concluded, not
between heads of States, but between governments.

Corps Diplomatique. The diplomatic body in any.
capital is composed of the diplomatic staffs of the
several missions, including the attach^. Consuls
and student interpreters are not generally regarded
240

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

as forming part of the body. The senior aiSRs-
sador or minister becomes the dean ’’ or
‘‘ doyen of the diplomatic body, and represents
them in any disputes affecting their corporate rights
an(J interests.

Counsellor. The senior secretary at an .embassy (and
in exceptional cases at a legation) has the title of
“ Counsellor ” (“ conseiller,’’ “ Botschaftsrat ”).
At important embassies, smch as those in Paris
and Washington, the Counsellor is given the rank
^jrf-Minister. It is he who, in the absence of the
head of a mission, acts as Charge d’Affaires.’’

Credentials. An ambassador or minister is, on being
appointed to a post, provided with Credentials, or
— ^betters of Credence, signed by his sovereign or the
h^d of his State. Until he has formally presented
his letters ’’ he is not officially recognized.

Di^marche. The closest English equivalent for the
expression “ faire une ddmarche ” is “ make
representations,” but it should be remembered
that the word in French covers all , manner of
representations from proposals to threats.

Ui^TENTE. The word “ detente ” is not, as some
^ people suppose, the opposite of ‘‘ entente,” It
simply means “ a relaxation of tension.”

Diploimatic Illness. It is frequently convenient for a
statesman or a negotiator to absent himself from
some ceremony or meeting. In order not to cause
undue offence, he pleads illness. In cases where
this malady is a feigned pretext it is called ‘‘ diplo-
matic.”

Diplomatic Privilege. Members of diplomatic mis-
sions are accorded certain privileges and immunities
in the countries where they reside officially. These
Z41

DIPLOMACY

privileges are given, not merely to the head of the
mission, but to his staff, their wives and families,
and his servants. They include such immunities
as inviolability of person and domicile, exemption
from local taxation and from local crimiiial and
civil jurisdiction. A member of the diplomatic
body cannot be summoned, sued or forced to give
witness in a court of law. He may be asked to
‘‘waive his diplomatic privilege,” but he is not
obliged to comply with such a request. In extreme
cases (which, for diplomatists are a mild race,
are fortunately rare) the government of the country
in which a diplomatist has committed a criminal
offence can demand his recall and can even arrest
him once he has been divested of his official status.
Diplomatic privilege is sometimes .extended to
persons (such as members of the League Secretariat)
who are not technically diplomatists.

En Clair. A telegram is sent either in secret code or
in ordinary language. If the latter, it is called
a telegram “ en clair.” Such messages are sent
when it is intended that the local government
should read the mesisage without undue trouble.

Entente. This expression arose from the phrase
“ entente cordiale ” or “ cordial understanding.”
It implies, as does the new word “ axis,” a similarity
of views and interests between certain coiintries
and an identity of policy upon certain issues. ^It
thus stands half-way between an “ alliance ” and
“ good relations.” During the war and subse-
quently the term was used concretely to describe
those Powers who were united by this form of
understanding, e.g. “ Triple Entente^” “ Balkan
Entente,” etc.

242

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

Excellency. In Great Britain this foolish title is
accorded only to Ambassadors, Viceroys and
Governors -General. In foreign countries it is

extended to Cabinet Ministers and to all those, of
a icertain age and standing, whom it is desired to
please.

Exterritoriality. This word is loosely used to de-
fine the diplomatic privileges and immunities
referred to above. See also under Capitula-
tions.

Extradition. Under the Extradition Treaties in force
between almost every country in the world a
criminal who escapes to a foreign country is
“ extradited ’’ to the country in which the crime
was committed. Political offences do not come
within the scope of extradition treaties and political
fugitives, once they make good their escape, are
granted “ asylum.’’

“ Extraordinary,” In the old days there existed a
distinction between “ ordinary,” or resident ambas-
sadors, and ‘‘ extraordinary ” ambassadors des-
patched on special missions. This led to invidious
distinctions, and all ambassadors are now “ extra-
ordinary.”

Fin De Non Recevoir.” An expression which is used
to describe the diplomatic practice of rejecting an
official complaint without examining into its merits.
When a diplomatist says that his representations
were met by a ‘‘ fin de non recevoir ” he is saying
much the same as “ they absolutely refused to
take up the case.” ^

Full Powers. A negotiator, before he signs an inter-
national treaty, is provided with “ full powers ”
signed and sealed by his sovereign. If he is only

^43

DIPLOMACY

signing a convention his “ full powers ’’ are signed
by the Secretary of State. In Great Britain a royal
“ full power ” assures “ all and singular to whom
these Presents shall come ’’ that reposing especial
Trust, and Confidence in the Wisdom, Loyalty,
Diligence and Circumspection of Our Trusty and
well-beloved Sir X, Y. . . . etc. etc. have named,
made, constituted and appointed him Our . un-
doubted Commissioner, Procurator and Pleni-
potentiary in respect of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.’’

General Act, A General Act is either a summary of *
the conclusions of a conference or detailed regula-
tions deriving from certain principles embodied in
a treaty.

Good Offices. In the event of a controversy or war
arising between two countries it often happens that
a third country uses its “ good offices ” for the
purpose, either of easing the controversy or facili-
tating peace negotiations. Good offices differ
from mediation in degree only. A government
which places its “ good offices ” at the disposal
^ of two conflicting parties is doing little more than

. acting as a channel of communication : mediation is

a far more formal method, and implies that the
mediator will actually conduct negotiations himself.

Guahantee, Treaties of. Certain treaties contain
clauses under which the signatories guarantee their
execution and maintenance. Thus under the
Treaty of London of 1839 we guaranteed the
integrity of Belgium and it was in execution of
this pledge that we made war in 1914. A great
difference exists between a “ collective guarantee ”
and a ‘‘joint and several guarantee.” In the

^44

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

former case (as in the case of our guarantee under
the 1867 Treaty of Luxemburg integrity) a signa-
tory is only obliged to take action if all the other
signatories do the same. Conversely, a “joint
and several ’’ guarantee (as, it was contended, had
been given to Belgium in 1839) obliges every
signatory to take action even if the other signatories
evade or violate their obligations.

Laisser Passer. Officials when travelling on business
are accorded by the embassy of the country which
they intend to visit a letter of recommendation
to the customs authorities. This ensures that their
luggage will not be examined at the frontier,
British missions abroad are discouraged from
granting laisser passers to any but actual officials
when travelling on official business. Other countries
are more generous in granting these facilities.

M^moire. Apart from the formal Notes (see later)
addressed by the. head of a mission to a foreign
government, there are varying types of memoranda
which differ from Notes in that they begin with
no formal introduction and need not be signed.
Several names are given to such documents —
“ pro-m^moria,*’ “ deduction or “ expos6 de
motifs.’’ Another form is the “ aide-m6moire,”
which is a short memorandum handed by an
ambassador to a Foreign Secretary at the end of
an interview in which a short written summary is
given of the oral representations which he has
been instructed to make.

Mise en Demeure. When government faces

government ‘*B” with a curt “ take it or leave it ”
demand, or insists upon a definition of intentions,
it is called a m.e.d.

DIPLOMACY

Modus Vivendi. A name given to a temporary agree- .
ment which it is intended to replace later on by a
more formal and precise convention.

Notes. The ordinary diplomatic Note is a formal
communication from the head of a missfen to a
government which may be written either in the
first or the third person. Variations of the ordinary
Note are : (a) Collective Note. This is a Note
addressed to a government by the representatives
of several States in regard to a matter on which
they have been instructed to make “joint repre-
sentations.” A “ Collective Note ’’ is seldom
signed by all participating ambassadors on the
same sheet, but each ambassador sends in his own
Note, the text being identical. On very solemn
occasions these Notes are presented simultaneously
by the ambassadors concerned, (b) Identic Note.
An “ Identic Note ” is similar to a Collective Note
but less overwhelmingly impressive. The text,
as distinct from the substance, need not be identical
and the Identic Note need not be presented simul-
taneously. (c) Note Verbale. This is a type of
communication which is less formal than a signed
Note and more formal than a memorandum. It
is unsigned, but it is customary that it should
contain at the end some conventional expression
of courtesy. It is, in fact, merely the addition of
this polite tag which differentiates it from the
memoire.'

Persona Grata. When an ambassador or other envoy
becomes intolerably obnoxious to the government
to which he is accredited* it is said that he has
ceased to be a “ persona grata,^’ This amounts
to a request for his recall. Thus Bulwer, who had
246

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

ventured to give advice to the Spanish Government
regarding their internal politics, was asked by
Sotomayor “ to anticipate as much as possible the
leave of absence he was contemplating/' Bulwer
replied that he had no such “ leave of absence "
in his mind. He was then handed his passports
and told to go. Palmerston thereupon broke off
diplomatic relations with Spain and dismissed
the Spanish Minister in London.

Placement. Although the old wrangles about pre-
cedence have diminished in intensity, diplomatists
are still much exercised by the order in which
they sit at a dinner-party. The science of seating
diplomatic guests in such a manner as to avoid
enraging them is called the science of “ placement.”

Prendre Acte is a diplomatic way of saying ‘‘ I shall
take note of this and bring it up against you in the
future.”

Proc^s Verbal. The ‘‘ minutes ” of a conference.
If signed by the participants, such minutes acquire
binding force.

PROTPCOL. Originally a protocol was a 'mere record
of agreement and as such far less formal than a
treaty or’ convention. Yet many very important
^ international compacts have taken this form, not-
ably the agreement signed in 1920 at Geneva
establishing the Permanent Court of International
Justice.

Protocole. There is no exact English translation of
the word “ protocole.” It combines' our “ correct
form of procedure ” and ‘‘ ceremonial.” Thus the
Chef du Protocole abroad corresponds on one side
to our Lord Chamberlain and on the other to the
head of the Treaty Department of the Foreign
247

DIPLOMACY

Office. The adjective ‘‘ protocokire is used for
a stickler for conventional forms.

Raison d'etat. The diplomatic and political theory
under which the interests of the State take pre-
cedence over all private morality. •

Rapporteur. When a committee or sub-committee
has been appointed by a conference to consider
some specific matter, they choose one of their
number to be their spokesman with the main
conference and to present their report. He is
called a “ rapporteur.^’

Recognition, De Facto. When an insurgent is suffi-
ciently successful to establish his administration
over an important area of a country he is usually
recognized by foreign Powers as the de facto ”
or actual, as distinct from the “ de jure,” or legiti-
mate, ruler of that area. Similarly in war a State
occupying and administering large areas of enemy
country is regarded as the “ de facto ” authority
in those areas.

Safe-conduct is permission for an individual to pass
without let or hindrance through the territory of
his country’s enemies. Thus Count Bernstorff in
1917 was given a safe-conduct by the Allies to enable
him to return to Germany from the United States.

Sanctions. Penalties inflicted for a breach of a law
or of the covenant.

Status Quo. The expression “ status quo ” is used to
denote the situation as it existed at a particular
moment. In former diplomatic language, when
referring to territories possessed by a sovereign
at any given date the phrase was ‘‘ uti possidetis”
“ Status quo ante helium” or “ status quo ante ”
merely means the situation as it was before the war.
348

DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE

Treaties. Treaties are either bilateral/’ or concluded
between two countries only, or “ militlateral,”
or concluded between several countries. Treaties
of “ mutual guarantee ” are those international
compacts which, as the Treaties of Locarno, aim
at guaranteeing each signatory against attack from
another.

Ultimatum. The word “ ultimatum ” is sometimes
regarded as meaning ‘‘ declaration of war.” This
is incorrect. It is often merely the last word ”
before a negotiation is broken oif. It generally
takes the form of a written intimation that unless
a satisfactory reply is received by a certain hour
on a certain date certain consequences will follow.
These consequences are not necessarily war. Thus
Palmerston, in the unfortunate affair of Don
Pacifico, presented an ultimatum to Greece in
which he informed them that if they did not ac-
cept his terms within twenty-four hours he would
seize Greek ships and blockade the coasts of Greece.

Under Flying Seal. It often happens that an ambas-
sador in sending a report home to his government
thinks that it would be useful if the information
therein contained were communicated to a colleague
in some other capital. He thus sends the despatch
under flying seal,” which only means that the
second ambassador reads it on its way through.
Thus a despatch from the British Ambassador in
St. Petersburg would, if marked “ under flying
seal to Berlin,” be opened and read on its way
through to the Foreign Office by the British
Ambassador in the latter capital.

Unfriendly Act, When a State wishes to warn other
States that certain actions on their part might

H9

DIPLOMACY

lead to war, it is usual to state that such action
would “ be regarded as an unfriendly act/’

Unilateral Declaration. Occasionally Powers seek
to establish their rights or policy by a declaration
of principle which is communicated to other
Powers for their information and guidance. The
Monroe Doctrine was in effect such a declaration.
A more recent example was Lord Curzon’s circular
Note to the Powers, of March 15, 1922, in which
he warned them that Great Britain “ would not
admit ” the special relations existing between
herself and Egypt to be questioned or discussed
by any other Power and would regard any attempt
at intervention in Egypt as an unfriendly act.”

Venue. This expression is not employed by experi-
enced diplomatists, but is much used by journalists.
It signifies the place where a conference or meeting
is held. It is considered by professional diplo-
matists rather vulgar to use this debased word.

VoEUX. It sometimes happens that a conference wishes
to add to its treaty certain “ recommendations ”
for future good conduct. These are ^called
“ wishes ” or “ voeux.” Thus the Hague Peace
Conference of 1899 emitted six “ voeux.” These
have no binding force upon the signatories.

250

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The standard work on diplomatic practice is Guide
to Diplomatic Practice^ by Sir Ernest Satow. This
admirable work has been revised and brought up to date
in its third edition by Mr. H. Ritchie. Much valuable
information will also be found in the Cambridge History
of British Foreign Policy.

Other books recommended are : /

TJie Diplomatist^ by Jules Cambon.

Diplomacy and Peace y by Professor R. B. Mowat.

Enfances diplomatiques, by W. d’Ormesson.

Envoys Extraordinary y by Edmund d’ Auvergne.

The Foreign Office, by Sir John Tilley.

Foundations of British Foreign Policy, by Temperley
and Penson.

International Relations, by Professor R. B. Mowat.

The Spirit of British Policy, by Professor Kantorowicz.

Our Foreign Affairs, by Paul Scott Mowrer.

Traitd de diplomatic, by Count Szilassy.

Vatican Diplomacy, by Count de Salis.

School of Ambassadors, by Jusserand.

251

INDEX

Abyssinia, 189, 190
Aerenthal, Count, 78, 147
Alexander I, 71
Alexander II, 67
Alexander, King of Serbia,
19s

Alexander the Great, 4s
Algeciras Conference, 198
Alphand, M,, 317
Ambassadors, 31-3, 178-98
— duties of, 195-8
American diplomatists,
138-30

Ami 5 hictyonic _ Councils,
40-1,157"

Angels as first diplomatists,

17

Archickmus, King, speech
at^ Sparta Conference,
38-40

Archivists, 27

Balance of Power, 135, 138,

15^

Barr^re, 150

Bernstorff, Count, 140, 141,
248

Berthelot, 150
Bethmann-Hollweg, 79,
107

Bismarck, Prince, 60, 67,

73>74. 97,149, 168

Boccaccio, 30

Boleyn, Sir Thomas, 30
Brest-Litovsk, Conference
of, 58

Briand, 158

British Commonwealth of
Nations, 174-7
British diplomacy, 131-44
British Foreign Office, 38
British Foreign Service,
302-35

Bryce, Lord, 185
Bfilow, Prince, 78, 107,
108, 133 , 140, 141, 168
Bulwer, 75, 193, 246, 247
Burke, Edmund, 28
Byzantine diplomacy, 24-5

Callkres, M. de, 108, 109,
121-2, 124, 125-6
Cambon, Jules, 57-9, 79,
no, 118, 150

Cambon, Paul, 117, ii8,

150

Camden, Lord, iiz
Canning, 73, 75, 88, 97,
136, 168

Canning, Stratford. See
Stratford de Redcliffe,
Lord

Catherine II, 60, 62-3
Cavour, Count, 60, 97
Cecil, Lord, 205
Chancellor, 27

»S3

INDEX

Chauvelin, 188-9, 193
Christian IX, 66
Civii Service, 81-3
Clarendon, Lord, 305, 306
Clemenceau, 69, 83, 300
Commerce, 50-1, 163-6
Concert of Europe, 73
Congress of Vienna, 38,

Crewe, Lord, 185
Crispi, 60

Crowe, Sir Eyre, 133-4, 194
Curzon, Lord, 158, 193,
I99> ^50

D’Abernon, Lord, 185
Dante, 30
Dawes Plan, 159
Derby, Lord, 185
Despatches, 193-6
Diplomacy, democratic,
80-103

— meaningof term, 13-16,

36

— origins of organized, 9-

33

— transition from the old

to the new, 56-79

— types of European, 137^

153

Diplomatic language, 336-
350

— practice, recent' changes

in, 154-^7 ;

— procedure, points of,

178-301

— Service, 303-35

— theory, development of,

34-55

Diplomatist, ideal, 104-36
Diplomatists and poli-
ticians, 38

Diplomatists, worst kind of

50

Draga, Queen, 193

Edward VII, 65-6
Elliot, 75
Envoys, 179-88
Ethiopia, 189, 190

Fichte, 146

Foreign Affairs Committee,
161

Frederick the Great, 60,
106, 136

French diplomacy, 150-1
— language in diplomacy,
330-3

George, David Lloyd, 83,
95, 166, 301, 331
German diplomacy, 144-50
Gladstone, Wm. E., 67, 73,

137

Glossary, 334-50
Gounaris, M., 193
Grandi, 153

Granville, Lord, 305, 307
Greek diplomatic -confet-
ence at Sparta, 31-3
Grenville, Lord, 188
Grey, Lord, 85, 138, 305, 33 1
Grotius, 36
Guicciardini, 30
Guide to Diplomatic Prac^
ticoy A, by Sir E.
Satow, 334, 351
Guizot, M., 1 14

Hankey, Sir lylaurice, 155,
157

Harris, Sir James (Lord
Malmesbury), 61-4,

75, III-I 3

^54

INDEX

Hegel, 146

'Heine, Heinrich, 139
Heralds, 20
Hermes, 19, 38
Herriot, M., 159
Hitler, Adolf, 60, 169, 170,

171

Holstein, Fritz von, 149

Imperial Conference of
1926, i74“7
International Law, 36
Iswolsky, 78
Italian city states, 29
— diplomacy, 15 1-3

James I, 44
Jusserand, 150
Justin II, 18
Justinian, 25

Kantorowicz, Dr., 138, 139
Kaunitz, Count, 71
Kiderlen-Waechter, Count
von, 1 18

Korsakoff, M., 63

Lansdowne, Lord, 205, 208
Lausanne Conference,
1922-3, 199
Law of Nations,” 36
League of Nations, 172-4
Lichnowsky^ Prince, 149
Lloyd George, David. See
George, pavid Lloyd
Locarno, Treaties of, 249
London, Treaty of, 88,
244

Louis XIV, 60, 90, 180
Louis XVI, 188-9
Luxemburg, Treaty of, 245

MacDonald, James Ram-
say, 159

Macdonell Committee, 204
Machiavelli, Niccolb, 30,
45-6, III

Maggi, Ottaviano, 106
Malmesbury, Lord, 61-4,
75, 111-12

Mantoux, Professor, 231
Margaria, Eusebio, 30
Mensdorff, Count, 140
Mettemich, Count, 71, 73,
H7, 168

Milan, Duke of, 30
Monroe Doctrine, 250
Morocco, Sultan of, 117 %

Mowat, Professor R. B.,
34-5, 147

Mussolini, Benito, 60, 170,
189

Napoleon, 117
Naval Disarmament Con-
* ference, 1926, 159
Nicholas, Emperor, 236
Nicholas, Tsar, 65
Normanby, Lord, 114

“ Official lie,” 44
Orlando, Signor, 170, 201
Overseas Trade, Depart-
ment of, 221

Pacifico, Don, 249
Palaeography, 27
Palmerston, Lord, 73, 97,
136, 247, 249
Panin, 63

Paris Conference, 84, 181,
200

Petrarch, 30
Phillips, W. Alison, 106

INDEX

Pitt, 1 88, 203
Plastiras, Colonel, 192
Poincar6, M., 158
Politicians and diplomat-
ists, 38

Polpreds,’’ 58-9
Potemkin, 63, 64
Precedence, 179-84
Press, importance and
power of, 167-72

— relations of, and govern-

ment, 97-100
Prince^ The^ 45“6
Propaganda, 168-72

— sums spent on, X71-2

Rapallo, Treaty of, 59
Ratification, 86-8
Regulus, 23
Ritchie, H., 234, 251
Roman doctrine of the
validity of contracts,

n

Rousseau, 81
Russell, Lord John, 135

St. Quentin, M. de, 189-90
Salisbury, Lord, 194
Salter, Sir Arthur, 156
Satow, Sir Ernest, 50, 227,
234, 251

Savoy, Duke of, 30
Scoones, Mr., 207
Sforza, 153

Sieburg, Friedrich, 145,
146

Smith, Sir Charles Euan,
117

Sonnino, Baron, iii
Sotomayor, 247

Sparta Conference, 22, 38
Squires, Mr., 169
Stinnes, Herr, 117
Stolypin, 79

Stratford de Redcliffe,
Lord, 203, 236
Stresemann, 158
Szilassy, Count, 107, 108

Talleyrand, 61, 116
Tattenbach, Count, 117
Terms used in diplomatic
language, 234-50 .

Thomas, Albert, 166
Thucydides, 21-2
Times, The, 97, 99
Trade, 50-1
Treaties, 84-7
Triple Alliance, 85

Ulysses, 38

Versailles, Treaty of, 83, 88
Victoria, Queen, 66
Vienna, Congress of, 28,
203

Wellington, Duke of, 234
West, Bishop Nicolas, 30
William II, 60, 64
Wilson, President, 35, 40,
68-9, 83, 84, 170, 201,
231

Wireless as propaganda,
169-70

' World - Economic Confer-
ence of 1933, 159
Wotton, Sir Henry, 44, 45

Zerbst, Princess of, 106

Printed by Tbe Eiverside Press, Edinburgh